A model for an antiguerrilla war of attrition<\/p>\n
By W. Waller<\/p>\n
CIANJUR, West Java (JP): The remarks by Akbar Tandjung,
\nspeaker of the House of Representatives, last month that \"if the
\nseparatists (in Aceh) mix with locals ... greater civilian
\ncasualties will be inevitable\", raises some fundamental
\nquestions. Why does this have to be? What is wrong in Aceh
\nthat so many innocent civilians are being killed? Why did the
\ninsurrection in East Timor continue the whole period of the
\nIndonesian occupation? And why is the same thing now happening in
\nAceh?<\/p>\n
Under the Soeharto regime, East Timor and Aceh only made the
\nnews when separatist forces killed Army or policemen; the extent
\nof their reprisals against Indonesian citizens was never
\nmentioned. But we are now coming to realize that the Army and
\npolice have been waging a total war against the whole of both
\nprovinces. They have been at war with their own country.<\/p>\n
This same warfare should not continue in Aceh. We must
\npersuade the Army and the police that their tactics are all
\nwrong; that unless they can prove that kampongs are separatist
\nenclaves, they can no longer send in regiments of soldiers to
\ndestroy the kampongs and murder their inhabitants.<\/p>\n
We often hear the excuse from spokesmen that the soldiers were
\n\"angry\" at the deaths of fellow soldiers. Such talk is
\nunacceptable. Whatever the type of warfare, there will always
\nbe killing. Properly trained soldiers will know how to use their
\nanger and grief to make even greater efforts to find the real
\nenemy.<\/p>\n
The history of guerrilla warfare is a history of
\nimprovisation, and every war is different. Each is invariably
\nfought to drive out an enemy who occupies the guerrillas'
\ncountry, with the odds in numbers of soldiers very much against
\nthe guerrillas. Time and again, in history, the occupier has
\ntried to use his overwhelming numbers to push the opposing forces
\nout, only to find that as the opposition \"disappears\", guerrilla
\nforces attack to the rear.<\/p>\n
The only winners against guerrillas are those who have adopted
\nguerrilla tactics -- who use part of their forces to do the
\nfighting and the remainder to garrison towns and strategic
\nresources such as oil refineries and industrial complexes.<\/p>\n
One very successful campaign in which occupying forces won
\nagainst guerrilla troops occurred in British Malaya at the end of
\nWorld War II. A self-styled Communist army had declared war on
\nthe British and, at first, was very successful using guerrilla
\ntactics.<\/p>\n
Up to that time, most guerrilla wars had been fought in the
\nmountainous areas of Europe and the Middle East, but Malaysian
\nterrain is typified by jungle-covered mountains and lowlands. The
\nBritish had been humiliated in 1941 when the Japanese took the
\nwhole of Malaya in 10 days, and they had learned their lessons
\nwell.<\/p>\n
The Japanese won in 1941 by taking the easiest way they could
\nfrom north to south of the country, using the jungle paths and
\nminor secondary roads, and ignoring the main strong points. They
\nthen concentrated on taking remaining isolated strong points with
\ncomparatively little struggle. These tactics of using the jungle
\nand maintaining strong points were adapted to fight the Communist
\narmy.<\/p>\n
Briefly, the British tactics involved two factors. One was the
\nprotection of the population and the prevention of its use as a
\nsupplier of food and guns. Kampungs all over the country were
\nenclosed with barbed wire fences and searchlights, and many were
\ngarrisoned with soldiers to protect the perimeter and the paddy
\nfields. Everyone had an identity card and was subject to a dusk-
\nto-dawn curfew within the fence. There was really only one rule
\n-- stay inside or be shot without warning.<\/p>\n
This was the maxim for the second factor, the prevention of
\nthe free movement of the guerrilla-enemy. Soldiers took up ambush
\npositions on the jungle paths, as well as on main and secondary
\nroads, with orders to shoot without warning. Once both factors
\nwere working, the random ambushes on small towns quickly died
\naway.<\/p>\n
The guerrillas found themselves at a disadvantage and, denied
\neasy access to food, had to take increased risks. As a colonial
\npeople, the local population were not the British army's best
\nallies, but the penalties for helping the guerrillas were so
\nharsh that most of the food that did reach the guerrillas had
\nbeen coerced by force.<\/p>\n
With this model for fighting a guerrilla war in jungle
\nterrain, the original questions asked at the beginning of this
\narticle becomes even more pertinent. Many of the best of
\nIndonesia's Army officers have been trained at Army staff
\ncolleges in the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia
\nwhere they must have learned about jungle warfare.<\/p>\n
Why was the method outlined above not adapted for use in Aceh
\nand East Timor?<\/p>\n
It must have been obvious, right from the very beginning, that
\nthe numbers of Indonesian men and women so convinced of their
\nright to self-rule that they would leave the safety of their
\nhomes and become guerrillas, would be very small. A much larger
\nnumber would be secret sympathizers, but the only way to discover
\nthem would be for the Army to employ informants and spies.<\/p>\n
By following the Malayan model above, by enclosing remote
\nkampongs and imposing curfews, the large-scale movements of
\nguerrilla troops would then be clearly discreet from villagers'
\nmovements. Further, military patrols protecting the villagers
\nwould then have legitimate targets, and not entire and innocent
\nvillages.<\/p>\n
Of course, such a war of attrition is costly in terms of the
\nnumbers of men employed, but Indonesia has a large, unemployed
\npopulation. Properly trained in the need for a unified Indonesia
\nand in human rights, a freshly recruited army of compulsory
\nnational servicemen could well break the habits of career-minded
\nArmy men. The introduction of this Malayan model of antiguerrilla
\nwarfare may well bring an end to the conflict in Aceh.<\/p>\n
All good government is with the consent of the governed, but
\nif the Aceh separatists refuse to come to the negotiating table,
\nthen the method of counteracting them must change. We must see an
\nend to the almost daily reports of the terrible loss of life in
\nambushes and the even more terrible reprisals that the
\nauthorities take on the local people.<\/p>\n
Once the antiguerrilla model described above is implemented,
\nthe Army and the police will quickly discover, as did the British
\nin Malaya, that the Acehnese who are loyal to their nation will
\njoin the crusade for Indonesia. Most importantly, they will get
\nthe guerrillas out of the towns and kampongs, relegating them to
\nremote jungles without access to food or arms.<\/p>\n
The writer was a base camp National Serviceman in British
\noccupied Malaya and now resides in Cianjur, West Java.<\/p>",
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