What are audits for?

What are audits for?

The uncovering of numerous irregularities in the implementation of the state budget reported by the State Audit Agency is not surprising. After all, we are still in the early stages of creating a clean government.

What is astounding is the disclosure by the agency's chairman, Soedarjono, that various ministries and government agencies have shown a lack of willingness to follow up and act on the findings of the agency. This indicates that, even though the development of a clean, competent, effective and authoritative government has supposedly been a major aim of every cabinet since the mid-1970s, the political will to achieve that objective has been extremely lacking. Further down the line, the tendency also shows that various government agencies waste valuable opportunities to learn from past mistakes in order to prevent the recurrence of similar irregularities.

That trend further points to a grimmer fact. Even the early stages of building a clean government has moved at a snail's pace. That is especially worrisome because theoretically the state budget actually has all the elements of a built-in supervision mechanism, right down from the planning stage (resource allocation) to implementation.

The National Development Planning Board is assigned to ensure that the working programs and investment projects proposed by ministries and other government agencies meet the directives as stipulated in the Five Year Development Plan, currently in its sixth series. The House of Representatives also sees to it that the budget conforms with the priority scale as stipulated in the Broad Outlines of State Policies as adopted by the People's Consultative Assembly, the highest state body.

Every ministry and local administration has its own internal audit mechanism. The mechanism is further strengthened by the Government Audit Agency (BPKP), which although itself a government agency, is supposed to be more independent in its supervision compared to the in-house inspectorate at the various government ministries and institutions.

The problem, though, is that the government is so powerful that the House, dominated by the quasi government's political party, is not capable of performing its role in the mechanism of checks and balances. Worse still, the Supreme Audit Body (Bepeka), which the Constitution assigns as the highest independent institution to audit state finances, has no authority for law enforcement. It simply reports its findings to the House.

Therefore, the sad truth is that if the government itself is not serious about cleaning its own ranks and files; if it is unwilling to conduct an effective accountability system and is not magnanimous to correct the mistakes made by its apparatuses, it is unlikely that any other authority will be able to do the job effectively. And this we will have to live with until the House and other state agencies develop the capability to exercise the power they are vested with by the Constitution.

It is then most imperative for the highest ranks within the government to set examples and properly enforce the built-in supervision mechanism. It is unrealistic to expect a dramatic reduction of irregularities. But concrete, consistent measures could be taken to prove that an effective supervision system is being developed and implemented properly and discriminately.

Without sincere efforts, the government may see its integrity eroding in the eyes of the people at a time when such a quality is more crucial for maintaining the support of the public and for enforcing laws and policies.