Will RI get tougher after Bali shock?
Will RI get tougher after Bali shock?
Barry Desker, Director, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies,
The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore
The Bali bomb blasts that killed almost 200 foreign tourists
and Indonesians on Oct. 12 shook Indonesia to its core. While
investigations are in progress, there is strong circumstantial
evidence that Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) extremists were responsible
for the attacks.
The question now is, will Indonesia act decisively against the
extremists? On the surface, it does seem that Jakarta is finally
moving.
Three major decisions have been taken since Bali. First, anti-
terror legislation allowing for preventive detention of terror
suspects has finally been passed. Second, JI has been declared a
terrorist organization. Third, Abu Bakar Bashir, whom Malaysia,
Singapore and the Philippines had earlier identified as the
spiritual leader of JI, has been detained.
Is all this activity a sign that Jakarta is finally playing
ball? There are two main reasons why circumspection is still in
order.
First, the Indonesian security apparatus is still a fractured,
fractious entity. The competing roles played by the different
agencies in the Bali bombing investigation highlight the decline
in the cohesion of the military (TNI) and the lack of a
coordinated response by the Indonesian government.
At different times, Chief Security Minister Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono, Police chief Da'i Bachtiar, National Intelligence
Agency chief A.M. Hendropriyono and TNI chief Endriartono Sutarto
have sought to lead the investigation.
While the police are now separate from the military and are
responsible for criminal investigations, they lack the
intelligence-gathering capability. Although Hendropriyono has
been appointed by President Megawati Soekarnoputri to coordinate
intelligence, Muslim groups view him with suspicion.
The TNI is a good example of the malaise affecting the
security set-up. The decline in central government funding
following the 1997-1998 economic crisis and the rise of regional
autonomy has resulted in more rapacious behavior by local TNI
units and support for local movements, even if they are directed
against central government interests.
Claims of support by TNI elements for acts of political
violence by extremist Islamic groups are, therefore, more
credible than generally recognised.
The second, more fundamental, reason why one should not expect
too much from Jakarta post-Bali is the rising influence of
political Islam.
Since independence, the Indonesian government has been
dominated by abangan (nominal Muslims), exemplified by former
presidents Sukarno and Soeharto, who saw the political demands of
the santri (devout Muslims) for the establishment of an Islamic
state as undermining the 1945 Constitution and threatening the
heterogeneous character of the Indonesian state.
However, a shift has occurred in the past decade towards
greater public and private practice of the Islamic faith in
Indonesia, a process that could be described as the santri-
isation of Indonesian society.
Increased religious identification reflected wider trends in
the region, where there was growing awareness of Islam's global
identity.
There has been increased awareness of, and even material
support for, the struggles of Palestinians, as well as Muslims in
Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo and Chechnya.
Increased santri influence has also been translated into
enhanced political clout since the Soeharto era.
Islamic political parties played a critical role in blocking
approval of former president B.J. Habibie's accountability
statement to the Indonesian People's Representative Assembly in
1999, precipitating his decision not to stand for office again.
By giving their backing to Abdurrahman Wahid, they prevented
Megawati from becoming president, although her party had won the
largest percentage of votes during the June General Election.
When Abdurrahman adopted secularist policies in government and
alienated support through his mercurial behavior, the Muslim
parties helped Ms Megawati secure the presidency in July last
year.
There is thus a growing belief in Indonesia that the support
of Islamic religious parties is crucial for anyone hoping to be
president.
Of course, moderate views dominate Indonesian Islam. But the
problem is that an unwillingness to challenge the more
doctrinaire views of religious extremists has allowed the
extremists to shape public debate in Indonesia.
On Sept. 25 last year, the Indonesian Ulama Council called on
Muslims in the world to 'fight in the path of Allah' (jihad fii
sabillah) should the United States and its allies commit
aggression against Afghanistan and the Islamic world.
If the US proceeds with the anticipated attack on Iraq,
Indonesia's Muslim leaders can be expected to call for a
righteous response to American aggression.
The political leadership in Jakarta is focused on the
forthcoming elections in 2004.
If Megawati's Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI
Perjuangan) and Golkar remain deadlocked while emerging as the
largest parties, the swing role of the major Islamic parties will
be crucial in determining the outcome of the presidential
elections.
Vision and character are demanded of the moderate leaders of
Indonesia's major Islamic parties.
However, the moderate Muslim leaders are likely to take the
easier path of seeking the support of extremist militants by
avoiding criticism of their activities.
In sum, despite the initial flurry of activity after the Bali
bombings, we should not anticipate any sustained campaign to
eradicate the cells of radical Islamic terrorists in Indonesia.
The writer was Singapore's ambassador to Indonesia from 1986
to 1993.