War on 'preman' may not solve the problem

War on 'preman' may not solve the problem

Mulyana W. Kusumah, a noted criminologist, argues that the
success of the current battle against criminals will be short-
lived unless it is accompanied by a crackdown on their support
system.

JAKARTA (JP): Within 10 days after the raid against the preman
street hoodlums by the security forces in Jakarta, Semarang,
Yogyakarta, Surabaya and other bigger towns began, around six
thousand people have been detained. Almost five thousand of them
have been arrested in big cities and small towns in Java alone.

The operation in Jakarta has resulted in the death of Mario,
24, who was considered the one most responsible for the killing
of Police First Lieutenant Budi Prasetyo. The next casualty was
Ambrawa Dinata, 29, who for years had been known as the number
one preman in the Blok M area. Still another casualty was Budi
Mulyono. He was believed to be a hired killer and he was shot to
death by officers at a billiard parlor in Lenteng Agung, south of
Jakarta.

Outside Jakarta, Biran, 30, who was called the "king" of
hoodlums in Banyumas and who was on the operation's arrest list,
was found strangled to death on March 16. Officials said he had
committed suicide.

Not only has the operation penetrated every corner of the
city, notably crowded areas plagued by hoodlums, it has also
entered the courtroom. A few days ago, officers entered the West
Jakarta Court when the leader of a youth organization was being
tried. They arrested 11 people among those who attended.

The aforementioned operation against hoodlums is the biggest
repressive action taken against those considered to be criminals
since the "mysterious killings" of suspected habitual criminals
-- who were popularly known at that time as gali -- that took
place in 1982-1983.

At that time, only in Yogyakarta was it admitted that the
shootings and killings were part of an official war against
crime. In other regions, the government denied that the deaths of
thousands of gali were the result of security officers' actions.

It seemed that the "mysterious killings" were also aimed at
groups of ex-convicts who belonged to organizations such as PREMS
in Jakarta, Fajar Menyingsing in Semarang, Massa 33 in Surabaya.
At that time, all those groups were leading organizations of
hoodlums. During that period, the majority of their leaders were
killed or simply "disappeared".

Another major fight against crime is the Operasi Bersih, or
"Operation Cleansing", carried out by the Jakarta branch of the
Coordinating Agency for National Defense and Stability since
April 1994. The operation is considered relatively successful in
reducing street crimes.

In Jakarta alone, during a period of three years up to last
year, no fewer than 250 criminals had been shot by the police,
with 200 of them dying. Other records show that from 1993 to
1994, 107 criminals were shot by police in one single police
precinct, West Jakarta, and 69 of them met their death.

Unlike the "mysterious killings" of hoodlums in 1982-1983,
which provoked mixed reactions and were never fully acknowledged
as being part of an official operation, the current operation is
based on official instructions from the coordinating minister of
political and security affairs, the chief of the Armed Forces and
the chief of national police, as well as several regional
military and police chiefs, while the majority of the people have
expressed their support.

In addition to support from leaders of mass organizations, the
ongoing fight against hoodlums has received the endorsement of
members of the House of Representatives, members of the National
Commission on Human Rights and even non-governmental
organizations which rarely give supportive statements. Among the
latter were the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation and its Jakarta
legal aid office, both of which recently gave statements of
support -- naturally on condition that there should be no
excesses or violations of legal procedures in carrying out the
operation.

In the short term, the operation against hoodlums could
produce deterrent effects that may hold back those with potential
to become hoodlums. It could also remove hoodlums from their
areas of control and fulfill the need of the people in those
communities for a sense of security, particularly in urban
centers where people have repeatedly become victims of their
criminal actions.

One major issue that those involved in the operation should
always keep in mind is the accountability aspect and the legal
procedures that have to be followed after the arrests. Certainly
the legal process of selection to cull out those who have to be
prosecuted in a criminal court is not an easy one. In addition,
just like any other citizen, these hoodlums have the legal right
to question their arrest.

Another task of no less importance is to tackle the support
system of this phenomenon of hooliganism, both in the physical
and in the cultural sense. The physical support system consists
of the powerful backers that stand behind them, while the
cultural support system comprises the norms and values that
support the prevalence of a counter-culture of hooliganism.

Without a set of integrated actions in social development, the
results of the current fight against hoodlums will only be
temporary in nature. In the meantime, hooliganism will continue
to grow, perhaps in more subtle forms.

The writer is professor of criminology at the University of
Indonesia and Executive Director at YLBHI Legal Aid Foundation,
Jakarta.