Where did Indonesia go wrong?
Where did Indonesia go wrong?
The following is the second of two articles by Olle Tornquist,
professor of political science and development research at the
University of Oslo.
OSLO, Norway (JP): So the picture is quite clear. There are
important freedoms, but the civil and democratic rights and
institutions are poor, often malfunctioning, and usually
difficult for ordinary people to make use of.
The politically marginalized but resourceful sections of the
elite would probably have turned to non-democratic methods
anyway.
But what's really wrong with Indonesia's democratization is
that it does not make much sense even to its major potential pro-
democratic force -- the people at large -- as a way of promoting
ideas and interests, solve conflicts, and agree with others on
how to handle issues of mutual concern.
Rather they usually have to find non- and anti-democratic
methods and avenues. For instance, they have to pay or bargain
for protection and contacts within administration, government and
elite circles as well as ethnic and religious networks. And if
nothing helps, they may have to take to the streets or end up
burning down a police station.
The obvious solution, then, is to start from the point of view
of these people and support processes and attempts among them at
making democracy accessible and meaningful. Of course, the
fashionable reply is that such efforts are naive and almost
ridiculous.
Patrimonial cultures and systems, it is argued, are so old and
strong that they will capture whatever instrument of democracy
that is introduced. But the role and importance of these elements
of patrimonialism and clientelism rarely have that deep and
strong roots.
In Indonesia, they primarily gained renewed importance as a
result of the authoritarian rule and exploitation from the late
1950s and onwards. So if one focuses on that enemy -- not on some
seemingly irrevocable cultural traits -- the favoring of
democracy cease to be impossible.
However, of course, that calls for more than idealistic
promotion of shallow institutions, rights, and election packages.
Rather one must focus exactly on how it would be possible for
common people to improve and make use of democracy under specific
conditions and opportunities in various settings.
What are their capacities and opportunities? How can people
improve them? How can they make use of rights and institutions?
How could these in turn be altered in favor of people's chances
to apply them?
Among the key areas of concern that stand out from this brief
essay are the rise of interest and ideology based popular
movements, organizations and parties, as well as mass based
campaigns for truth, justice, and the rewriting of history; which
would also promote popular education.
For one example only, pro-democrats might wish to consider
giving more emphasis to local level actions and public discourse,
including demanding legal changes that would enable new parties
to stand a chance by emerging from below, from the grass roots.
Otherwise even the best of local reformation committees or
action groups, or unions, would be captured by the few "national"
big parties and politicians, or limited to pressure and lobby
groups that at worst would not even bother about democracy.
Further, the activists might also wish to modify their
campaign for simple majority elections in one-man constituencies.
Without some proportional representation, it might not just be
difficult to govern democratically a diverse society but more
importantly: the chances for new alternative parties to emerge
from below will be very slim -- while resourceful local bosses
tend to benefit. This is textbook knowledge!
And those who do not read or trust them may learn from the
uphill struggle for new popular rooted politics next door, in the
Philippines.
In short, Indonesia's democratization is at the brink. To
prevent collapse and move ahead there is an urgent need for a
third path, between determinism and idealism; a third path that
aims at substantial democratization -- not in terms of good
outcome for everyone (that remains an open question) but the
promotion of citizen's actual capacity to make use of and further
improve civil and democratic rights and institutions.
One of the main puzzles to me is why, in a case like
Indonesia, northern Europeans, for instance, come down so
floppily, and suppress their own experiences (not to talk of
those of the South Africans, for example) of the need for social
and economic preconditions and popular organizing in processes of
democratization, in face of the predominant idealistic and often
shallow betting on institutions, rights, and election packages.
In fact, most foreign democracy-makers do not just tend to
avoid the promotion of those additional conditions for
substantial and therefore sustainable democracy.
The support for open and accountable government is generally
also dispersed through exclusive elitist circles and not
organized in a transparent and accountable way with regard to the
demonstrations, the people, that are supposed to develop
democracy (occasionally the support is even favoring foreign
consultants-cum-NGOs at the expense of pro-democratic Indonesian
efforts).
One cannot but recall the so-called Berkeley Mafia promotion
of New Order technocrats in the 1960s.
So in spite of good intentions (and nice and skilled persons),
the fundamental problems of divisiveness and economic patronage
among Indonesian pro-democrats are thus nourished, at the expense
of the desperate need for unity on the basis of democratic ideas
and collective interests.
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/where-did-indonesia-go-wrong-1447893297-1115241)
Originally published by The Jakarta Post