U.S. interests in Malacca Straits

U.S. interests in Malacca Straits

Barrett Bingley, Jakarta

Meetings between the U.S., Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore over the last ten days appear to have laid a path for security cooperation in the Straits of Malacca. However, the recent agreements are only the first step in ensuring maritime security in the Straits.

A lack of effective implementation by the littoral states would almost certainly result in a renewed push by the U.S. to allow its forces to patrol the Straits.

The first key meeting took place in Putrajaya on June 20th between Admiral Fargo, the Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Command and Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak.

The outcome of the meeting established that the United States was not intending to deploy its own forces to patrol the Straits. Instead, Fargo indicated the U.S. would support increased information and intelligence exchange with the littoral states.

In Jakarta, a second important meeting took place on June 30th and resulted in a joint declaration by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore to initiate stepped-up coordinated patrols. These patrols are to be the backbone of a viable security strategy in the Malacca Straits, sans U.S. forces. Operational planning is meant to commence this following week.

These meetings have laid a strong groundwork for fighting piracy and terrorism in the Malacca Straits while maintaining the maritime sovereignty of the three states. The statements made by the littoral state's defense officials must now result in a robust implementation of a maritime security regime in the Malacca Straits.

Should intent not be translated into increased security in the Straits, the U.S. will surely apply renewed pressure on Indonesia and Malaysia to allow U.S. forces to begin patrols in the area.

Whether or not this is proper international behavior is the subject of a different debate. The fact is, this course of action is an attractive one to the U.S and will likely be pursued.

The Malacca Strait is an area of continuing economic, strategic and grand strategic interest to the United States.

The U.S. will closely monitor the security situation there and is likely to intervene if it feels its interests are in danger. It will be up to Indonesia to see that this danger does not emanate from its territorial waters, lest it risk foreign intervention.

The United States, along with its strongest regional supporter Singapore, considers the threat of a catastrophic terrorist strike in the Malacca Straits unacceptably high.

The U.S. and Singapore focus on worst-case scenarios, such as closure of the Straits by the sinking of a tanker at its narrowest, shallowest point (only 1.5 km across and 25 meters deep), or the use of a Liquefied Natural Gas tanker as a floating bomb against a port facility.

Both the United States and Singapore would like to see security in the Straits become the responsibility of more than just the littoral states.

Indonesians may deny the risk of catastrophic terrorism exists as, Adm. Sondakh did on April 12 when he called U.S. concerns 'baseless' and this may even be correct, but this does not mean the concerns of the world's most powerful state can easily be ignored.

The U.S. economic interests in keeping the Straits open are enormous, given that 30 percent of world trade passes through the Straits annually. Perhaps just as important is the U.S. interest in ensuring the free-flow of oil to Japan and South Korea, its strongest East Asian allies. Japan alone receives 80 percent of its oil from ships transiting the Straits.

There are also important strategic and operational considerations for the U.S. and Singapore. Warship freedom of movement and port security is a high priority for both countries following the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole and the revelation of numerous Al-Qaeda plots to attack other U.S. warships, including those in transiting the Malacca Straits.

Now that Singapore has opened the aircraft carrier docking facility at Changi Naval Base U.S. warship traffic in the Strait will be higher than ever before, presenting numerous tempting targets for terrorists.

One somewhat overlooked reason for the recent U.S. interest in the Malacca Straits is the role it plays in the newest incarnation of U.S. grand strategy.

Thomas Barnett, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College, has written a persuasive book called The Pentagon's New Map that has received substantial interest in U.S. policy-making circles. While by no means official U.S. policy, its main arguments appear to parallel the latest U.S. geo-strategic actions.

Barnett argues that, from a U.S. security point of view, the world can be divided into the Functioning Core which has embraced globalization and is thick with connectivity, and the Non- Integrating Gap where globalization is thinning or just plain absent.

The keys to U.S. security are shrinking the Gap and stopping terrorist networks from accessing the Core via 'seam states' that lie along the Gap's boundaries. Barnett identifies Indonesia and Malaysia as two notable 'seam states'.

The newly inaugurated Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) can be seen as the U.S. Navy's contribution to shrinking the Gap. The interest in counter-terrorism in the Malacca Straits, which falls under the mandate of the RMSI, can be understood as an effort to harden a key waterway against terrorist forays originating from the 'seam states'.

Therefore, U.S. interest in the Malacca Straits is part of an ambitious plan to improve security worldwide and that interest is thus unlikely to diminish.

Given the strong and multi-layered interests of the U.S. in the Malacca Straits the littoral states must prove they can provide sufficient security against terrorism in order to avoid provoking the U.S. into using its own forces in the waterway.

Meetings and agreements are not enough; the key to maintaining maritime sovereignty for Indonesia and Malaysia is in their implementation of these agreements.

The writer, a visiting fellow with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, can be reached at bbingley@hotmail.com.