War on 'preman' may not solve the problem

War on 'preman' may not solve the problem

Mulyana W. Kusumah, a noted criminologist, argues that the success of the current battle against criminals will be short- lived unless it is accompanied by a crackdown on their support system.

JAKARTA (JP): Within 10 days after the raid against the preman street hoodlums by the security forces in Jakarta, Semarang, Yogyakarta, Surabaya and other bigger towns began, around six thousand people have been detained. Almost five thousand of them have been arrested in big cities and small towns in Java alone.

The operation in Jakarta has resulted in the death of Mario, 24, who was considered the one most responsible for the killing of Police First Lieutenant Budi Prasetyo. The next casualty was Ambrawa Dinata, 29, who for years had been known as the number one preman in the Blok M area. Still another casualty was Budi Mulyono. He was believed to be a hired killer and he was shot to death by officers at a billiard parlor in Lenteng Agung, south of Jakarta.

Outside Jakarta, Biran, 30, who was called the "king" of hoodlums in Banyumas and who was on the operation's arrest list, was found strangled to death on March 16. Officials said he had committed suicide.

Not only has the operation penetrated every corner of the city, notably crowded areas plagued by hoodlums, it has also entered the courtroom. A few days ago, officers entered the West Jakarta Court when the leader of a youth organization was being tried. They arrested 11 people among those who attended.

The aforementioned operation against hoodlums is the biggest repressive action taken against those considered to be criminals since the "mysterious killings" of suspected habitual criminals -- who were popularly known at that time as gali -- that took place in 1982-1983.

At that time, only in Yogyakarta was it admitted that the shootings and killings were part of an official war against crime. In other regions, the government denied that the deaths of thousands of gali were the result of security officers' actions.

It seemed that the "mysterious killings" were also aimed at groups of ex-convicts who belonged to organizations such as PREMS in Jakarta, Fajar Menyingsing in Semarang, Massa 33 in Surabaya. At that time, all those groups were leading organizations of hoodlums. During that period, the majority of their leaders were killed or simply "disappeared".

Another major fight against crime is the Operasi Bersih, or "Operation Cleansing", carried out by the Jakarta branch of the Coordinating Agency for National Defense and Stability since April 1994. The operation is considered relatively successful in reducing street crimes.

In Jakarta alone, during a period of three years up to last year, no fewer than 250 criminals had been shot by the police, with 200 of them dying. Other records show that from 1993 to 1994, 107 criminals were shot by police in one single police precinct, West Jakarta, and 69 of them met their death.

Unlike the "mysterious killings" of hoodlums in 1982-1983, which provoked mixed reactions and were never fully acknowledged as being part of an official operation, the current operation is based on official instructions from the coordinating minister of political and security affairs, the chief of the Armed Forces and the chief of national police, as well as several regional military and police chiefs, while the majority of the people have expressed their support.

In addition to support from leaders of mass organizations, the ongoing fight against hoodlums has received the endorsement of members of the House of Representatives, members of the National Commission on Human Rights and even non-governmental organizations which rarely give supportive statements. Among the latter were the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation and its Jakarta legal aid office, both of which recently gave statements of support -- naturally on condition that there should be no excesses or violations of legal procedures in carrying out the operation.

In the short term, the operation against hoodlums could produce deterrent effects that may hold back those with potential to become hoodlums. It could also remove hoodlums from their areas of control and fulfill the need of the people in those communities for a sense of security, particularly in urban centers where people have repeatedly become victims of their criminal actions.

One major issue that those involved in the operation should always keep in mind is the accountability aspect and the legal procedures that have to be followed after the arrests. Certainly the legal process of selection to cull out those who have to be prosecuted in a criminal court is not an easy one. In addition, just like any other citizen, these hoodlums have the legal right to question their arrest.

Another task of no less importance is to tackle the support system of this phenomenon of hooliganism, both in the physical and in the cultural sense. The physical support system consists of the powerful backers that stand behind them, while the cultural support system comprises the norms and values that support the prevalence of a counter-culture of hooliganism.

Without a set of integrated actions in social development, the results of the current fight against hoodlums will only be temporary in nature. In the meantime, hooliganism will continue to grow, perhaps in more subtle forms.

The writer is professor of criminology at the University of Indonesia and Executive Director at YLBHI Legal Aid Foundation, Jakarta.