What's wrong with reviving the 'Koter'

What's wrong with reviving the 'Koter'

Ardimas Sasdi, Jakarta

The military can breathe a sigh of relief for now, with no major protests against the stealthy reactivation of the dormant Indonesian Military (TNI) Koter territorial command. But the silence will unlikely last for long.

The public, especially the Muslim-majority of the population who have to restrain themselves during the fasting month, will likely unite and rise against this unpopular plan after Ramadhan. By that time, the people will also know more about what this plan entails.

The rejection of the Koter, which the TNI claims will act as a deterrent to continuing terrorism threats, will most likely come from intellectuals, non-governmental organizations, reformist camps and the victims of state violence during the New Order era.

University students, who have experienced the luxury of living in a democracy for the past seven years, will join the protests against the revival of the security network, part of the TNI's long-held ambition to return to power. But the cost the nation will have to pay for this new militarism will be very high -- the untimely death of a fledging democracy and the possible regression of this country into a pariah dictatorship like Myanmar or North Korea.

The TNI could certainly help in the terror fight by providing intelligence information to the police through its extensive spy networks if it wished. The war on terror does not need soldiers because it is different from a conventional war against invaders or secessionists, where the enemies are more concrete.

Even in the United States, a superpower which sponsored the Global War On Terrorism after 9/11, the job of combating terrorism is entrusted to the Homeland Security Office, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) -- not the military.

In Indonesia, the task is currently the territory of the police, intelligence agencies under the coordination of National Intelligence Agency (BIN) and the Counterterror Agency, which is still being set up by the government.

"The diagnosis (that terrorism is dangerous and must be boldly fought) is right, but the therapy is wrong," former president Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid said about the TNI's plan.

The Koter was one of three main branches of the TNI along with the General Affairs Division and the dissolved Socio-Political Affairs Division, which was supposedly scrapped a few years ago after internal reforms in the military. These divisions were responsible for the deployment of personnel, the formulation of strategy in wartime and the regulation of the military's role in politics.

The military, especially the Army as the largest branch, played a key role in domestic politics in line with its dual function -- as a defense system and a so-called "political stabilizer". So powerful was the military that at one time half of around 30 governors and 400 regents and mayors were active servicemen. One-sixth of the seats in the legislative assemblies were also occupied by the military.

This political privilege, received by the military in return for its role in the political machinery of the Soeharto regime, was abolished by the People's Consultative Assembly in 2001.

It is understandable if the removal of these powers caused gripes and grievances in the military and recent reports of the secret reactivation of the Babinsa spying service in some villages, the frontline of the Koter, is a striking indication of that gripe. But the reemergence of the Babinsa, which is against the internal reforms supposed to have been effected in the TNI, has created more fear among the people rather than the "peace of mind" the military claims.

History also has shown that a military approach to domestic security threats, especially home-grown terrorism, has been effective only as a short-term solution. However, the involvement left a chain of problems in the long-term -- people's basic rights to assemble and to express their opinions freely were trampled on -- those who did not want to join the numbers of the disappeared kept quiet as others fell victim to the security forces.

More importantly this military approach did not solve the root causes of terrorism -- backwardness, poverty, illiteracy, inequality, unfairness in politics and education and the perversion of religious teachings.

Endorsing the new Koter plan is also problematic legally -- once an institution is legalized it is very difficult to revoke it. It is notable that this much-hated force, which had the powers to interrogate, arrest and detain people without charges for indefinite periods, could not be abolished for some years after the fall of Soeharto in 1998.

The reactivation of the Koter is also a misinterpretation of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's call upon the TNI to become more active in the fight against terrorism.

Moreover the plan is very costly as it will entail the deployment of thousands of personnel, the purchase of spying equipment and many payments for operational expenses.

Jakarta Military commander Maj. Gen. Agustadi S. Purnomo said the city would need 460 active Babinsa personnel for just South Jakarta municipality alone, so one can only imagine the numbers that would be required to cover more than 400 regencies and towns in the country.

Indications that terrorists enjoyed protection, support and funds from certain quarters in the country -- out of misguided religious beliefs -- show that fighting terrorism should be more the work of police and intelligence agencies. Noordin Moh. Top, the Malaysian-born terrorist, for example, married a woman in East Java. This marriage happened, of course, like all good Muslim marriages, with her parents' consent.

The choice is now with the TNI -- to back up the police and intelligence agencies in the hunt for terrorists or pursue its own vested interests. This is also a litmus test of the TNI's philosophy of kejuangan (idealism), which should put the national interest above its own.

The author is a staff writer at The Jakarta Post.