Will RI get tougher after Bali shock?

Will RI get tougher after Bali shock?

Barry Desker, Director, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore

The Bali bomb blasts that killed almost 200 foreign tourists and Indonesians on Oct. 12 shook Indonesia to its core. While investigations are in progress, there is strong circumstantial evidence that Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) extremists were responsible for the attacks.

The question now is, will Indonesia act decisively against the extremists? On the surface, it does seem that Jakarta is finally moving.

Three major decisions have been taken since Bali. First, anti- terror legislation allowing for preventive detention of terror suspects has finally been passed. Second, JI has been declared a terrorist organization. Third, Abu Bakar Bashir, whom Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines had earlier identified as the spiritual leader of JI, has been detained.

Is all this activity a sign that Jakarta is finally playing ball? There are two main reasons why circumspection is still in order.

First, the Indonesian security apparatus is still a fractured, fractious entity. The competing roles played by the different agencies in the Bali bombing investigation highlight the decline in the cohesion of the military (TNI) and the lack of a coordinated response by the Indonesian government.

At different times, Chief Security Minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Police chief Da'i Bachtiar, National Intelligence Agency chief A.M. Hendropriyono and TNI chief Endriartono Sutarto have sought to lead the investigation.

While the police are now separate from the military and are responsible for criminal investigations, they lack the intelligence-gathering capability. Although Hendropriyono has been appointed by President Megawati Soekarnoputri to coordinate intelligence, Muslim groups view him with suspicion.

The TNI is a good example of the malaise affecting the security set-up. The decline in central government funding following the 1997-1998 economic crisis and the rise of regional autonomy has resulted in more rapacious behavior by local TNI units and support for local movements, even if they are directed against central government interests.

Claims of support by TNI elements for acts of political violence by extremist Islamic groups are, therefore, more credible than generally recognised.

The second, more fundamental, reason why one should not expect too much from Jakarta post-Bali is the rising influence of political Islam.

Since independence, the Indonesian government has been dominated by abangan (nominal Muslims), exemplified by former presidents Sukarno and Soeharto, who saw the political demands of the santri (devout Muslims) for the establishment of an Islamic state as undermining the 1945 Constitution and threatening the heterogeneous character of the Indonesian state.

However, a shift has occurred in the past decade towards greater public and private practice of the Islamic faith in Indonesia, a process that could be described as the santri- isation of Indonesian society.

Increased religious identification reflected wider trends in the region, where there was growing awareness of Islam's global identity.

There has been increased awareness of, and even material support for, the struggles of Palestinians, as well as Muslims in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo and Chechnya.

Increased santri influence has also been translated into enhanced political clout since the Soeharto era.

Islamic political parties played a critical role in blocking approval of former president B.J. Habibie's accountability statement to the Indonesian People's Representative Assembly in 1999, precipitating his decision not to stand for office again.

By giving their backing to Abdurrahman Wahid, they prevented Megawati from becoming president, although her party had won the largest percentage of votes during the June General Election.

When Abdurrahman adopted secularist policies in government and alienated support through his mercurial behavior, the Muslim parties helped Ms Megawati secure the presidency in July last year.

There is thus a growing belief in Indonesia that the support of Islamic religious parties is crucial for anyone hoping to be president.

Of course, moderate views dominate Indonesian Islam. But the problem is that an unwillingness to challenge the more doctrinaire views of religious extremists has allowed the extremists to shape public debate in Indonesia.

On Sept. 25 last year, the Indonesian Ulama Council called on Muslims in the world to 'fight in the path of Allah' (jihad fii sabillah) should the United States and its allies commit aggression against Afghanistan and the Islamic world.

If the US proceeds with the anticipated attack on Iraq, Indonesia's Muslim leaders can be expected to call for a righteous response to American aggression.

The political leadership in Jakarta is focused on the forthcoming elections in 2004.

If Megawati's Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) and Golkar remain deadlocked while emerging as the largest parties, the swing role of the major Islamic parties will be crucial in determining the outcome of the presidential elections.

Vision and character are demanded of the moderate leaders of Indonesia's major Islamic parties.

However, the moderate Muslim leaders are likely to take the easier path of seeking the support of extremist militants by avoiding criticism of their activities.

In sum, despite the initial flurry of activity after the Bali bombings, we should not anticipate any sustained campaign to eradicate the cells of radical Islamic terrorists in Indonesia.

The writer was Singapore's ambassador to Indonesia from 1986 to 1993.