When the Indonesian President's Personal Assistant Clashed with a Four-Star General

Jakarta, CNBC Indonesia - A dispute within the closest circle of the Indonesian President once occurred during the New Order era. The conflict involved the President’s Personal Assistant (Aspri), Ali Moertopo, and the Commander of the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Pangkopkamtib), General Soemitro. Both wielded significant influence around Soeharto but operated in different corridors of power.

Ali Moertopo had been one of the Aspri since 1968, with the latitude to manage various intelligence and special operations (Opsus). Although he only held the rank of Major General, or a two-star officer, his influence was immense because he was one of Soeharto’s principal confidants. Meanwhile, Soemitro served as Pangkopkamtib from 1971. As a four-star general, he held broad authority to maintain national security and order, including confronting threats of subversion and rebellion.

The clash between the two began to emerge in 1971 because their areas of work frequently overlapped. Soemitro assessed that the existence of Opsus, led by Ali Moertopo, had the potential to cause duplication with other intelligence agencies. “With the existence of Opsus, conflicts of interest could occur between intelligence bodies, for example with Bakin or Intel Kopkamtib, so that their work areas overlapped. Sometimes unnecessary tensions arose,” Soemitro stated in his biography Soemitro: From Panglima Mulawarman to Pangkopkamtib (1994).

On the other hand, Ali Moertopo’s close associate, Jusuf Wanandi, in a testimony titled Unveiling the New Order (2015), assessed that Soemitro also sought to expand his influence beyond his formal duties. In his notes, the man born in Probolinggo was said to often act like a day-to-day government coordinator and frequently summoned ministers to his office, even though he was not acting as president. “In the early 1970s, he behaved as if he were Soeharto’s trusted man to run the wheels of government and often called ministers to his office,” Jusuf Wanandi revealed.

The enormous influence of the two figures even bred suspicion between them. Each party allegedly suspected that their rival harboured greater political ambitions, potentially even to become a competitor to Soeharto. Ali’s camp suspected Soemitro wanted to rival the president. At that time, a document circulated revealing Soemitro’s desire to become president. Likewise, Soemitro had once warned Ali Moertopo directly. “Do not engage in machtsvorming (power building) with the aim of overthrowing him (Soeharto). If that is what you do, you will face me,” Soemitro asserted.

Over time, the conflict between the two widened further. According to Jusuf Wanandi’s testimony, Soemitro went so far as to withdraw soldiers from Ali’s house and conduct wiretapping. This led to many unknown individuals barging into the intelligence operative’s residence. Subsequently, Ali’s colleague, Soedjono, was declared ‘persona non grata’ or an undesirable person. Ali then fought back by reporting the Pangkopkamtib’s actions directly to the president, including the withdrawal of troops and Soemitro’s desire to court student support.

Not wanting the conflict to escalate, Soeharto intervened. At the end of 1973, he summoned Moertopo, Soemitro, and several other generals to resolve the issue. “Whoever has the ambition to replace him (Soeharto) must do so constitutionally so that Indonesia does not become like Latin American countries that change leaders through coups,” Soeharto stated.

However, the rivalry ended after the Malari Riots on 15 January 1974. According to Ken Conboy in Intel: Inside Indonesia’s Intelligence Service (2008), the major riot triggered by student demonstrations tarnished Soeharto’s image. As Pangkopkamtib, Soemitro was held responsible. He chose to resign, also turning down an ambassadorship to the United States. After stepping down, Soemitro admitted to having confronted Ali Moertopo, whom he accused of being behind efforts to ruin his reputation, including allegedly engineering the riots. “I order you to ruin my name. Ruin it! This is an order, not a request,” Soemitro told Ali emphatically.

After Malari, Soeharto carried out a major reshuffle. Soemitro’s close associates were moved from strategic positions, while Ali Moertopo also lost some of his influence after the Aspri structure was dissolved and he was transferred to BAKIN. From that point on, Soeharto no longer permitted his aides to hold excessively great power.