Trump Unsettles Europe, Forcing Self-Reliance Against Russian Threats

Jakarta, CNBC Indonesia - Europe is now facing a challenging situation. The region is beginning to realise that its security can no longer fully depend on the United States (US), especially in the era of President Donald Trump.

For years, the US has been the backbone of European defence through NATO. However, Trump’s frequent questioning of US commitment to the alliance has led many European countries to recalculate their positions.

Citing Reuters, Trump cannot simply withdraw the US from NATO without Congressional approval.

However, Europe’s concern is not just about whether the US will leave NATO. The greater worry is whether the US will truly assist if Russia attacks a European country at some point.

In simple terms, Europe actually has one major answer: strengthening its own defence. The problem is that unifying the defence of many countries is no easy task.

Each country has a different perspective on the Russian threat. Poland, for instance, is far more concerned due to its proximity to Russia. Meanwhile, Spain, located further away, does not feel the same level of threat.

This difference is evident in defence budgets. Last year, Poland spent 4.5% of its gross domestic product on defence. In contrast, Spain allocated only 2.0%. This means that from the outset, the level of readiness and willingness of each country to strengthen its military has varied.

Military capabilities also differ. The UK and France possess nuclear weapons, while other European countries do not. Germany has greater economic capacity to fund defence, whereas many other countries still face high debt burdens.

National interests often pose obstacles. Germany and France, for example, still disagree on a joint fighter jet project. In many countries, governments also prefer awarding defence contracts to domestic companies rather than seeking the best suppliers through open competition.

Yet, modern warfare moves very quickly. Drones, robots, satellite systems, and anti-missile defences are becoming increasingly important. In such conditions, Europe cannot rely solely on old patterns and large, slow-moving companies.

Another equally complex issue is wartime decision-making. Many countries do not want such critical decisions determined by others. Governments are naturally concerned if their citizens must go to war due to collective decisions they do not fully control.

Domestic political conditions add further complexity. The rise of right-wing nationalist parties, such as France’s National Front, the UK’s Reform UK, and Germany’s Alternative for Germany, makes European defence cooperation even more difficult. Some of these parties have at times shown a softer stance towards Russia.

Nevertheless, Europe’s position is not entirely weak. Europe differs from Russia or the US because its primary goal is not to start wars but to defend itself. For defence, its military needs do not have to be as large as those of a country intent on attacking.

From an economic perspective, Europe’s capital is substantial. The gross domestic product of NATO countries in Europe reaches US$25 trillion in 2025. This figure is nearly ten times larger than Russia’s economy, which stands at US$2.6 trillion.

This means that in terms of economic capacity, Europe actually has the resources to strengthen its defence. The challenge is how these countries are willing to pool some of their resources, money, technology, and strategies.

Additionally, Russia is currently preoccupied with the war in Ukraine. As long as Russia has not won in Ukraine, Moscow will struggle to open a new front elsewhere, such as in the Baltic states.

Therefore, Europe’s aid to Ukraine is not just about helping Kyiv. For Europe, strengthening Ukraine also means safeguarding its own front line. If support for Ukraine is increased beyond the €90 billion commitment agreed last week, pressure on Russia can be maintained.

The US is also not entirely absent as an ally. Even with Trump in the White House, the US retains strategic value for Europe. Moreover, the US president after Trump could restore more solid US-Europe relations.

Small Coalitions as a Middle Path

In an ideal scenario, European countries could unify their defence in many areas. From alliances and military missions to joint capabilities, weapons production, and funding.

However, in reality, it is unlikely to be that neat. What is more plausible is the emergence of several different cooperation groups, tailored to each country’s interests and needs.

NATO remains the most realistic main defence umbrella. The European Union does have rules on joint defence. However, those rules have hardly been tested in a major war situation.

Moreover, the European Union does not encompass all important military powers in the region. The UK, for example, has left the European Union, yet it is one of Europe’s largest military forces.

Therefore, countries feeling most threatened by Russia could move faster in smaller groups. One such is the Joint Expeditionary Force, a rapid reaction force led by the UK and comprising 10 northern European countries.

The UK and France also have strong defence cooperation. The two even lead two groups of countries ready to act together, commonly known as “coalitions of the willing”.

The first group aims to keep the Strait of Hormuz open after the conflict with Iran ends. The second is prepared to help defend Ukraine if that country reaches a peace agreement with Russia.

Germany is also beginning to show greater ambition. Last week, Berlin released a military strategy named “Responsibi