A Japanese security role in Southeast Asia?

A Japanese security role in Southeast Asia?

There are several scenarios that could lead to a Japanese
security role in the region

By Lee Poh Ping

The recent visit to Japan by American President Bill Clinton
has led to a reaffirmation of the U.S.-Japan security agreement
which had been thought to be in danger of unraveling as a result
of the Okinawa rape incident. That visit has also opened the
possibility that the scope of the agreement could be widened to
allow for more specific American-Japanese military co-operation
in the Far East outside Japan, a subject previous Japanese
governments have approached with the greatest of caution.

Such caution is understandable as many Japanese believe that
the security agreement is essentially bilateral, which only
obligates the United States to defend their country. Any attempt
to broaden the definition of the defense of Japan to include the
deployment of its forces overseas for offensive purposes would,
in the eyes of many of its people, violate article nine of the
country's constitution.

Some of them might even go so far as to argue that any attempt
to amend or abolish article nine involves not merely the question
of the legal or constitutional facilitation of military moves
necessary for the defense of their country but also that of the
redefinition of the post-war Japanese state, as such abolition
could lead down the slippery slope of Japanese militarism.

Whatever the substance and terms of the Japanese debate, this
is an opportune moment for ASEAN to consider what its reactions
would be to the question of a Japanese security role in South-
east Asia.

There is first an almost unanimous ASEAN belief that a
Japanese security role should be defined very broadly, a
definition that would not necessarily involve a military role.
This belief was quite well summed up in 1973 by a very
influential Indonesian general, the late Ali Moertopo, who, when
referring to an American call for Japan to share the military
burden, said that any such Japanese sharing should not
necessarily introduce a military element to Japanese relations
with South-east Asia.

According to him, the security and stability of South-east
Asia was not a purely military affair. What he meant was that
Japan could best help South-east Asian security through the prism
of economics. This would involve not only more aid, but better
terms in economic relations such as a greater transfer of
technology, better market access and so on. An economically
strong South-east Asia is the best guarantee of stability in the
area, which in turn better ensures the protection of Japanese
interests than, for example, the dispatch of troops.

While many Japanese will agree with this approach, there is an
increasing feeling among them as well as South-east Asians that
the actual military component, specifically Japanese security co-
operation with ASEAN, has to be factored into the debate. That
being the case, one way of analyzing the ASEAN attitude is by
resorting to computer terminology, distinguishing between
"software" co-operation, not involving the dispatch of troops,
and "hardware" co-operation which allows for such dispatch.

The Japanese approach in the past had been of the software
variety, basically involving strategic aid (aid that is
indirectly related to military considerations), and the exchange
of military personnel and information. This was acceptable to
most South-east Asians. However, many ASEAN countries would want
the Japanese to go further such as in the transfer of military
technology or armaments sold at concessionary rates. Japan has so
far not entertained such requests.

Though there is strictly speaking no constitutional
prohibition in Japan against such transfer or sale, the Japanese
government remains sensitive to possible domestic criticism that
it may be abandoning the policy of Japan as a peace-loving nation
if it did so.

Nevertheless, it must be said vis-a-vis the U.S., Japan under
Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone did transfer some military
technology and had allowed its scientists to take part in the
Reagan Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or
"Star Wars" program. Presumably, U.S.-Japan relations are sui
generis. What may be permitted in this relationship may not be
allowed in Japan's relations with other countries, including
ASEAN.

As to hardware co-operation, one can conceive of various
scenarios. The first involves the unilateral dispatch of Japanese
troops to South-east Asia to solve what security problems that
might arise. Such dispatch would be outside any multilateral or
bilateral framework and decided basically by Japan alone. Such a
move for now will not be welcome at all by ASEAN, whatever the
justification. In all ASEAN discussions on Japan's security role,
there has been no significant body of opinion which has advocated
such a move.

A second scenario involves Japan collaborating with either an
ASEAN country or with ASEAN collectively. The former was actually
suggested in 1990 by the then Thai prime minister Chatichai
Choonhavan who wanted Thailand and Japan to cooperate in joint
military exercises. This was heavily criticized in Singapore. On
their part, the Japanese did not welcome it.

A third scenario consists of Japanese security involvement as
part of a multilateral endeavor, specifically under United
Nations auspices. Here a distinction, insisted on by many
Japanese, has to be made between Japanese participation in
peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations. The
former involves such situations where ceasefires have already
been declared such as in the case of the UN force in Cambodia.
After much emotional debate, Japan accepted participation in
Cambodia. So ASEAN has similarly accepted this Japanese
participation.

But peace enforcement such as UN involvement in the Korean
War or Gulf War situations are a different kettle of fish for the
Japanese. So far there has been no such Japanese involvement. If
there were to be such participation, ASEAN would probably accept
it as it would be in keeping with the ASEAN call for Japan to
take on more international responsibilities.

There remains the scenario of Japanese troops co-operating
with the Americans to address security problems in South-east
Asia. There is as yet no framework for such co-operation. For the
present, it is unlikely that the U.S.-Japan security agreement
could be so widely interpreted as to allow for this possibility.
Even the Hashimoto government specifically ruled out South-east
Asia as part of the "Asia-Pacific" included in the widening of
the agreement during Clinton's visit. Yet, Japan once considered
a mini-Marshall plan for the Philippines which was negotiating
with the U.S. over the future of American bases. It was believed
that such Japanese funding would help "stabilize" the Philippines
so as to make it easier for the retention of the American bases.

Future bilateral Japanese-American security co-operation in
South-east Asia thus cannot be ruled out. Whether it will involve
the dispatch of Japanese troops alongside with the Americans
remains to be seen. The possibility is remote, but if it happens,
the ASEAN reaction will depend on the circumstances.

In sum, most South-east Asians now appear to be reconciling
themselves to the inevitability of a Japanese security role in
the region. The feeling is widespread that this role will be
better fulfilled with Japanese participation in some multilateral
framework. There is little support for any unilateral Japanese
role.

Dr. Lee Poh Ping is Professor at the Faculty of Economics and
Administration, University of Malaya.