When Drug Lords Defy the State
Kampung Bahari has heated up again. A group suspected of being linked to a drug network mounted open resistance against officers. Stones were thrown. Firecrackers were shot. A police officer was reported injured.
The incident occurred on Thursday, 13 August 2026, when a joint team from the National Narcotics Agency (BNN) and the Jakarta Metropolitan Police conducted another raid in Kampung Bahari, Tanjung Priok, North Jakarta. During the operation, officers arrested MR, also known as Bos Gendut, who is described as an influential drug lord in the area.
A similar incident occurred in Katingan, Central Kalimantan, in early July 2026. A drug eradication operation ended tragically with the deaths of three members of the Katingan Police narcotics unit. Police subsequently arrested a number of people suspected of involvement in the attack. Nine people have been named as suspects, while three others are still being pursued and have been placed on the wanted list.
The two incidents point to a symptom that deserves serious attention. Action against drug lords no longer always involves confronting individual perpetrators. Officers may also face social groups that feel threatened and have an interest in maintaining the network.
Katingan demonstrated an extreme escalation of violence. Kampung Bahari showed open mass resistance. Both share a common thread: drug networks are able to build social support in their areas of operation, so that law enforcement action is perceived as a threat to their interests. At this point, drugs are no longer merely a legal issue. They have become a social, economic, territorial governance, and even local power issue.
One of the mistakes in drug eradication is viewing the drug lord as a single actor. In fact, in drug-prone areas, a drug lord can become the centre of a network connected to dealers, couriers, security guards, users, families, and residents who benefit directly or indirectly. This phenomenon can be understood through patron-client relationships.
In such relationships, the patron possesses resources, power, access, or the ability to provide protection. In return, the client provides loyalty, support, labour, information, or services. The relationship is not always formal. It can be built through debts of gratitude, economic assistance, employment, family ties, protection, and even fear.
In drug-prone areas, a drug lord can develop into a ‘criminal patron’. He has the resources to provide money, informal employment, assistance when residents are ill or need funds, to finance community activities, and to provide protection. In return, the drug lord gains loyalty.
He obtains information about the movement of officers, hiding places, and support when the network faces pressure. As a result, the arrest of a drug lord is not always perceived as law enforcement. For some people, such action can be seen as a threat to the source of income, protection, or power they have enjoyed.
Therefore, residents in drug-prone areas must not be lumped together. There are residents who are victims. There are those who are forced to follow the drug lord’s power. There are also those who consciously benefit from the network. The three must be distinguished. If not, policy risks missing its target. Communities that should be protected may feel they are the target of enforcement. Conversely, actors who actively support the network can hide behind their identity as ordinary residents.
The problem becomes more serious when drug networks begin to dominate the social life of the community. A drug lord with financial strength and networks can build influence. Influence breeds loyalty. Loyalty then provides protection for illegal activities.
In extreme conditions, drug networks can create a kind of informal authority that competes with state authority. They do not have legal authority. However, they can have social influence. They can determine who gets work, who gets assistance, who is allowed to enter a particular area, and even who is considered a threat.
Katingan showed how dangerous this condition is when loyalty to a drug network turns into violence against officers. The alleged use of homemade firearms, machetes, mandau, provocation, and attacks demonstrates the network’s ability to organise resistance.
If left unchecked, the network’s organisational structure, social influence, and resources will grow stronger. In the long term, criminal networks can have increasingly greater bargaining power vis-à-vis the state. Therefore, Katingan and Kampung Bahari must serve as a loud alarm. The state must not allow community environments to develop into spaces socially controlled by drug networks. The key to handling drug-prone areas is to sever patronage, not merely to sever transactions.
If a drug lord is arrested but the people who have been earning income from the network have no economic alternative, the network can grow back. If a courier is arrested but young people have no legal jobs and productive spaces, new couriers will emerge. If users are arrested without adequate access to rehabilitation, demand will remain. The market will continue to live. Likewise, if the community is merely asked to become informants without protection and security guarantees, they tend to choose silence.
Therefore, reclaiming areas from drug networks requires a comprehensive and sustainable approach. The goal is not merely to clean up drugs, but to create an environment that no longer needs drugs as a source of income, protection, or power.
There are five strategies that need to be implemented. First, operations must be network-based. Officers are not enough to arrest street-level dealers. Enforcement must be directed at the entire ecosystem: suppliers, financial controllers, couriers.