U.S. interests in Malacca Straits
U.S. interests in Malacca Straits
Barrett Bingley, Jakarta
Meetings between the U.S., Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore
over the last ten days appear to have laid a path for security
cooperation in the Straits of Malacca. However, the recent
agreements are only the first step in ensuring maritime security
in the Straits.
A lack of effective implementation by the littoral states
would almost certainly result in a renewed push by the U.S. to
allow its forces to patrol the Straits.
The first key meeting took place in Putrajaya on June 20th
between Admiral Fargo, the Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific
Command and Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun
Razak.
The outcome of the meeting established that the United States
was not intending to deploy its own forces to patrol the Straits.
Instead, Fargo indicated the U.S. would support increased
information and intelligence exchange with the littoral states.
In Jakarta, a second important meeting took place on June 30th
and resulted in a joint declaration by Indonesia, Malaysia and
Singapore to initiate stepped-up coordinated patrols. These
patrols are to be the backbone of a viable security strategy in
the Malacca Straits, sans U.S. forces. Operational planning is
meant to commence this following week.
These meetings have laid a strong groundwork for fighting
piracy and terrorism in the Malacca Straits while maintaining the
maritime sovereignty of the three states. The statements made by
the littoral state's defense officials must now result in a
robust implementation of a maritime security regime in the
Malacca Straits.
Should intent not be translated into increased security in the
Straits, the U.S. will surely apply renewed pressure on Indonesia
and Malaysia to allow U.S. forces to begin patrols in the area.
Whether or not this is proper international behavior is the
subject of a different debate. The fact is, this course of
action is an attractive one to the U.S and will likely be
pursued.
The Malacca Strait is an area of continuing economic,
strategic and grand strategic interest to the United States.
The U.S. will closely monitor the security situation there and
is likely to intervene if it feels its interests are in danger.
It will be up to Indonesia to see that this danger does not
emanate from its territorial waters, lest it risk foreign
intervention.
The United States, along with its strongest regional supporter
Singapore, considers the threat of a catastrophic terrorist
strike in the Malacca Straits unacceptably high.
The U.S. and Singapore focus on worst-case scenarios, such
as closure of the Straits by the sinking of a tanker at its
narrowest, shallowest point (only 1.5 km across and 25 meters
deep), or the use of a Liquefied Natural Gas tanker as a floating
bomb against a port facility.
Both the United States and Singapore would like to see
security in the Straits become the responsibility of more than
just the littoral states.
Indonesians may deny the risk of catastrophic terrorism
exists as, Adm. Sondakh did on April 12 when he called U.S.
concerns 'baseless' and this may even be correct, but this does
not mean the concerns of the world's most powerful state can
easily be ignored.
The U.S. economic interests in keeping the Straits open are
enormous, given that 30 percent of world trade passes through the
Straits annually. Perhaps just as important is the U.S. interest
in ensuring the free-flow of oil to Japan and South Korea, its
strongest East Asian allies. Japan alone receives 80 percent of
its oil from ships transiting the Straits.
There are also important strategic and operational
considerations for the U.S. and Singapore. Warship freedom of
movement and port security is a high priority for both countries
following the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole and the
revelation of numerous Al-Qaeda plots to attack other U.S.
warships, including those in transiting the Malacca Straits.
Now that Singapore has opened the aircraft carrier docking
facility at Changi Naval Base U.S. warship traffic in the Strait
will be higher than ever before, presenting numerous tempting
targets for terrorists.
One somewhat overlooked reason for the recent U.S. interest in
the Malacca Straits is the role it plays in the newest
incarnation of U.S. grand strategy.
Thomas Barnett, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College,
has written a persuasive book called The Pentagon's New Map that
has received substantial interest in U.S. policy-making circles.
While by no means official U.S. policy, its main arguments appear
to parallel the latest U.S. geo-strategic actions.
Barnett argues that, from a U.S. security point of view, the
world can be divided into the Functioning Core which has embraced
globalization and is thick with connectivity, and the Non-
Integrating Gap where globalization is thinning or just plain
absent.
The keys to U.S. security are shrinking the Gap and stopping
terrorist networks from accessing the Core via 'seam states' that
lie along the Gap's boundaries. Barnett identifies Indonesia and
Malaysia as two notable 'seam states'.
The newly inaugurated Regional Maritime Security Initiative
(RMSI) can be seen as the U.S. Navy's contribution to shrinking
the Gap. The interest in counter-terrorism in the Malacca
Straits, which falls under the mandate of the RMSI, can be
understood as an effort to harden a key waterway against
terrorist forays originating from the 'seam states'.
Therefore, U.S. interest in the Malacca Straits is part of
an ambitious plan to improve security worldwide and that interest
is thus unlikely to diminish.
Given the strong and multi-layered interests of the U.S. in
the Malacca Straits the littoral states must prove they can
provide sufficient security against terrorism in order to avoid
provoking the U.S. into using its own forces in the waterway.
Meetings and agreements are not enough; the key to maintaining
maritime sovereignty for Indonesia and Malaysia is in their
implementation of these agreements.
The writer, a visiting fellow with the Centre for Strategic
and International Studies, can be reached at bbingley@hotmail.com.