To the Bitter End: Solo’s Legacy and the Test of Hambalang’s Control
To the Bitter End: Solo’s Legacy and the Test of Hambalang’s Control
From a general’s rise through the circles of power under Jokowi to allegations of surveillance targeting President Prabowo, a major question has emerged: who really controls the instruments of the state?
On Tuesday evening, 3 November 2026, Indonesians were confronted with an event that was difficult to believe. The police announced that three police generals were suspects in an alleged illegal surveillance operation. One was former National Police Chief Listyo Sigit Prabowo, who had taken up the post of Presidential Chief of Staff only a month earlier. More strikingly, one of the alleged targets was President Prabowo Subianto.
A former head of the police, still within the orbit of the Presidential Palace, now faces legal proceedings over the alleged use of state apparatus to monitor the head of state himself.
Nine months earlier, on 26 January 2026, Listyo appeared before the Indonesian House of Representatives’ Commission III. He rejected the idea of placing the National Police under a ministry, arguing that it was best for the force to report directly to the President. He even urged all ranks to defend that position ‘to the bitter end’. In the parliamentary hearing room, he sounded like a general defending the honour of his institution. Now, those words carry a very different resonance.
Less than a day after the suspects were announced, another shock came from the Presidential Palace. On Wednesday, 4 November 2026, Prabowo formally dismissed Listyo as Presidential Chief of Staff and appointed Lieutenant General Ariyo Windutomo as acting chief. The Palace said the alleged actions of Listyo and two other officers could amount to treason because they might endanger the interests and safety of the country’s leadership. This is an extremely serious claim.
Under the Criminal Code that came into force in January 2026, Article 160 defines treason as an intention to carry out an attack that has been put into effect through preparatory acts. Article 191 covers an aim to render the President or Vice-President unable to govern, while Article 193 concerns an intention to overthrow the government. Illegal surveillance of the President, therefore, does not automatically prove treason.
The authorities must establish an aim and conduct that meet the legal elements of the offence. The day before, Coordinating Minister for Law, Human Rights, Immigration and Corrections Yusril Ihza Mahendra also said the investigation was not using treason charges. The suspects are accused of illegal surveillance, unauthorised access and deletion of electronic information. They remain entitled to the presumption of innocence.
Politically, however, the matter has already sent shockwaves. If state apparatus was indeed used to monitor its own President, who really holds control over the instruments of the state?
Solo’s legacy: a general’s journey to the centre of power
To understand why Listyo’s name has shaken national politics, it is necessary to look back to Central Java. In 2009, Listyo was chief of police in Pati. A year later he became deputy chief of the Semarang City Police, before being appointed head of the Surakarta City Police in 2011. At the time, Joko Widodo was Mayor of Solo. Their professional relationship continued, eventually taking Listyo to the centre of power.
After Jokowi was elected President in 2014, Listyo became his aide until 2016. His career then advanced rapidly: he became Banten Police Chief, head of the Police Professional and Security Division, and chief of the Criminal Investigation Agency. In January 2021, Jokowi nominated him as the sole candidate for National Police Chief. This career trajectory is documented history. There is nothing improper about a President placing trust in an officer he considers capable. But in power politics, a long professional relationship can also foster closeness and networks of influence. Presidents may change and appointments may end, but personal ties do not automatically dissolve when an administration leaves office.
This is why Solo matters. It was the starting point of a political relationship that influenced the career of a senior police leader. Interestingly, on 1 October 2026, President Prabowo appointed Listyo as Presidential Chief of Staff. This may have been part of Prabowo’s political strategy to reposition a general with extensive networks in the previous administration. The actual calculation is not known. In politics, an appointment does not always represent unlimited trust. Sometimes a person is brought into the circle of power because their influence needs to be managed.
The problem is that moving someone from one post to another does not necessarily move all their loyalties and networks of influence with them. An official can lose their position in a day, but a network built over years does not automatically lose its grip.
Three generals: how far does the network reach?
The Criminal Investigation Agency named three suspects: Listyo Sigit Prabowo, Inspector General Ahrie Sonta Nasution and Inspector General Eko Hadi Santoso. Investigators suspect that surveillance was conducted without due legal process against the President, state officials, political figures, journalists, civil society organisations and businesspeople during 2025–2026. Electronic traces were also allegedly deleted in October 2026. If these allegations are proven, could misuse of the state’s surveillance systems really have been the work of just three people, without raising questions about oversight and the chain of command?
Surveillance systems involve requests, authorisation, technical access, data storage and activity logs. The investigation needs to establish who gave orders, who carried them out, who knew about them and who benefited from the information—without making indiscriminate accusations against everyone with access. The central questions are: why was the information collected, who controlled it, and was it ever used to influence political decisions?
In modern power struggles, information has extraordinary strategic value. Knowledge of a decision-maker’s conversations, plans or vulnerabilities can become a means of exerting influence. Information can even serve as ‘bargaining power’ more dangerous than an open threat.
Did that happen in this case? It has not been proven. But an investigation that stops with three suspects without establishing the motive and use of the information would leave major questions unanswered. The Palace’s assessment that the case could involve treason must also be tested against the evidence. If the surveillance formed part of a plan to disable the President’s authority or unlawfully overthrow the government, the case could fall within the scope of treason offences. If those elements are not established, the state must not force the charge. The seriousness of a threat to the President must be answered with evidence, not left at the level of political statements.
