U.S. in the Philippines: Benefit or liability?
U.S. in the Philippines: Benefit or liability?
Lee Kim Chew, The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore
America's war against terrorism has given the country a new
opportunity to re-establish its military presence in the
Philippines.
It is not just Philippine President Gloria Arroyo's readiness
to play host again to United States troops in her fight against
the Abu Sayyaf rebels.
More significantly, the two countries are working on a new
pact that will give the Americans greater access to military
facilities in the Philippines.
President Arroyo wants to get hitched to America's anti-
terrorism bandwagon in her efforts to root out Abu Sayyaf, an
Islamic militant group that has links with the al-Qaeda terrorist
network, and get US$100 million (S$184 million) in military aid
from the U.S.
American support by way of training and logistical backup for
the poorly-equipped Philippine troops will bolster her
administration, even if these do not resolve the problems that
fuel the Muslim separatist war in the south.
But the ramifications go beyond the divisive debate in Manila
about the constitutionality of Arroyo's move to let the Americans
join the Philippine military in putting down an internal
rebellion.
Any significant scaling up of permanent U.S. military
facilities, such as supply depots, will certainly deepen China's
suspicions about encirclement.
Geoffrey Till, dean of academic studies at Britain's Joint
Services Command and Staff College in London, says Chinese
reaction to any new American facility in the Philippines depends
on what they do with it.
He told The Straits Times: "If the Americans are seen as
developing a kind of permanent presence in Southeast Asia, they
would be very wary. But if they see it as simply facilitating a
kind of limited police presence, I think they would be fairly
relaxed about that.
"The Chinese attitude towards American naval power is a lot
more complicated than most people think it is.
"To an extent, they are quite content to see the U.S. military
establishment generally providing a kind of stabilizing function
within the area, because it means that Japan won't do it.
Effectively, it's a way of heading off conflict.
"But if the U.S. threatens to become a kind of hegemony in
that area threatening Chinese interests, then there would be
resistance to it."
Deploying American troops in the southern Philippines, a
hotbed of Islamic and communist insurgences, can also be a
political liability for the Arroyo administration if domestic
opposition mounts.
Already, left-wing critics lambaste the proposed pact as a
pretext for the return of American troops to the Philippines.
Despite the opposition, even within her own Cabinet, Arroyo
did not cut back the 650 U.S. troops that will soon be sent to
Basilan and Mindanao.
But she shortened the duration of their stay from a year to
six months and promised that the American forces will not be
involved in combat operations.
Arroyo is trying to get around the resistance in the
Philippine Senate, which is holding its own inquiry, by asserting
that the new logistics pact with the U.S. is not a treaty but an
executive agreement that needs no congressional ratification.
This is a deft, but politically risky, move because it can
backfire on her government if popular sentiment, not just
opposition law-makers, turns against it. National sovereignty and
pride are at stake, even though the Philippine military had
failed to root out the several hundred Abu Sayyaf rebels from
their jungle hideouts in Basilan Island.
With training from the American special forces and fresh
logistical supplies -- helicopters, night-vision equipment and
new arms -- it has a better chance of defeating them.
Because the U.S. troops are there as trainers, not combatants,
their involvement in the battle zone is not likely to lead
America into another quagmire as it did in Vietnam.
Success in wiping out the Abu Sayyaf militants, who have
turned to kidnapping for ransom, will highlight Washington's
determination that it spares no effort in destroying any group
that works with al-Qaeda.
But a gung-ho attempt by the Americans to flex their military
might in the Philippines will stoke nationalistic passions among
a people who evicted them only a decade ago.
Washington's long-term agenda is to get access, or establish
military facilities, in the Philippines, even though a permanent
base is something it has learnt to live without.
America has pursued a policy of seeking access to port
facilities rather than establishing permanent bases after its
eviction from the country in 1992.
Till says the U.S. has built a huge self-sustaining sea-based
logistics system for its navy and no longer needs Subic Bay like
it used to. Also, it has Diego Garcia as well as facilities in
Japan and Singapore.
The Americans want a logistics agreement with the Philippines
as an additional facility, he says.
"It's a way of multiplying options. If, for example, the U.S.
does something that Singapore does not approve of, then it has
another option of trying somewhere else. The more facilities you
have, the more options you've got."
Are the Filipinos game?
President Arroyo is going for it. There are, after all, enough
Filipinos who regret America's abrupt departure from Subic Bay
and Clark Air Base, and the massive economic benefits that went
with it.
Now they see a chance to recover lost ground.