Truth about balance of power dimension

Truth about balance of power dimension

From its very inception, ASEAN's approach to security issues has contained a balance of power dimension.

By Michael Leifer

In academic and political debate on regional security within Southeast Asia, a dismissive attitude has arisen towards the concept and practice of balance of power. The conventional wisdom is that balance of power is a mechanical contrivance of European provenance which is not suitable for regional circumstances, especially in the wake of the Cold War. Indeed, the criticism goes further in suggesting that indulgence in the balance of power would be a self-affliction best confined to the dust-bin of history along with colonialism because it would provoke confrontation and not facilitate reconciliation.

Part of the difficulty in coming to terms with the concept of balance of power is its intrinsic ambiguity. Many tomes have been written exploring and explaining the different meanings of the concept as applied in a variety of historical circumstances. A short-cut to understanding the concept is to simplify its meanings into only two kinds.

One meaning of balance of power is a description of a relationship between two or more states defined in terms of their respective capabilities. Balance of power in this sense is best understood as distribution of power and, of course, marked changes in such a distribution can have disturbing consequences as states which feel disadvantaged and vulnerable may take steps to redress any adverse change in capabilities between themselves and potential adversaries.

This meaning of balance of power, which is akin to the notion of a bank balance, provides a direct link to the second, which is best explained as a policy rather than a situation. Such a policy is best understood as being directed at preventing the establishment of undue dominance by one or more states. Balance of power in this sense is undertaken with the objective of denying the emergence of a hegemonial state able to dictate the terms of regional order through forming a countervailing coalition of states. The normal name for such a coalition is an alliance defined in terms of military purpose and, traditionally, the instrument of the balance has been war.

The experience of alliance in Southeast Asia has been mixed but, where it has existed, a critical precondition has been necessary; namely, a common definition of external threat on the part of prospective alliance partners. Such a common definition has never been obtained among the members of ASEAN who have approached the management of security issues through alternative political means with some success. A reluctance to contemplate alliance has been based also on an aversion to the very concept and practice which is believed to be alien to and incompatible with non-aligned aspirations.

In point of fact, however, ASEAN's practice has contained an evident dimension of balance of power from the outset. ASEAN was established in an attempt to promote regional reconciliation within an institutional framework of multilateral constraint. "Confrontation" had revealed Indonesia's hegemonial propensities under President Sukarno. His successor, President Soeharto, well understood that one practical way of restoring both regional confidence and stability would be to lock Indonesia into a structure of regional partnership which would be seen to disavow hegemonial pretensions. It was not an exercise in the balance of power in the classical sense through alliance formation but ASEAN had an evident balance of power purpose.

In the wake of the Cold War, ASEAN has taken the formal initiative to apply its own model for regional security on a wider Asia-Pacific basis. The modalities of the embryonic ASEAN Regional Forum have been drawn in important part from ASEAN's experience at avoiding and managing conflict. In this undertaking, however, balance of power has not been discarded.

When the senior officials of ASEAN and its dialogue partners convened at a seminal meeting in Singapore in May 1993 which led on to the ARF, balance of power as well as the ASEAN model were very much in mind with China identified as a potential regional hegemony. In that context, it was pointed out that "the continuing presence of the United States together with stable relationships among the United States, Japan, and China and other states of the region would contribute to regional stability".

The object of the exercise was not necessarily to contain China. Indeed, it was hoped that the nexus of economic incentive would serve to bring about the constructive engagement which has become part of regional rhetoric. Nonetheless, the very attempt to lock China into a network of constraining multilateral arrangements underpinned hopefully by a sustained and viable American military presence would seem to serve the purpose of the balance of power by means other than alliance.

That commitment and presence is not to be taken on trust, as pointed out by American academic Donald Weatherbee. For that reason, in part, regional states which can afford it have begun unilaterally to engage in defense force modernization which would seem to be yet another version of balance of power practice.

The balance of power may have become identified historically with a particular phase of European experience. Its underlying tenets have a universal application, however, irrespective of the manner in which they are expressed and applied. For that reason, it is possible to conclude that the balance of power is alive and well in Southeast Asia albeit confined to the closet.

Professor Michael Leifer is a Senior Professorial Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.