Wooing the Myanmar military junta is a tricky game

Wooing the Myanmar military junta is a tricky game

By Vorapun Srivoranart

BANGKOK: Thaksin's visit to Burma could prove fruitful to relations, though there are many long-term obstacles

In reality, there is no black and white foreign policy, nor is there a single mould for every problem. It all depends on where and when a particular event occurs.

With 2,401 kilometers of common border, Thailand has been shouldering the burden of proximity of internal political disruption in Burma without the comfort of distance. Hence the question of whether to engage the Burmese military junta is irrelevant. A more pertinent issue is how, bearing in mind our national interest and political values.

Of late, two main approaches towards Burma have been dominant among Thai policy-makers. The first is that of the liberal- democratic school of thought which favors values like human rights, democracy, institutions and formality. This group believes the root of the problem lies with the undemocratic junta using military solutions for ethno-political issues. The cure, it says, is to restore democracy and civilian control, which not unexpectedly is rejected by the junta as intrusive and unfriendly.

The other school of thought addresses the Burmese question from a completely opposite perspective, stressing ends over means. This group proposes non-interference, informality, a non- confrontational stance and a preference for summit meetings, reflecting the highly elitist nature of decision-making in this part of the world. All these make up the controversial trait called the "Asian Way".

With this in mind, a landmark visit to Rangoon last week by Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra effectively pushed the pendulum to the extreme "Asian Way". The merit of this argument has to be gauged deeper than the facade of cordiality the Burmese leaders rolled out for him. Rather it is the concrete implementation of transforming the "tyranny of geography" into an opportunity.

Thaksin's trip may well serve the immediate national interest of peace and stability, but the long-term value has to be taken with a grain of salt. No one wants war: War means the failure of diplomacy as the first line of defense.

But the Thai-Burmese relationship is too complex and contains many uncontrollable variables that cannot be dispelled completely at a meeting between leaders. There are several fundamental issues warranting immediate scrutiny.

First, have we yielded too much? It is clear that at present Thailand recognizes the Burmese brand of politics and is determined to deal with it accordingly. This was reflected by Thaksin's conviction that only summit meetings will rescue worsening bilateral ties because in a highly centralized state like Burma "the tail won't move if the head does not move first" and there is a decree-based legal system. But for how much longer can we continue to play this game? Friendship and fraternity are a two-way street requiring a great degree of give and take. Therefore we should also make the Burmese junta accept our brand of politics. If Rangoon is true to the spirit of brotherhood, it should do so.

Second, Thaksin's economic diplomacy calls into question an orthodox assumption that economic development will eventually lead to political reform. It is doubtful whether economic transactions reduce the chances of conflict by raising the cost of aggression. It is even more uncertain how a middle class of independent entrepreneurs can emerge given the stranglehold of the military on all aspects of the economy. How to guarantee that the economic pie will not be gobbled up by vested interests of both sides needs a serious answer.

Third, does Rangoon have the capability to tackle narcotics and border problems? The short answer is no. Most drug-production areas are ruled by armed ethnic minorities which have peace accords with the junta in exchange for quasi-autonomy. It is an open secret that the Burmese military has little control over these groups and a lot of them cohabit with the drug-traders.

Rangoon could ill-afford to open a war on two fronts by getting tough with the heavily armed United Wa State Army (UWSA) given the fact that it still cannot exert control over the entire border, which is rife with insurgents. In this vein, national security and consolidation come before drug suppression.

Fourth, it is doubtful whether the renewed friendship is based on personal rapport or a genuine willingness on the part of Rangoon to coexist with its eastern neighbor. If the past is any guide, friendship is left often to the whim of the Burmese generals. Pandering too much to the generals also risks alienating pro-democracy forces and future generations of Burmese, who we have to live with.

Last but not least, there is folly in thinking about Thailand- Burma border problems in terms of a post-modern state system where the political border has become obsolete and the states are bound by a web of transactions to the point of sharing a common destiny. The two nations are nowhere near that point in view of the level of political development and the unstable environment. Burma is a state extremely conscious of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Failure to address these problems will have far-reaching ramifications and set a wrong policy course. Therefore, the onus is on the Thai government to steer the country's foreign policy in the right direction, since it is a policy that affects national security and well-being. For the first time in history it has the chance to open a new chapter in relations.

But in view of the chronic internal political problems in Burma, more spillover can be expected. The only way is to utilize the friendship to activate mechanisms and construct a "safety net" as insurance for when the incumbents are no longer in power, so that the spirit of brotherhood is upheld.

-- The Nation/Asia News Network