Winters, critic who loves RI

Berni K. Moestafa, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

Shocking statements often shake the political scene in Indonesia, but coming from Jeffrey A. Winters, they can be powerful indeed.

The Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University in Chicago, is a staunch critic of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Both, Winters said, were susceptible to America's interests.

His comments have given Indonesians a look at the other side of America's foreign policy. The unofficial side, that is.

"If Indonesia becomes a banana republic, or 50 years from now turns into a country of coolies, America (government) couldn't care less as long as Indonesia doesn't make trouble," he said last week.

Lately, trouble has meant the rise of Islamic groups with links to terrorism here, he said. Before, it was the possible rise of communism.

In between, there appeared to be no particular ideological reason for the U.S. government to develop an interest in Indonesia. As Winters said in a 1999 seminar in Yogyakarta, it faded with the end of the Cold War.

Yet, Indonesia nearly became a troublemaker of a different sort when in 1998 President Soeharto's downfall shocked the power establishment and put general stability at risk throughout the Southeast Asian region.

He said talks with several U.S. officials six to eight months before Soeharto quit in May 1998, showed that the U.S. was paying little attention to the growing political tension in Jakarta.

It just watched the events unfold, he said in the 1999 seminar as quoted by the local magazine Tokoh. American ideologues, he said were likely surprised and disappointed that General Prabowo Subianto failed to take over Soeharto's post. Analysts believed that Soeharto had been grooming Prabowo to become his successor.

Prabowo is Soeharto's son-in-law who received high level military training in the U.S. But here, speculation abounds that his expertise was put to use in the kidnapping of several activists campaigning for political reforms in 1998. "So much power and so little responsibility," Winters said of his government.

His criticism of America's foreign policy, however, pales in comparison to his admonitions which target the IMF and the World Bank.

In an analysis of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, he attacked the IMF for prescribing the same medicine to different countries suffering from different economic illnesses.

Winters however dropped his biggest bombshell on the World Bank.

Following some research on the World Bank policies, he found that the bank may have known that 30 percent of its loans were being misused by the country. The loss, he estimated, amounted to some US$10 billion over the 30 years under Soeharto.

His assault against the World Bank made him an instant hero with the Indonesian media in 1998. But senior World Bank officials were outraged.

Then World Bank country director Dennis de Tray denied the charges and only backed down a year later after an internal memo of the bank said fund leakages did occur and estimated them to have been more than 20 percent.

Winters asks for the World Bank to be accountable, calling it unfair to Indonesians to have to pay back all of the loans the bank knew was being siphoned off by corruptors.

For Indonesians, however, the message is that neither the IMF nor the World Bank are angels.

The message itself is old. But Winters stands out against the us-vs-them attitude often displayed by most Indonesian critics whose credibility is tainted by a hefty dose of anti-foreigner sentiment rather than sound reasoning.

So how did Winters turn into the critic that he is today?

He is an Indonesianist, teaching political science at Northwestern University. Winters researched comparative political economy, business-government relations under capitalism, international capital flows and the politics of post-colonial states. He specializes in Southeast Asia.

His 1996 book Power in Motion: Capital Mobility and the Indonesian State shed light on the relation between power and capital flow from the 1970s to the early 1990s in Indonesia.

When the 1997 financial crisis broke out, he was already in the know about the region's cause and effect in capital movement.

He pointed out how a herd mentality had set in amongst investors driving their capital into Asian countries as they followed others' lead. Sound economic fundamentals were of minor concern against the belief that security was to be found where others had their money.

Once the crisis struck, the same mentality drained capital out of countries. In Winters' opinion, the situation turned worse after the IMF came to the rescue with its billions of US$ aid packages.

IMF attached conditions to its loans that proved detrimental to Indonesia's economy. Its requirement to raise Bank Indonesia benchmark rates failed to stop the foreign capital flight while it squashed businesses here which took up debts from local banks. The result is no money and a devastated domestic economy.

Winters spent several years in Indonesia. He was a teacher at the University of Gadjah Mada in Yogyakarta. Fluent in Bahasa Indonesia, he is also a frequent visitor to this country.

That does not stop him from taking a swipe against the government even though it has invited trouble with the local authorities.

In 1998 Winters charged then coordinating minister for the economy, Ginandjar Kartasasmita of corrupt practices he said involved the U.S.-based copper and gold mining company PT Freeport Indonesia.

Then president B.J. Habibie instead of trying to refute the claim, went after Winters, accusing him of insulting his minister.

Then Justice Minister Muladi said the insult could have been grounds to put him in jail for up to five years.

Winters' misadventure in Yogyakarta, where three male students charged him of sexual harassment and beat him up, also brought up questions about his sexual orientation.

But jail threats and the one or two bruises he sustained, do not lessen his affection for the country.

One point that Winters often makes is that Indonesians should not to confuse the American people with the government or its foreign policy.