U.S.-Indonesia ties under Susilo

U.S.-Indonesia ties under Susilo

Anthony Smith, Jakarta

One of the interesting photos from the recent Indonesian
presidential election featured candidate Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
pausing for a day to sit for a doctoral-level examination in
agricultural economics at the Bogor Institute for Agriculture.
Given Susilo's overwhelming victory in the second round of
Indonesia's presidential elections, Indonesia now has a head of
state who is at least interested in the details of policy.

Susilo's election will have a positive impact on U.S.-
Indonesia relations, but the new president will have to be
careful not to be too closely associated with Washington to
maintain domestic legitimacy and build coalitions with
parliamentary allies.

First, there is the war on terror. Although this tops
Washington's list of modern threats, Indonesia continues to
regard this as one of many security problems, and one that ranks
behind the problem of separatism. Megawati Soekarnoputri, while
in office, failed to demonstrate leadership on the problem of
domestic terrorism, making no official statements after the
October 2002 Bali bombing and failing to attend commemoration
ceremonies in Bali on the annual anniversary of the terrorist
attack. Susilo, while a Cabinet minister, took the lead in
speaking out against the terrorist threat, even in the face of a
skeptical public, and seems committed to confronting the problem.

He may be constrained, on this and other issues, by his
relative weakness in Parliament. The new president will face many
of the same political pressures Megawati faced when it came to
arresting key leaders of Jamaah Islamiyah, and will be unable to
enact much tougher legislation. But Indonesia now has a head of
state that is willing, and able, to speak directly to the masses
on the issue of international terrorism.

Second, a major obstacle to stronger U.S.-Indonesia relations
remains the ban on military-to-military relations imposed on
Washington by Congress. Military-to-military relations were
severed during the violence in East Timor in 1999. Attempts by
the Bush administration to begin to restore those links have met
opposition from Congress due to a series of concerns over human
rights violations.

The Bush administration showed an interest in restoration of
those links prior to Sept. 11, and the war on terrorism has added
impetus, from Washington's standpoint, for attempts to forge
ties, where possible, with the Indonesian military and police.

The death of two American teachers in Papua, with suspicion
falling on the army, has been the latest hurdle. Human rights
issues, corruption, and a lack of professionalism within the
Indonesia military will outlive the term of the newly elected
president no matter how hard he tackles them.

Yet, important progress can be achieved. In particular,
Susilo has spoken about finding a political solution to the
conflict in Aceh, and while he was a member of the Megawati
Cabinet seemed to be almost a lone voice advocating the
continuation of peace talks in that province. Ending the all-out
military offensive in Aceh and going back to the negotiating
table has been urged on Indonesia by the Bush administration
since an earlier agreement broke down in December 2002.

A revival of such talks, including a draw-down of forces, will
go a long way toward convincing Washington that Susilo is serious
about revamping Indonesia's security approach. Should Susilo be
able to end Indonesia's hamfisted approach to separatist
problems, this will remove a fundamental issue that drives
separatist sentiment -- namely, hatred of the military.

Third, Susilo has already signaled to the international
community that Indonesia will continue to seek international
assistance and remain connected to global trade, investment, aid,
and loans where needed. He has an ambitious economic reform plan,
which includes tackling Indonesia's massive subsidies for bulk
commodities, although it is doubtful that he will be able to move
quickly on these issues.

Although Susilo faces formidable opposition from Parliament's
largest political parties, who say they will remain outside
government as a "loyal opposition," his landslide victory will
focus the minds of politicians in Jakarta, at least in the short
term. The Susilo presidency and Cabinet, although likely to be!
frustrated at times, give Indonesia a more technocratic
government with which to shore up stability.

A Susilo presidency will not do away with some of the
structural bilateral problems between the U.S. and Indonesia.
Many in Indonesia remain skeptical about the U.S. war on
terrorism, seeing it as a means to weaken Islam. Political
elites in Indonesia will remain concerned that the U.S. is the
only superpower and that the Bush administration is an unhealthy
unilateralist power.

Above all, under a Susilo presidency, Indonesia will be
unwilling to fully support America's methods in the war on
terrorism even if there is agreement on the evils of terrorism.
In particular, Jakarta will remain concerned that Washington is
not being even-handed toward the Middle East, especially
Palestine.

The Susilo administration is therefore likely to improve U.S.-
Indonesia relations in particular areas but disagreements will
continue. Ironically, Susilo's ability to substantially improve
the relationship could have a downside: This could add substance
to charges that Susilo is too close to Washington. Such an
association would be a political liability. The new president
must use good judgment to improve relations with the U.S. -- as
he will want to do -- while avoiding a public backlash. Time
will tell if he has the skills for that political balancing act.

The writer is an associate fellow at the Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. He can be reached at
smitha@apcss.org