U.S. in the Philippines: Benefit or liability?
U.S. in the Philippines: Benefit or liability?
Lee Kim Chew, The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore
America's war against terrorism has given the country a new opportunity to re-establish its military presence in the Philippines.
It is not just Philippine President Gloria Arroyo's readiness to play host again to United States troops in her fight against the Abu Sayyaf rebels.
More significantly, the two countries are working on a new pact that will give the Americans greater access to military facilities in the Philippines.
President Arroyo wants to get hitched to America's anti- terrorism bandwagon in her efforts to root out Abu Sayyaf, an Islamic militant group that has links with the al-Qaeda terrorist network, and get US$100 million (S$184 million) in military aid from the U.S.
American support by way of training and logistical backup for the poorly-equipped Philippine troops will bolster her administration, even if these do not resolve the problems that fuel the Muslim separatist war in the south.
But the ramifications go beyond the divisive debate in Manila about the constitutionality of Arroyo's move to let the Americans join the Philippine military in putting down an internal rebellion.
Any significant scaling up of permanent U.S. military facilities, such as supply depots, will certainly deepen China's suspicions about encirclement.
Geoffrey Till, dean of academic studies at Britain's Joint Services Command and Staff College in London, says Chinese reaction to any new American facility in the Philippines depends on what they do with it.
He told The Straits Times: "If the Americans are seen as developing a kind of permanent presence in Southeast Asia, they would be very wary. But if they see it as simply facilitating a kind of limited police presence, I think they would be fairly relaxed about that.
"The Chinese attitude towards American naval power is a lot more complicated than most people think it is.
"To an extent, they are quite content to see the U.S. military establishment generally providing a kind of stabilizing function within the area, because it means that Japan won't do it. Effectively, it's a way of heading off conflict.
"But if the U.S. threatens to become a kind of hegemony in that area threatening Chinese interests, then there would be resistance to it."
Deploying American troops in the southern Philippines, a hotbed of Islamic and communist insurgences, can also be a political liability for the Arroyo administration if domestic opposition mounts.
Already, left-wing critics lambaste the proposed pact as a pretext for the return of American troops to the Philippines.
Despite the opposition, even within her own Cabinet, Arroyo did not cut back the 650 U.S. troops that will soon be sent to Basilan and Mindanao.
But she shortened the duration of their stay from a year to six months and promised that the American forces will not be involved in combat operations.
Arroyo is trying to get around the resistance in the Philippine Senate, which is holding its own inquiry, by asserting that the new logistics pact with the U.S. is not a treaty but an executive agreement that needs no congressional ratification.
This is a deft, but politically risky, move because it can backfire on her government if popular sentiment, not just opposition law-makers, turns against it. National sovereignty and pride are at stake, even though the Philippine military had failed to root out the several hundred Abu Sayyaf rebels from their jungle hideouts in Basilan Island.
With training from the American special forces and fresh logistical supplies -- helicopters, night-vision equipment and new arms -- it has a better chance of defeating them.
Because the U.S. troops are there as trainers, not combatants, their involvement in the battle zone is not likely to lead America into another quagmire as it did in Vietnam.
Success in wiping out the Abu Sayyaf militants, who have turned to kidnapping for ransom, will highlight Washington's determination that it spares no effort in destroying any group that works with al-Qaeda.
But a gung-ho attempt by the Americans to flex their military might in the Philippines will stoke nationalistic passions among a people who evicted them only a decade ago.
Washington's long-term agenda is to get access, or establish military facilities, in the Philippines, even though a permanent base is something it has learnt to live without.
America has pursued a policy of seeking access to port facilities rather than establishing permanent bases after its eviction from the country in 1992.
Till says the U.S. has built a huge self-sustaining sea-based logistics system for its navy and no longer needs Subic Bay like it used to. Also, it has Diego Garcia as well as facilities in Japan and Singapore.
The Americans want a logistics agreement with the Philippines as an additional facility, he says.
"It's a way of multiplying options. If, for example, the U.S. does something that Singapore does not approve of, then it has another option of trying somewhere else. The more facilities you have, the more options you've got."
Are the Filipinos game?
President Arroyo is going for it. There are, after all, enough Filipinos who regret America's abrupt departure from Subic Bay and Clark Air Base, and the massive economic benefits that went with it.
Now they see a chance to recover lost ground.