A Japanese security role in Southeast Asia?<\/p>\n
There are several scenarios that could lead to a Japanese
\nsecurity role in the region<\/p>\n
By Lee Poh Ping<\/p>\n
The recent visit to Japan by American President Bill Clinton
\nhas led to a reaffirmation of the U.S.-Japan security agreement
\nwhich had been thought to be in danger of unraveling as a result
\nof the Okinawa rape incident. That visit has also opened the
\npossibility that the scope of the agreement could be widened to
\nallow for more specific American-Japanese military co-operation
\nin the Far East outside Japan, a subject previous Japanese
\ngovernments have approached with the greatest of caution.<\/p>\n
Such caution is understandable as many Japanese believe that
\nthe security agreement is essentially bilateral, which only
\nobligates the United States to defend their country. Any attempt
\nto broaden the definition of the defense of Japan to include the
\ndeployment of its forces overseas for offensive purposes would,
\nin the eyes of many of its people, violate article nine of the
\ncountry's constitution.<\/p>\n
Some of them might even go so far as to argue that any attempt
\nto amend or abolish article nine involves not merely the question
\nof the legal or constitutional facilitation of military moves
\nnecessary for the defense of their country but also that of the
\nredefinition of the post-war Japanese state, as such abolition
\ncould lead down the slippery slope of Japanese militarism.<\/p>\n
Whatever the substance and terms of the Japanese debate, this
\nis an opportune moment for ASEAN to consider what its reactions
\nwould be to the question of a Japanese security role in South-
\neast Asia.<\/p>\n
There is first an almost unanimous ASEAN belief that a
\nJapanese security role should be defined very broadly, a
\ndefinition that would not necessarily involve a military role.
\nThis belief was quite well summed up in 1973 by a very
\ninfluential Indonesian general, the late Ali Moertopo, who, when
\nreferring to an American call for Japan to share the military
\nburden, said that any such Japanese sharing should not
\nnecessarily introduce a military element to Japanese relations
\nwith South-east Asia.<\/p>\n
According to him, the security and stability of South-east
\nAsia was not a purely military affair. What he meant was that
\nJapan could best help South-east Asian security through the prism
\nof economics. This would involve not only more aid, but better
\nterms in economic relations such as a greater transfer of
\ntechnology, better market access and so on. An economically
\nstrong South-east Asia is the best guarantee of stability in the
\narea, which in turn better ensures the protection of Japanese
\ninterests than, for example, the dispatch of troops.<\/p>\n
While many Japanese will agree with this approach, there is an
\nincreasing feeling among them as well as South-east Asians that
\nthe actual military component, specifically Japanese security co-
\noperation with ASEAN, has to be factored into the debate. That
\nbeing the case, one way of analyzing the ASEAN attitude is by
\nresorting to computer terminology, distinguishing between
\n\"software\" co-operation, not involving the dispatch of troops,
\nand \"hardware\" co-operation which allows for such dispatch.<\/p>\n
The Japanese approach in the past had been of the software
\nvariety, basically involving strategic aid (aid that is
\nindirectly related to military considerations), and the exchange
\nof military personnel and information. This was acceptable to
\nmost South-east Asians. However, many ASEAN countries would want
\nthe Japanese to go further such as in the transfer of military
\ntechnology or armaments sold at concessionary rates. Japan has so
\nfar not entertained such requests.<\/p>\n
Though there is strictly speaking no constitutional
\nprohibition in Japan against such transfer or sale, the Japanese
\ngovernment remains sensitive to possible domestic criticism that
\nit may be abandoning the policy of Japan as a peace-loving nation
\nif it did so.<\/p>\n
Nevertheless, it must be said vis-a-vis the U.S., Japan under
\nPrime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone did transfer some military
\ntechnology and had allowed its scientists to take part in the
\nReagan Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or
\n\"Star Wars\" program. Presumably, U.S.-Japan relations are sui
\ngeneris. What may be permitted in this relationship may not be
\nallowed in Japan's relations with other countries, including
\nASEAN.<\/p>\n
As to hardware co-operation, one can conceive of various
\nscenarios. The first involves the unilateral dispatch of Japanese
\ntroops to South-east Asia to solve what security problems that
\nmight arise. Such dispatch would be outside any multilateral or
\nbilateral framework and decided basically by Japan alone. Such a
\nmove for now will not be welcome at all by ASEAN, whatever the
\njustification. In all ASEAN discussions on Japan's security role,
\nthere has been no significant body of opinion which has advocated
\nsuch a move.<\/p>\n
A second scenario involves Japan collaborating with either an
\nASEAN country or with ASEAN collectively. The former was actually
\nsuggested in 1990 by the then Thai prime minister Chatichai
\nChoonhavan who wanted Thailand and Japan to cooperate in joint
\nmilitary exercises. This was heavily criticized in Singapore. On
\ntheir part, the Japanese did not welcome it.<\/p>\n
A third scenario consists of Japanese security involvement as
\npart of a multilateral endeavor, specifically under United
\nNations auspices. Here a distinction, insisted on by many
\nJapanese, has to be made between Japanese participation in
\npeacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations. The
\nformer involves such situations where ceasefires have already
\nbeen declared such as in the case of the UN force in Cambodia.
\nAfter much emotional debate, Japan accepted participation in
\nCambodia. So ASEAN has similarly accepted this Japanese
\nparticipation.<\/p>\n
But peace enforcement such as UN involvement in the Korean
\nWar or Gulf War situations are a different kettle of fish for the
\nJapanese. So far there has been no such Japanese involvement. If
\nthere were to be such participation, ASEAN would probably accept
\nit as it would be in keeping with the ASEAN call for Japan to
\ntake on more international responsibilities.<\/p>\n
There remains the scenario of Japanese troops co-operating
\nwith the Americans to address security problems in South-east
\nAsia. There is as yet no framework for such co-operation. For the
\npresent, it is unlikely that the U.S.-Japan security agreement
\ncould be so widely interpreted as to allow for this possibility.
\nEven the Hashimoto government specifically ruled out South-east
\nAsia as part of the \"Asia-Pacific\" included in the widening of
\nthe agreement during Clinton's visit. Yet, Japan once considered
\na mini-Marshall plan for the Philippines which was negotiating
\nwith the U.S. over the future of American bases. It was believed
\nthat such Japanese funding would help \"stabilize\" the Philippines
\nso as to make it easier for the retention of the American bases.<\/p>\n
Future bilateral Japanese-American security co-operation in
\nSouth-east Asia thus cannot be ruled out. Whether it will involve
\nthe dispatch of Japanese troops alongside with the Americans
\nremains to be seen. The possibility is remote, but if it happens,
\nthe ASEAN reaction will depend on the circumstances.<\/p>\n
In sum, most South-east Asians now appear to be reconciling
\nthemselves to the inevitability of a Japanese security role in
\nthe region. The feeling is widespread that this role will be
\nbetter fulfilled with Japanese participation in some multilateral
\nframework. There is little support for any unilateral Japanese
\nrole.<\/p>\n
Dr. Lee Poh Ping is Professor at the Faculty of Economics and
\nAdministration, University of Malaya.<\/p>",
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