What's wrong with reviving the 'Koter'

What's wrong with reviving the 'Koter'

Ardimas Sasdi, Jakarta

The military can breathe a sigh of relief for now, with no
major protests against the stealthy reactivation of the dormant
Indonesian Military (TNI) Koter territorial command. But the
silence will unlikely last for long.

The public, especially the Muslim-majority of the population
who have to restrain themselves during the fasting month, will
likely unite and rise against this unpopular plan after Ramadhan.
By that time, the people will also know more about what this plan
entails.

The rejection of the Koter, which the TNI claims will act as a
deterrent to continuing terrorism threats, will most likely come
from intellectuals, non-governmental organizations, reformist
camps and the victims of state violence during the New Order era.

University students, who have experienced the luxury of living
in a democracy for the past seven years, will join the protests
against the revival of the security network, part of the TNI's
long-held ambition to return to power. But the cost the nation
will have to pay for this new militarism will be very high -- the
untimely death of a fledging democracy and the possible
regression of this country into a pariah dictatorship like
Myanmar or North Korea.

The TNI could certainly help in the terror fight by providing
intelligence information to the police through its extensive spy
networks if it wished. The war on terror does not need soldiers
because it is different from a conventional war against invaders
or secessionists, where the enemies are more concrete.

Even in the United States, a superpower which sponsored the
Global War On Terrorism after 9/11, the job of combating
terrorism is entrusted to the Homeland Security Office, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) -- not the military.

In Indonesia, the task is currently the territory of the
police, intelligence agencies under the coordination of National
Intelligence Agency (BIN) and the Counterterror Agency, which is
still being set up by the government.

"The diagnosis (that terrorism is dangerous and must be boldly
fought) is right, but the therapy is wrong," former president
Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid said about the TNI's plan.

The Koter was one of three main branches of the TNI along with
the General Affairs Division and the dissolved Socio-Political
Affairs Division, which was supposedly scrapped a few years ago
after internal reforms in the military. These divisions were
responsible for the deployment of personnel, the formulation of
strategy in wartime and the regulation of the military's role in
politics.

The military, especially the Army as the largest branch,
played a key role in domestic politics in line with its dual
function -- as a defense system and a so-called "political
stabilizer". So powerful was the military that at one time half
of around 30 governors and 400 regents and mayors were active
servicemen. One-sixth of the seats in the legislative assemblies
were also occupied by the military.

This political privilege, received by the military in return
for its role in the political machinery of the Soeharto regime,
was abolished by the People's Consultative Assembly in 2001.

It is understandable if the removal of these powers caused
gripes and grievances in the military and recent reports of the
secret reactivation of the Babinsa spying service in some
villages, the frontline of the Koter, is a striking indication of
that gripe. But the reemergence of the Babinsa, which is against
the internal reforms supposed to have been effected in the TNI,
has created more fear among the people rather than the "peace of
mind" the military claims.

History also has shown that a military approach to domestic
security threats, especially home-grown terrorism, has been
effective only as a short-term solution. However, the involvement
left a chain of problems in the long-term -- people's basic
rights to assemble and to express their opinions freely were
trampled on -- those who did not want to join the numbers of the
disappeared kept quiet as others fell victim to the security
forces.

More importantly this military approach did not solve the root
causes of terrorism -- backwardness, poverty, illiteracy,
inequality, unfairness in politics and education and the
perversion of religious teachings.

Endorsing the new Koter plan is also problematic legally --
once an institution is legalized it is very difficult to revoke
it. It is notable that this much-hated force, which had the
powers to interrogate, arrest and detain people without charges
for indefinite periods, could not be abolished for some years
after the fall of Soeharto in 1998.

The reactivation of the Koter is also a misinterpretation of
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's call upon the TNI to become
more active in the fight against terrorism.

Moreover the plan is very costly as it will entail the
deployment of thousands of personnel, the purchase of spying
equipment and many payments for operational expenses.

Jakarta Military commander Maj. Gen. Agustadi S. Purnomo said
the city would need 460 active Babinsa personnel for just South
Jakarta municipality alone, so one can only imagine the numbers
that would be required to cover more than 400 regencies and towns
in the country.

Indications that terrorists enjoyed protection, support and
funds from certain quarters in the country -- out of misguided
religious beliefs -- show that fighting terrorism should be more
the work of police and intelligence agencies. Noordin Moh. Top,
the Malaysian-born terrorist, for example, married a woman in
East Java. This marriage happened, of course, like all good
Muslim marriages, with her parents' consent.

The choice is now with the TNI -- to back up the police and
intelligence agencies in the hunt for terrorists or pursue its
own vested interests. This is also a litmus test of the TNI's
philosophy of kejuangan (idealism), which should put the national
interest above its own.

The author is a staff writer at The Jakarta Post.