Wooing the Myanmar military junta is a tricky game

Wooing the Myanmar military junta is a tricky game

By Vorapun Srivoranart

BANGKOK: Thaksin's visit to Burma could prove fruitful to
relations, though there are many long-term obstacles

In reality, there is no black and white foreign policy, nor is
there a single mould for every problem. It all depends on where
and when a particular event occurs.

With 2,401 kilometers of common border, Thailand has been
shouldering the burden of proximity of internal political
disruption in Burma without the comfort of distance. Hence the
question of whether to engage the Burmese military junta is
irrelevant. A more pertinent issue is how, bearing in mind our
national interest and political values.

Of late, two main approaches towards Burma have been dominant
among Thai policy-makers. The first is that of the liberal-
democratic school of thought which favors values like human
rights, democracy, institutions and formality. This group
believes the root of the problem lies with the undemocratic junta
using military solutions for ethno-political issues. The cure, it
says, is to restore democracy and civilian control, which not
unexpectedly is rejected by the junta as intrusive and
unfriendly.

The other school of thought addresses the Burmese question
from a completely opposite perspective, stressing ends over
means. This group proposes non-interference, informality, a non-
confrontational stance and a preference for summit meetings,
reflecting the highly elitist nature of decision-making in this
part of the world. All these make up the controversial trait
called the "Asian Way".

With this in mind, a landmark visit to Rangoon last week by
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra effectively pushed the pendulum
to the extreme "Asian Way". The merit of this argument has to be
gauged deeper than the facade of cordiality the Burmese leaders
rolled out for him. Rather it is the concrete implementation of
transforming the "tyranny of geography" into an opportunity.

Thaksin's trip may well serve the immediate national interest
of peace and stability, but the long-term value has to be taken
with a grain of salt. No one wants war: War means the failure of
diplomacy as the first line of defense.

But the Thai-Burmese relationship is too complex and contains
many uncontrollable variables that cannot be dispelled completely
at a meeting between leaders. There are several fundamental
issues warranting immediate scrutiny.

First, have we yielded too much? It is clear that at present
Thailand recognizes the Burmese brand of politics and is
determined to deal with it accordingly. This was reflected by
Thaksin's conviction that only summit meetings will rescue
worsening bilateral ties because in a highly centralized state
like Burma "the tail won't move if the head does not move first"
and there is a decree-based legal system. But for how much longer
can we continue to play this game? Friendship and fraternity are
a two-way street requiring a great degree of give and take.
Therefore we should also make the Burmese junta accept our brand
of politics. If Rangoon is true to the spirit of brotherhood, it
should do so.

Second, Thaksin's economic diplomacy calls into question an
orthodox assumption that economic development will eventually
lead to political reform. It is doubtful whether economic
transactions reduce the chances of conflict by raising the cost
of aggression. It is even more uncertain how a middle class of
independent entrepreneurs can emerge given the stranglehold of
the military on all aspects of the economy. How to guarantee that
the economic pie will not be gobbled up by vested interests of
both sides needs a serious answer.

Third, does Rangoon have the capability to tackle narcotics
and border problems? The short answer is no. Most drug-production
areas are ruled by armed ethnic minorities which have peace
accords with the junta in exchange for quasi-autonomy. It is an
open secret that the Burmese military has little control over
these groups and a lot of them cohabit with the drug-traders.

Rangoon could ill-afford to open a war on two fronts by
getting tough with the heavily armed United Wa State Army (UWSA)
given the fact that it still cannot exert control over the entire
border, which is rife with insurgents. In this vein, national
security and consolidation come before drug suppression.

Fourth, it is doubtful whether the renewed friendship is based
on personal rapport or a genuine willingness on the part of
Rangoon to coexist with its eastern neighbor. If the past is any
guide, friendship is left often to the whim of the Burmese
generals. Pandering too much to the generals also risks
alienating pro-democracy forces and future generations of
Burmese, who we have to live with.

Last but not least, there is folly in thinking about Thailand-
Burma border problems in terms of a post-modern state system
where the political border has become obsolete and the states are
bound by a web of transactions to the point of sharing a common
destiny. The two nations are nowhere near that point in view of
the level of political development and the unstable environment.
Burma is a state extremely conscious of its sovereignty and
territorial integrity.

Failure to address these problems will have far-reaching
ramifications and set a wrong policy course. Therefore, the onus
is on the Thai government to steer the country's foreign policy
in the right direction, since it is a policy that affects
national security and well-being. For the first time in history
it has the chance to open a new chapter in relations.

But in view of the chronic internal political problems in
Burma, more spillover can be expected. The only way is to utilize
the friendship to activate mechanisms and construct a "safety
net" as insurance for when the incumbents are no longer in power,
so that the spirit of brotherhood is upheld.

-- The Nation/Asia News Network