Walkouts on Repeat, Yet Still at the Same Table: Where Is Indonesia’s Diplomacy on Palestine Heading?
The Palestine issue is often treated as a reflection of faith and a form of solidarity deeply held by Indonesian society. The state’s firm stance serves as a form of proof and inner validation of what the public has long believed. That firmness was on display again on Thursday (24 September 2026), when Indonesia left the delegation seats as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu approached the green marble podium of the UN General Assembly in New York. Several other countries, including Spain, South Africa and Qatar, also walked out.
What appears to be a simple act in fact carries much greater meaning: “diplomatic jihad”. It represents the people’s inner convictions expressed through the state, becoming a collective moral stance translated into concrete action on the world stage.
Interestingly, Israeli media also recorded the countries that walked out during Netanyahu’s speech, noting their backgrounds. Indonesia, for instance, was described as a Muslim-majority country. This publication is ironic: rather than dampening the protest, it amplified and circulated the list of “dissident countries”. In doing so, it underscored that many countries have chosen to stand with Palestine.
The gesture on 24 September, however, was not a spontaneous reaction; it was part of a pattern repeated for three years in a row. At the 80th session in 2025, Netanyahu even spoke to a nearly empty chamber. At the 79th session in 2024, Indonesia had already walked out alongside Kuwait, Iran, Pakistan, Malaysia and Cuba—fellow members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the Arab League and the Non-Aligned Movement.
This consistency is not the product of a single administration or political moment. Its roots reach back to President Sukarno’s refusal to invite Israel to the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference. He affirmed that the stance on Palestine was part of the nation’s identity, not merely a policy choice.
The question, then, is no longer whether Indonesia will remain consistent, but why this symbolic consistency continues to be displayed on a stage as prominent as the UN General Assembly.
Two theoretical frameworks can help explain this tension, and they offer opposing answers.
First, James Fearon’s Audience Cost Theory (1994) explains that when leaders take a firm public stance, such as walking out, they put their own reputations at stake in the eyes of the public. The logic is that once a position is taken openly and recorded in history, it leaves a trace that cannot be erased.
If the government later chooses to soften or abandon that position, the cost is more than criticism: it may incur a real political penalty. The government could face accusations of inconsistency or be seen as betraying the values it has long proclaimed.
From this perspective, three consecutive years of walkouts are not an empty gesture. They bind the government to continued consistency because the public is now aware of its position and will keep demanding that it uphold it. This suggests that Indonesia’s solidarity with Palestine is not a passing reaction, but a historic commitment whose consistency is continually tested.
Second, however, Murray Edelman’s Symbolic Politics Theory (1964) offers a far more critical interpretation. Edelman argues that political symbols are often deliberately produced not to change policy, but to calm public anxiety—as a kind of “pressure-release valve”. A gesture such as a walkout may be enough to make people feel that their convictions are being defended, without requiring the state to alter its broader strategic course.
In this reading, three years of walkouts could be interpreted in the opposite way: not as evidence of a strengthening commitment, but as a safe annual ritual with little risk, lasting only a few minutes and never truly affecting more substantive foreign policy.
Edelman’s concern has grown since Indonesia officially joined the Board of Peace (BoP) on 22 January 2026. The forum was initiated by US President Donald Trump, with former British Prime Minister Tony Blair among the key members of its executive board. Within this forum, Israel sits as an equal member alongside Indonesia, rather than being treated as an occupying power that should be held accountable.
The BoP is not simply a post-conflict reconstruction forum. Fajri Matahati Muhammadin, an international law expert at the Faculty of Law of Gadjah Mada University, has pointed out that the BoP charter provides for the deployment of military forces and regime change. The board’s considerable powers also place the United States in a dominant position in decision-making. In other words, in a forum with far greater authority than a symbolic stage, Indonesia has chosen to sit at the same table rather than stand up and leave.
The irony is all the more striking given that just a week before the UN walkout, President Prabowo Subianto repeatedly shouted “Free Palestine” in front of students at Islamic boarding schools and other guests during the centenary celebration of Pondok Modern Darussalam Gontor on 19 September 2026. The moment ended with an embrace of the Palestinian ambassador. That embrace seemed to show how deeply the Palestine issue is bound up with the country’s emotional and religious ties.
But this is where the contradiction lies. On one hand, the country calls for Palestine’s liberation and leaves the podium to refuse sharing a stage with Netanyahu; on the other, it remains part of a forum that seats Israel as its equal and wields powers far beyond symbolism.
What distinguishes genuine commitment from an annual ritual? The answer lies in the scale of the sacrifice and the follow-through.
A walkout takes only a few minutes and costs no one anything, whereas a serious stance always demands a price from those taking it. At least two steps could demonstrate such commitment. A “negative” step would mean ending actions that contradict one’s own principles, such as leaving the BoP or freezing membership until Israel is treated as responsible for the occupation rather than as an equal partner.
A “positive” step would mean putting into practice what has long been proclaimed: alongside “diplomatic jihad”, there should also be “economic jihad”. As Haya Amani Muti’ah wrote in Republika, the status quo still sees products linked to Zionism being used even in government offices, not to mention their widespread consumption by the public. This needs to change. Political actions must not be merely “performative” while Zionist products continue to receive financial support.
The proposed legislation on Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) should be advanced so that Indonesia joins countries already applying economic pressure on Israel, rather than merely cheering from the stands. The bill is included in the 2024–2029 National Legislation Programme, but there has been no sign of progress. The public has long shown its seriousness through consumer boycotts and is waiting for a legal basis for action on a larger, more organised scale.
The question now is whether the state can match the seriousness of its citizens through policy. Without concrete steps, Fearon’s theory has no policy record against which the government can be held accountable, while Edelman’s critique remains valid: the walkout is perceived only as a “pressure-release valve”, however loudly “Free Palestine” is proclaimed.
So, is Indonesia’s walkout a genuine commitment or merely a performative display? We shall see.
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/walkouts-on-repeat-yet-still-at-the-same-table-where-is-indonesias-diplomacy-on-palestine-heading-1792651948)
Originally published by Republika (https://rejogja.republika.co.id/berita/tnancw291/walkout-terus-tapi-semeja-terus-ke-mana-arah-diplomasi-indonesia-terhadap-palestina), translated from Indonesian