A Japanese security role in Southeast Asia?

A Japanese security role in Southeast Asia?

There are several scenarios that could lead to a Japanese security role in the region

By Lee Poh Ping

The recent visit to Japan by American President Bill Clinton has led to a reaffirmation of the U.S.-Japan security agreement which had been thought to be in danger of unraveling as a result of the Okinawa rape incident. That visit has also opened the possibility that the scope of the agreement could be widened to allow for more specific American-Japanese military co-operation in the Far East outside Japan, a subject previous Japanese governments have approached with the greatest of caution.

Such caution is understandable as many Japanese believe that the security agreement is essentially bilateral, which only obligates the United States to defend their country. Any attempt to broaden the definition of the defense of Japan to include the deployment of its forces overseas for offensive purposes would, in the eyes of many of its people, violate article nine of the country's constitution.

Some of them might even go so far as to argue that any attempt to amend or abolish article nine involves not merely the question of the legal or constitutional facilitation of military moves necessary for the defense of their country but also that of the redefinition of the post-war Japanese state, as such abolition could lead down the slippery slope of Japanese militarism.

Whatever the substance and terms of the Japanese debate, this is an opportune moment for ASEAN to consider what its reactions would be to the question of a Japanese security role in South- east Asia.

There is first an almost unanimous ASEAN belief that a Japanese security role should be defined very broadly, a definition that would not necessarily involve a military role. This belief was quite well summed up in 1973 by a very influential Indonesian general, the late Ali Moertopo, who, when referring to an American call for Japan to share the military burden, said that any such Japanese sharing should not necessarily introduce a military element to Japanese relations with South-east Asia.

According to him, the security and stability of South-east Asia was not a purely military affair. What he meant was that Japan could best help South-east Asian security through the prism of economics. This would involve not only more aid, but better terms in economic relations such as a greater transfer of technology, better market access and so on. An economically strong South-east Asia is the best guarantee of stability in the area, which in turn better ensures the protection of Japanese interests than, for example, the dispatch of troops.

While many Japanese will agree with this approach, there is an increasing feeling among them as well as South-east Asians that the actual military component, specifically Japanese security co- operation with ASEAN, has to be factored into the debate. That being the case, one way of analyzing the ASEAN attitude is by resorting to computer terminology, distinguishing between "software" co-operation, not involving the dispatch of troops, and "hardware" co-operation which allows for such dispatch.

The Japanese approach in the past had been of the software variety, basically involving strategic aid (aid that is indirectly related to military considerations), and the exchange of military personnel and information. This was acceptable to most South-east Asians. However, many ASEAN countries would want the Japanese to go further such as in the transfer of military technology or armaments sold at concessionary rates. Japan has so far not entertained such requests.

Though there is strictly speaking no constitutional prohibition in Japan against such transfer or sale, the Japanese government remains sensitive to possible domestic criticism that it may be abandoning the policy of Japan as a peace-loving nation if it did so.

Nevertheless, it must be said vis-a-vis the U.S., Japan under Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone did transfer some military technology and had allowed its scientists to take part in the Reagan Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or "Star Wars" program. Presumably, U.S.-Japan relations are sui generis. What may be permitted in this relationship may not be allowed in Japan's relations with other countries, including ASEAN.

As to hardware co-operation, one can conceive of various scenarios. The first involves the unilateral dispatch of Japanese troops to South-east Asia to solve what security problems that might arise. Such dispatch would be outside any multilateral or bilateral framework and decided basically by Japan alone. Such a move for now will not be welcome at all by ASEAN, whatever the justification. In all ASEAN discussions on Japan's security role, there has been no significant body of opinion which has advocated such a move.

A second scenario involves Japan collaborating with either an ASEAN country or with ASEAN collectively. The former was actually suggested in 1990 by the then Thai prime minister Chatichai Choonhavan who wanted Thailand and Japan to cooperate in joint military exercises. This was heavily criticized in Singapore. On their part, the Japanese did not welcome it.

A third scenario consists of Japanese security involvement as part of a multilateral endeavor, specifically under United Nations auspices. Here a distinction, insisted on by many Japanese, has to be made between Japanese participation in peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations. The former involves such situations where ceasefires have already been declared such as in the case of the UN force in Cambodia. After much emotional debate, Japan accepted participation in Cambodia. So ASEAN has similarly accepted this Japanese participation.

But peace enforcement such as UN involvement in the Korean War or Gulf War situations are a different kettle of fish for the Japanese. So far there has been no such Japanese involvement. If there were to be such participation, ASEAN would probably accept it as it would be in keeping with the ASEAN call for Japan to take on more international responsibilities.

There remains the scenario of Japanese troops co-operating with the Americans to address security problems in South-east Asia. There is as yet no framework for such co-operation. For the present, it is unlikely that the U.S.-Japan security agreement could be so widely interpreted as to allow for this possibility. Even the Hashimoto government specifically ruled out South-east Asia as part of the "Asia-Pacific" included in the widening of the agreement during Clinton's visit. Yet, Japan once considered a mini-Marshall plan for the Philippines which was negotiating with the U.S. over the future of American bases. It was believed that such Japanese funding would help "stabilize" the Philippines so as to make it easier for the retention of the American bases.

Future bilateral Japanese-American security co-operation in South-east Asia thus cannot be ruled out. Whether it will involve the dispatch of Japanese troops alongside with the Americans remains to be seen. The possibility is remote, but if it happens, the ASEAN reaction will depend on the circumstances.

In sum, most South-east Asians now appear to be reconciling themselves to the inevitability of a Japanese security role in the region. The feeling is widespread that this role will be better fulfilled with Japanese participation in some multilateral framework. There is little support for any unilateral Japanese role.

Dr. Lee Poh Ping is Professor at the Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya.