Total Defence and Conscription
For a long time, the issue of the military and democracy has been seen as a point of contention, even though the two should not be placed in an adversarial position. In the Indonesian context, this is somewhat understood due to our long history and experience during the New Order era, when the military dominated various civilian and political institutional positions, using military power for praetorian purposes.
However, post-New Order, as part of the national consensus to build democracy, the military has matured to meet democratic demands, focusing the national defence sector as the foundation of its professional service. This piece is not intended to discuss the position of the military, and I believe the position maintained by the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) has not shifted. The TNI has remained ‘the guardian of the republic’ since its inception, and we must help ensure the TNI remains focused on its primary duties.
What we need to consider next is how to translate this into trained reserve and supporting forces. The concept of Total Defence is clearly enshrined in the 1945 Constitution, specifically Article 27, Clause 3 regarding the Right and Obligation of State Defence, and Article 30, Clause 2, which states that the TNI and the Police serve as the primary forces for security and defence, with the people serving as the supporting force.
How is this Total Defence doctrine implemented? To date, we still rely on the primary defence force, the TNI, and the reserve component, consisting of citizens selected to undergo military training. The ‘total’ aspect of this concept is not yet fully visible, necessitating a reconsideration.
Conscription in Democratic Nations
At present, at least a dozen countries implement conscription for their citizens, including South Korea, Turkey, Brazil, Russia, Algeria, Armenia, Estonia, Israel, and North Korea. Developed nations in Western Europe such as Finland, Sweden, Norway, and even neutral nations like Switzerland also implement conscription. Some of our neighbours, such as Singapore and Thailand, also utilise conscription.
There are various models of conscription globally. South Korea requires all men aged 18-28 to undergo 18-24 months of military service across various branches. Those deemed to have achieved world-class excellence are exempted by their government. In many other countries, including Western Europe, the pattern is similar, with service starting at age 18. In 2016, Norway introduced mandatory military service for women as part of a gender equality policy.
In contrast, the United States initially implemented conscription, but this ended in 1973. Subsequently, conscription became selective, targeting citizens who pass selection by the federal government. However, all citizens, including both legal and undocumented immigrants aged 18 and above, must register with the Selective Service System (SSS). Those who pass the SSS are obligated to undergo military service.
Our neighbour, Malaysia, appears to implement a system similar to the United States. Malaysian citizens selected by the government, specifically youths aged 16 and above, are required to participate in the National Service Training Programme (PLKN) for 45 days.
Rethinking the Implementation of Total Defence
The concept of Total Defence is based on the doctrine formulated by General AH Nasution in 1953. This doctrine was the result of the General’s reflections on his guerrilla warfare experiences during the early years of independence. But is this doctrine still relevant today?
Without hesitation, I answer that this doctrine remains relevant; what has changed is the complexity of threats due to the expansion of asymmetric warfare and hybrid warfare. As the primary force, the TNI bears a heavy responsibility, compounded by limited fiscal strength. Therefore, to face defence threats, the TNI requires resource support to increase professionalism and the readiness of an escalated trained civilian force.
A trained populace does not mean ignoring the primary priority of building a capable TNI posture that meets the Minimum Essential Force (MEF); rather, we need to reconsider the concept of the Reserve Component (Komcad) as a layer of defence. Our definition of the defence spectrum also needs to be expanded. The Komcad concept is more akin to the Malaysian-style ‘conscription’, involving the voluntary participation of citizens into the reserve force.
Defence threats are often too focused on military threats, whereas asymmetric and hybrid warfare have expanded into the framework of civil order. This situation can create a dilemma for the TNI, as military mobilisation within a civil order regime is not easy. Therefore, with a solid combination of the TNI and the people, the populace can be relied upon to face non-conventional warfare.
A trained populace is not just those involved in the Komcad; more importantly, it is an inherent awareness held by every citizen—both personally and institutionally—utilising their respective expertise and capacity, feeling called to assist against various national defence threats. These resources have not yet been well-organised and have rarely been tested since the war of independence.
Secondly, we need to consider the expansion of the Komcad. Perhaps we need a limited form of conscription, aimed not solely at the needs of the defence reserve, but at building a supporting culture for the implementation of total development, especially among the younger generation. It may be time to introduce discipline, character building, and an understanding of state defence to 18-year-olds through integrated education involving schools, the TNI, the Police, and practitioners for long-term training and development. The goal is to build a new, more productive culture, increasing innovation and noble character among our youth.