A model for an antiguerrilla war of attrition

A model for an antiguerrilla war of attrition

By W. Waller

CIANJUR, West Java (JP): The remarks by Akbar Tandjung,
speaker of the House of Representatives, last month that "if the
separatists (in Aceh) mix with locals ... greater civilian
casualties will be inevitable", raises some fundamental
questions. Why does this have to be? What is wrong in Aceh
that so many innocent civilians are being killed? Why did the
insurrection in East Timor continue the whole period of the
Indonesian occupation? And why is the same thing now happening in
Aceh?

Under the Soeharto regime, East Timor and Aceh only made the
news when separatist forces killed Army or policemen; the extent
of their reprisals against Indonesian citizens was never
mentioned. But we are now coming to realize that the Army and
police have been waging a total war against the whole of both
provinces. They have been at war with their own country.

This same warfare should not continue in Aceh. We must
persuade the Army and the police that their tactics are all
wrong; that unless they can prove that kampongs are separatist
enclaves, they can no longer send in regiments of soldiers to
destroy the kampongs and murder their inhabitants.

We often hear the excuse from spokesmen that the soldiers were
"angry" at the deaths of fellow soldiers. Such talk is
unacceptable. Whatever the type of warfare, there will always
be killing. Properly trained soldiers will know how to use their
anger and grief to make even greater efforts to find the real
enemy.

The history of guerrilla warfare is a history of
improvisation, and every war is different. Each is invariably
fought to drive out an enemy who occupies the guerrillas'
country, with the odds in numbers of soldiers very much against
the guerrillas. Time and again, in history, the occupier has
tried to use his overwhelming numbers to push the opposing forces
out, only to find that as the opposition "disappears", guerrilla
forces attack to the rear.

The only winners against guerrillas are those who have adopted
guerrilla tactics -- who use part of their forces to do the
fighting and the remainder to garrison towns and strategic
resources such as oil refineries and industrial complexes.

One very successful campaign in which occupying forces won
against guerrilla troops occurred in British Malaya at the end of
World War II. A self-styled Communist army had declared war on
the British and, at first, was very successful using guerrilla
tactics.

Up to that time, most guerrilla wars had been fought in the
mountainous areas of Europe and the Middle East, but Malaysian
terrain is typified by jungle-covered mountains and lowlands. The
British had been humiliated in 1941 when the Japanese took the
whole of Malaya in 10 days, and they had learned their lessons
well.

The Japanese won in 1941 by taking the easiest way they could
from north to south of the country, using the jungle paths and
minor secondary roads, and ignoring the main strong points. They
then concentrated on taking remaining isolated strong points with
comparatively little struggle. These tactics of using the jungle
and maintaining strong points were adapted to fight the Communist
army.

Briefly, the British tactics involved two factors. One was the
protection of the population and the prevention of its use as a
supplier of food and guns. Kampungs all over the country were
enclosed with barbed wire fences and searchlights, and many were
garrisoned with soldiers to protect the perimeter and the paddy
fields. Everyone had an identity card and was subject to a dusk-
to-dawn curfew within the fence. There was really only one rule
-- stay inside or be shot without warning.

This was the maxim for the second factor, the prevention of
the free movement of the guerrilla-enemy. Soldiers took up ambush
positions on the jungle paths, as well as on main and secondary
roads, with orders to shoot without warning. Once both factors
were working, the random ambushes on small towns quickly died
away.

The guerrillas found themselves at a disadvantage and, denied
easy access to food, had to take increased risks. As a colonial
people, the local population were not the British army's best
allies, but the penalties for helping the guerrillas were so
harsh that most of the food that did reach the guerrillas had
been coerced by force.

With this model for fighting a guerrilla war in jungle
terrain, the original questions asked at the beginning of this
article becomes even more pertinent. Many of the best of
Indonesia's Army officers have been trained at Army staff
colleges in the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia
where they must have learned about jungle warfare.

Why was the method outlined above not adapted for use in Aceh
and East Timor?

It must have been obvious, right from the very beginning, that
the numbers of Indonesian men and women so convinced of their
right to self-rule that they would leave the safety of their
homes and become guerrillas, would be very small. A much larger
number would be secret sympathizers, but the only way to discover
them would be for the Army to employ informants and spies.

By following the Malayan model above, by enclosing remote
kampongs and imposing curfews, the large-scale movements of
guerrilla troops would then be clearly discreet from villagers'
movements. Further, military patrols protecting the villagers
would then have legitimate targets, and not entire and innocent
villages.

Of course, such a war of attrition is costly in terms of the
numbers of men employed, but Indonesia has a large, unemployed
population. Properly trained in the need for a unified Indonesia
and in human rights, a freshly recruited army of compulsory
national servicemen could well break the habits of career-minded
Army men. The introduction of this Malayan model of antiguerrilla
warfare may well bring an end to the conflict in Aceh.

All good government is with the consent of the governed, but
if the Aceh separatists refuse to come to the negotiating table,
then the method of counteracting them must change. We must see an
end to the almost daily reports of the terrible loss of life in
ambushes and the even more terrible reprisals that the
authorities take on the local people.

Once the antiguerrilla model described above is implemented,
the Army and the police will quickly discover, as did the British
in Malaya, that the Acehnese who are loyal to their nation will
join the crusade for Indonesia. Most importantly, they will get
the guerrillas out of the towns and kampongs, relegating them to
remote jungles without access to food or arms.

The writer was a base camp National Serviceman in British
occupied Malaya and now resides in Cianjur, West Java.