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Wishful thinking vs debt crisis

| Source: The Jakarta Post

Wishful thinking vs debt crisis

This is the last of two articles on Indonesian debt by Juergen
Kaiser, campaign coordinator of Erlassjahr 2000, the German
Jubilee 2000 campaign, an international civil society initiative
for debt cancellation and the reform of international debt
negotiation procedures.

ESSEN, Germany (JP): The actual political environment in fact
is far from providing the internal and external stability which
underlay the growth rates during the Soeharto era, which are more
or less in line with the World Bank (WB)'s forecast for this next
decade.

To support its assumption that such a success story might be
realistic, the WB recalls the successful reduction of the
government debt ratio between 1988 and 1997 as well as a
comparable success story by Indonesia's neighbor, Malaysia.

This, however, ignores the fact that a reduction from 54
percent to 26 percent is much easier to achieve than halving the
debt stock from a huge debt overhang.

Moreover, the comparison with Malaysia's successful debt
service ratio reduction ignores the fact that the Malaysian
success story has been based on extensive regulation of the
country's international financial relations, while Indonesia has
been forced to liberalize its financial system.

Additionally a huge part of Indonesia's income in the critical
next few years is to come from the sale of government assets,
while Malaysia, in the respective period, built its success on
regular (and not one-off) income.

Debt reduction?

International creditor governments, which happen to be the
most important shareholders of the World Bank, excludes Indonesia
from any debt reduction. The rationale of the document is that
the current crisis can be overcome without creditors having to
renounce any of their claims.

If one looks for the term "debt relief" in the document, one
finds it only in quite strange contexts: Sources of "debt
reduction" identified, relate exclusively to sources of
additional INCOME.

These would, should they occur, in fact reduce the relative
importance of the debt burden. They would by no means, reduce the
actual debt.

In April 2000 Indonesia received an extensive debt
rescheduling from its official bilateral creditors in the Paris
Club. No partial write-off was included.

It is common practice between the Paris Club and the
International Financial Institutions to point at each other when
it comes to asking who is to blame for an insufficient agreement
which fails to restore fiscal, macroeconomic and social viability
of an indebted country.

Regarding the particular Indonesian agreement, the World Bank
document states: "In accordance with standard practice, the Paris
Club creditors based their decision on an assessment of
Indonesia's balance of payment needs and foreign exchange
requirements".

Of course, no details of this assessment were revealed. It can
be assumed, however, that the Paris Club was not hard to be
convinced by a data display like the one we find in the actual
document, that no debt reduction was necessary at all.

Once it turns out that an agreement was grossly inadequate,
Paris Club members tend to claim that those documents are worked
out by the IMF, while the fund in turn claims that it is not
prejudice by any means by a Paris Club decision which identifies
any need for debt reduction (which would be the logical result of
a sustainability analysis). This kind of well-organized
irresponsibility leaves the debtor country without anybody to
turn to.

Are there any alternatives?

It is certainly a useful service to the reader that the
document explains the arrangements for Indonesia and two middle-
income countries as well as the Paris Club's "Houston" Terms for
Severely Indebted Lower Middle Income Countries" (SILMICs).

Again it is, however, slightly misleading as Indonesia under
the Paris Club's criteria of per capita income, debt level and
debt service capacity would not fall into the SILMIC category
like the Philippines and Jordan but rather into the SILIC
(Severely Indebted Low Income Countries) category which normally
receive Net Present Value reductions of their debt services or
even debt stocks under "Naples" or "Lyon" terms.

The former allow for reductions of up to 67 percent, the
latter of up to 80 percent. These frameworks are not even
mentioned here.

Instead the document puts this information in its annex with
the laconic remark that Indonesia is not internationally regarded
as a HIPC country and, therefore, cannot be a candidate for the
"HIPC initiative".

Why not? If we look at the formal criteria for HIPC relief by
bilateral and multilateral creditors, we find that Indonesia
fulfills all of them except for the one, being an International
Development Agency (IDA)-only country", i.e. borrowing
exclusively from the World Bank's soft loan window IDA.

However, Indonesia actually does borrow from IDA. The point is
that it does also receive nonconcessional loans from the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD),
which makes it a so-called "blend" country, which has access to
both facilities.

If Indonesia applies for the IDA-only status, it would
consequently forgo some US$1.2 billion in annual loans actually
on offer from the IBRD. In return for this loss of access to new
unconcessional loans (i.e. new debt), it could get access to a
substantial debt reduction, which -- if applied along current
HIPC guidelines -- should cut Indonesia's current annual debt
service of some US$19 billion (1998 figure), roughly by half.

This would certainly be a good deal for Indonesia -- provided
creditors stuck to the principles and criteria they once have
established themselves.

This nondebate on a possible HIPC-style (not necessarily HIPC-
scheme) solution for Indonesia is regrettable as is also the
Indonesian government's deliberations on the matter which are
fairly shallow.

Bambang Prijambodo's paper, Government of Indonesia's
Strategies in Reducing Debt Burden presented at a recent INFID
(International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development) seminar,
where also the WB document was introduced, simply states:
" ...the only way (to debt relief) is through HIPC." There are
only 2 countries in Asia in this scheme, Vietnam and Laos. Are we
at their stage of development?"

In reality per capita incomes in both countries are lower,
while indebtedness ratios are either comparable (Lao P.D.R) or
substantially less dramatic (Vietnam) than in Indonesia.

There was an alternative.

One commendable element of the WB paper is its brief and
largely correct presentation of the extraordinary solution which
was found for the Indonesian debt crisis of 1969/1970.

Most key elements of the solution are mentioned, from the
profligate borrowing and "unwise lending" of the former
administration through the included bisque clauses, which allowed
for additional reductions in the early years if necessary, to the
comprehensive character of the solution.

The only thing it fails to mention is the key role played by a
neutral mediator, the German banker H.J. Abs.

A common argument by creditors and the World Bank alike
against a comparable solution for today's debt problem is that it
would endanger Indonesia's urgently-needed access to private
credit markets.

However, history reveals that a comprehensive solution, which
is fair to all parties involved, is far from being punished by
the markets. Indonesia's access to private creditors was not
hampered at all through the 1970 accord.

It was rather enhanced, as possible lenders were relieved from
the threat that a large portion of their invested hard currency
might be used up paying off old loans. The agreement was even so
successful in that respect that only five years later, the
country faced its next liquidity shortfall, the Pertamina crisis.

So, the most obvious question remains unanswered: If the
creditors could provide an unusual and unusually generous
solution in order to stabilize the military dictatorship in its
earliest phase -- why are they unable or unwilling to do the same
for the stabilization of a still quite fragile democracy?

More from 16 November 2000 โ†’

Cite this article
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/wishful-thinking-vs-debt-crisis-1447893297-1275486)
Originally published by The Jakarta Post
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