Truth about balance of power dimension

Truth about balance of power dimension

From its very inception, ASEAN's approach to security issues has
contained a balance of power dimension.

By Michael Leifer

In academic and political debate on regional security within
Southeast Asia, a dismissive attitude has arisen towards the
concept and practice of balance of power. The conventional
wisdom is that balance of power is a mechanical contrivance of
European provenance which is not suitable for regional
circumstances, especially in the wake of the Cold War. Indeed,
the criticism goes further in suggesting that indulgence in the
balance of power would be a self-affliction best confined to the
dust-bin of history along with colonialism because it would
provoke confrontation and not facilitate reconciliation.

Part of the difficulty in coming to terms with the concept of
balance of power is its intrinsic ambiguity. Many tomes have been
written exploring and explaining the different meanings of the
concept as applied in a variety of historical circumstances. A
short-cut to understanding the concept is to simplify its
meanings into only two kinds.

One meaning of balance of power is a description of a
relationship between two or more states defined in terms of their
respective capabilities. Balance of power in this sense is best
understood as distribution of power and, of course, marked
changes in such a distribution can have disturbing consequences
as states which feel disadvantaged and vulnerable may take steps
to redress any adverse change in capabilities between themselves
and potential adversaries.

This meaning of balance of power, which is akin to the notion
of a bank balance, provides a direct link to the second, which is
best explained as a policy rather than a situation. Such a policy
is best understood as being directed at preventing the
establishment of undue dominance by one or more states. Balance
of power in this sense is undertaken with the objective of
denying the emergence of a hegemonial state able to dictate the
terms of regional order through forming a countervailing
coalition of states. The normal name for such a coalition is an
alliance defined in terms of military purpose and, traditionally,
the instrument of the balance has been war.

The experience of alliance in Southeast Asia has been mixed
but, where it has existed, a critical precondition has been
necessary; namely, a common definition of external threat on the
part of prospective alliance partners. Such a common definition
has never been obtained among the members of ASEAN who have
approached the management of security issues through alternative
political means with some success. A reluctance to contemplate
alliance has been based also on an aversion to the very concept
and practice which is believed to be alien to and incompatible
with non-aligned aspirations.

In point of fact, however, ASEAN's practice has contained an
evident dimension of balance of power from the outset. ASEAN was
established in an attempt to promote regional reconciliation
within an institutional framework of multilateral constraint.
"Confrontation" had revealed Indonesia's hegemonial propensities
under President Sukarno. His successor, President Soeharto, well
understood that one practical way of restoring both regional
confidence and stability would be to lock Indonesia into a
structure of regional partnership which would be seen to disavow
hegemonial pretensions. It was not an exercise in the balance of
power in the classical sense through alliance formation but ASEAN
had an evident balance of power purpose.

In the wake of the Cold War, ASEAN has taken the formal
initiative to apply its own model for regional security on a
wider Asia-Pacific basis. The modalities of the embryonic ASEAN
Regional Forum have been drawn in important part from ASEAN's
experience at avoiding and managing conflict. In this
undertaking, however, balance of power has not been discarded.

When the senior officials of ASEAN and its dialogue partners
convened at a seminal meeting in Singapore in May 1993 which led
on to the ARF, balance of power as well as the ASEAN model were
very much in mind with China identified as a potential regional
hegemony. In that context, it was pointed out that "the
continuing presence of the United States together with stable
relationships among the United States, Japan, and China and other
states of the region would contribute to regional stability".

The object of the exercise was not necessarily to contain
China. Indeed, it was hoped that the nexus of economic incentive
would serve to bring about the constructive engagement which has
become part of regional rhetoric. Nonetheless, the very attempt
to lock China into a network of constraining multilateral
arrangements underpinned hopefully by a sustained and viable
American military presence would seem to serve the purpose of the
balance of power by means other than alliance.

That commitment and presence is not to be taken on trust, as
pointed out by American academic Donald Weatherbee. For that
reason, in part, regional states which can afford it have begun
unilaterally to engage in defense force modernization which would
seem to be yet another version of balance of power practice.

The balance of power may have become identified historically
with a particular phase of European experience. Its underlying
tenets have a universal application, however, irrespective of the
manner in which they are expressed and applied. For that reason,
it is possible to conclude that the balance of power is alive and
well in Southeast Asia albeit confined to the closet.

Professor Michael Leifer is a Senior Professorial Fellow at the
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.