Aceh factor in RI-Sweden relations<\/p>\n
Bantarto Bandoro, Editor, 'The Indonesian Quarterly',
\nCentre For Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),
\nJakarta, bandoro@csis.or.id<\/p>\n
Sweden was among the first countries to recognize Indonesia's
\nindependence in 1947. Since Sweden opened its embassy here in
\nJakarta in 1950, Indonesian-Swedish bilateral relations were
\nalmost without problems. Even when the Free Aceh Movement (GAM)
\nwas established in 1976 and its top leaders flew to Sweden,
\nIndonesian-Swedish bilateral relations were hardly touched by the
\nGAM issue.<\/p>\n
The backbone of Indonesian-Swedish relations has always been
\nin trade and industrial contacts. Everyone here recognizes
\nSwedish products such as Sony Ericsson telephone handsets and
\nElectrolux home appliances, and Indonesian women will associate
\nquality cosmetic products with Oriflame. Indonesians here also
\nlisten to Swedish music, such as Roxette, Eagle-Eye Cherry and A-
\nteens. Over in Sweden, people use Indonesian products, wear
\nIndonesian-made clothes and enjoy excellent Indonesian
\npineapples. Thousands of people travel between the two countries
\nevery year.<\/p>\n
No one had ever thought before that the Aceh integrated
\noperation initiated by the government of Indonesia would touch
\nupon the basic foundation of Indonesia's relations with Sweden.
\nIt is a political reality now that the GAM issue has dragged
\nIndonesia and Sweden into a mire of competing interests.<\/p>\n
Indonesia seems to be on the offensive, demanding that Sweden
\nlegally reprimand its citizens for leading GAM's independence
\ndrive in a sovereign country. The government of Indonesia has
\neven threatened to downgrade its diplomatic ties with Sweden,
\nunless the Swedish government takes legal steps against Swedish
\nGAM leaders there. Sweden has made it clear that it will take no
\naction against the Acehnese unless they break Swedish law.<\/p>\n
At present, a delegation from Indonesia, led by former foreign
\nminister Ali Alatas, is again in Sweden, taking along with it
\nfurther evidence, allegedly of the involvement of GAM leaders in
\nSweden in a series of acts of terror in Indonesia, in its fourth
\nattempt to pressure the Swedish government to take steps against
\nGAM's top leaders. Many here, however, doubt that the team will
\nbe successful in pressuring the Swedish government. Will the
\nSwedish government bow to Indonesia's request after seeing the
\nevidence?<\/p>\n
If Indonesia continues to press for Sweden's cooperation but
\nthe latter objects, Indonesia's steps could fuel a political and
\nlegal retaliation from Sweden that might bring the Aceh issue to
\nan international forum, with allegations of human rights abuse
\nbeing made. If that were to happen, it could be counterproductive
\nfor Indonesia. This would mean that Indonesia, through its own
\naction, would have created a new front it needed to defend, thus
\nadding to the country's diplomatic burdens.<\/p>\n
One may question the government's belated move to raise the
\nissue of GAM's leaders living in Sweden. It is a political fact
\nthat they have been living there for years and are also known for
\ntheir political and financial support of GAM. So, why has the
\ngovernment raised the issue only recently? Perhaps, by doing so,
\nthe government was expecting international support for its
\nintegrated operation after a series of negotiations with GAM had
\nended in failure.<\/p>\n
What is so interesting about the current state of affairs in
\nIndonesian-Swedish bilateral relations is that on the diplomatic
\nfront the talks between them may lead to a standoff if both are
\nunwilling to yield to the other's requests. Whether the policy of
\nIndonesia, in sending a team to Sweden, may change fundamentally
\nthe position of Sweden and thus the climate of the current
\nbilateral relations will mostly depend on the response of the
\nSwedish government and the way the government of Indonesia
\nperceives the response of Sweden.<\/p>\n
By presenting evidence to the Swedish government, the
\ngovernment in Jakarta is indeed expecting a positive response
\nfrom Sweden. Thus, the evidence itself is playing a part in
\ninfluencing the position of the Swedish government. Not only
\nthis. The ability of Ali Alatas' team to convince Sweden that
\nGAM's leaders with Swedish citizenship were instrumental in
\ndriving GAM to demand independence will also be another important
\ndeterminant in the way Sweden reacts to the request of Indonesia.<\/p>\n
In this diplomatic game between Indonesia and Sweden, one,
\nhowever, may conclude that the perception of the Swedish
\ngovernment of evidence presented by Indonesia and Sweden's
\nassessment of overall bilateral relations with Indonesia will
\nplay the most significant role in determining the success or
\nfailure of Indonesian diplomacy. The response made by Sweden that
\nthe GAM leaders have not violated any Swedish laws is a very
\nclear initial indication that Sweden's position is unlikely to
\nchange.<\/p>\n
Being an independent and law-abiding state, Sweden will
\ndefinitely not sacrifice its national interest, which is to
\nuphold and respect the law, simply to yield to the request of
\nIndonesia. It is understandable that Sweden has ranked bilateral
\nrelations as a lower priority than protecting its citizens.<\/p>\n
The above assessment again may lead one to be pessimistic
\nabout the effectiveness of Indonesian diplomacy toward Sweden as
\nthe latter has continued to stress that it will follows its
\nlegislation, which does not allow it to expel its citizens. There
\nis a probability that Ali Alatas' team might lose face, because
\nit could end up with nothing. We shall then see whether Indonesia
\nwill act on its threat of severing diplomatic ties with Sweden.<\/p>",
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