The legacy of power and the danger of a state within a state
The relationship between the police and political power has long been a matter of public concern. Tempo’s investigative reporting on alleged involvement by security personnel in the 2024 regional elections highlighted the debate about police independence. Those allegations do not, of course, automatically prove any particular individual’s guilt.
In December 2025, Indonesia’s Ombudsman said it had received 3,308 complaints concerning police services over five years. That figure is not a count of proven violations, but it points to governance and oversight issues that warrant serious attention and reform. Six national human rights institutions also conducted fact-finding into the handling of demonstrations in August and September 2025, including concerns about accountability for the use of force. Together, these events point to long-standing institutional challenges.
The risks grow when a single institution holds legal powers, coercive force and strategic information. These are legitimate tools of the state, but weak oversight creates opportunities for abuse. The phrase ‘state within a state’ is a warning about the possibility of centres of influence emerging inside institutions, placing personal relationships or group interests above their constitutional mandate.
Such networks, if they exist, may be sustained by career ties, patronage and access to appointments. A change of President may not be enough to dismantle them.
During his ten years leading Indonesia, Jokowi shaped the configuration of power through appointments and relationships with various state elites. The question is whether all those networks now operate fully within the new administration’s chain of command. This is a legitimate political question. But there is no evidence that Jokowi ordered, knew about or was involved in the alleged surveillance of Prabowo. The investigation must follow the evidence, protecting no one because of political connections and attributing guilt to no one solely on the basis of personal ties. If a network is proven to have abused state instruments to retain influence, a change of President alone will not be enough. What must be restored is the state’s control over its own institutions.
When weapons, intelligence and loyalty converge
There is another dimension to consider: the place of armed forces in a democracy. The National Police and the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) have different constitutional mandates. The police are responsible for security and law enforcement, while the TNI is responsible for national defence. Both, however, must exercise their powers under the authority of the lawful state.
On 4 November 2026, TNI Headquarters confirmed that a large number of personnel had been deployed to Jakarta, citing readiness. On the same day, Prabowo appointed an army general as acting Presidential Chief of Staff.
Both developments merit attention in the context of national security dynamics. But there is no evidence that the troop deployment was directly connected to the alleged treason, let alone that it proves a struggle between factions of the TNI and the police. In a democracy, the President must exercise constitutional control over the security apparatus. Conversely, security forces must not become the President’s personal political instrument.
This is the difference between loyalty to the state and loyalty to the person leading it. Oversight cannot therefore be limited to changing senior personnel. The state needs mechanisms to detect, investigate and hold people accountable for misconduct, including when senior officials are involved. The strength of the state is tested by its ability to ensure that those who wield coercive power are not above the law.
The test of Hambalang’s control
Attention now turns to Hambalang. The site has long been known as one of Prabowo’s political centres. From there, his long journey to the presidency was built through political consolidation and strategic planning. As President, however, he faces a different challenge: ensuring that all state instruments operate within the constitutional order, with the law setting the limits of their authority. Dismissing Listyo shows that Prabowo has taken decisive action. But an administrative decision does not resolve every issue.
Five urgent tasks must now be completed.
First, the chain of authority behind the surveillance must be uncovered through forensic examination: who ordered it, who carried it out, how access was granted and who deleted the data.
Second, the motive for the surveillance and the use of its results must be established. If the information was used for political pressure or bargaining, those who controlled and exploited it must be traced.
Third, the investigation should examine, on the basis of evidence, whether others were involved. There must be no political protection, but neither should anyone be accused merely because of ties to the previous administration.
Fourth, the state’s surveillance equipment must be audited and its oversight strengthened. Strategic information about officials and the public cannot depend solely on the integrity of the person holding office.
Fifth, the Palace’s assessment that the case may involve treason must be tested in court. If evidence establishes a plan to disable the President or unlawfully overthrow the government, the case should be prosecuted under the appropriate criminal provisions. If the legal elements are not proven, the state must say so clearly.
This matter is now far bigger than the fate of Listyo Sigit Prabowo. Prabowo faces a test: to prove that a change of President also means that the lawful government has firm control over all state instruments. The test must not be reduced to a personal contest between Prabowo and Jokowi. If there was a political motive, a network of influence or the use of information as leverage, the evidence should bring it to light.
That is how Prabowo’s leadership will be judged. Will this moment lead to institutional reform, or will it end with a few names being replaced while the old problems endure? The case is still developing. The motive has not been fully revealed, and the possible involvement of others remains to be examined. The public must continue to monitor the investigation so it does not become an instrument of either political protection or retaliation.
Solo is part of a past journey of power. Hambalang now bears responsibility for the government in office. Neither should be a measure of the loyalty of state officials. This Republic was not founded to be passed from one circle of power to another. And Listyo’s phrase ‘to the bitter end’ now raises a question far bigger than the debate over where the National Police should sit in the government structure.
‘To the bitter end’—but who, in truth, is being defended: the state, the institution or those in power?
The answer must be demonstrated through the courage to enforce the law against anyone, uncover the truth fully and ensure that no force can control the Republic from the shadows of power. That is the test of Hambalang’s control.
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/to-the-bitter-end-solos-legacy-and-the-test-of-hambalangs-control-1793789526)
Originally published by Republika (https://retizen.republika.co.id/posts/791244/titik-darah-penghabisan-jejak-solo-dan-ujian-kendali-hambalang), translated from Indonesian