TNI will not let go of its political grip

TNI will not let go of its political grip

Dewi Anggraeni, Contributor, Melbourne, Australia

The Indonesian Military (TNI) has repeatedly expresses hopes
of more professionalism within its ranks. The author of a
forthcoming book on the TNI, Dr Damien Kingsbury heads the
philosophical, political and international studies at Deakin
University, Victoria in Australia. The following are excerpts of
an interview on the TNI.

Question: The TNI and the National Police (Polri) willl bow
out of legislative politics in 2004. What is stopping a serving
or retired officer to campaign for election, especially a
regional one, and be subsequently elected?

Answer: There is nothing to stop them, and this is quite
common in Thailand. There are also small parties set up to
represent the interests of retired officers, such as Coordinating
Minister of Political Affairs and Security Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono's Democratic Party.

In most cases, serving members of the armed forces of
different countries are not allowed to hold office while serving,
and one would hope that there will be regulations to clarify this
ambiguity in Indonesia.

Q: What would be the implications to the political role of the
military and the national police?

A: Members of the armed forces have a history of retiring and
entering politics to achieve specific political outcomes. In
November 1988, around 120 officers retired to contest Golkar
regional positions to oust vice-president Sudharmono as Golkar
chairman.

The TNI is, by world standards, a highly politicized military
organization, and while one might wish for its members to leave
politics to elected civilian representatives it is highly
unlikely that already highly polticized officers will accept
complete depoliticization.

Q: The amended Constitution rules that there will not be any
modification to the unitary state. As aspirations of any region
to become independent are seen as secessionist, and as primary
tasks of the police are internal security, can this provision be
a potential avenue for the police, aided by TNI, to return to
politics?

A: The requirement that Indonesia remain a unitary state was the
condition by which the TNI agreed to leave formal politics. If
that criterion was challenged, it is highly likely the TNI would
again intervene "to save" Indonesia. Saving a country from its
own citizens, regardless of their aspirations, raises some
serious questions about the appropriate role of a military. The
continuation of the territorial structure is the main means by
which the TNI exercises political influence, and this has
recently expanded, not retracted.

Q: How has it been expanded?

A: The territorial structure has been increased by creating a
number of new Military Command Areas (Kodam). The intention is to
increase the number of Kodam from 10 to 17 -- despite earlier
plans under the TNI's New Paradigm to either reduce or do away
with the territorial structure as an anachronism.

Q: Toward the closing of the recent MPR Annual Session, TNI
commander Gen. Endriartono Sutarto proposed a return to 1945
Constitution or a transitional constitution. Was he genuinely
concerned about the likelihood of the situation getting out of
hand, or was he still keen on being active in legislative
politics?

A: Endriartono could accept a transitional constitution if it
redefined the state in ways that made it more cohesive. However,
given his orientation, that cohesion would be required rather
than voluntary ... if all Indonesians were asked if they wished
to remain within the state, the response would not be
overwhelmingly positive in either Aceh or Papua ...

The construction of the Republic was based on it being a
successor state to the Netherlands East Indies. The problem is
that the NEI was, according to the revolution that overthrew it,
an illegitimate political expression. Ipso facto, its successor
inherited problems of territorial legitimacy, which is why a
coersive armed forces has been necessary to maintain state
cohesion.

This has not changed, and Endriartono could not accept
anything other than a unitary republic defined along its current
geographic lines. This means a continued major role for the TNI.
The fact that it will not give up its territorial role will
continue to implicate the TNI in regional politics for the
forseeable future.

Even without the territorial role, the TNI's capacity to
intervene locally (e.g. training local militias) and quickly
(e.g. Rapid Reaction Strike Force of the Strategic Army Reserve
Command, Kostrad) means that its local presence will remain
strong. TNI's extensive legal and illegal business interests
continue to implicate it both in regional economies and as a
largely independent state actor.

With more than two-thirds of its actual income derived from
non-government sources, the TNI is not controlled by the state in
the way most militaries are. In so far as Polri is increasingly
responsible for internal security, it continues to operate in
critical areas under the same lines of command and control as the
army (e.g. Aceh, Maluku, Papua).

The functional role of the Brimob (mobile brigade) in the
provinces is as a civil guard rather than as a police in any
meaningful sense. Conventional police don't have "Hunter" groups,
as I have seen in Aceh (which pursue guerrilas) nor do they use
military weapons and equipment and have essentilly military
training.

Q: TNI is still the most organized and disciplined body among the
national institutions. Is it still a force to reckon with?

A: The military has substantially rebuilt itself since 1998. It
was always more cohesive and united in purpose than any other of
the state's institutions. All factions have always agreed about
the unitary structure of the state, including the "reformers".

Over the last two years the TNI has undergone a number of
internal changes, and is now more united and coherent than at any
times probably since the late 1980s. Endriartono was critical in
that -- he was a person the "conservative professional" core of
the TNI could cohere around.

Q: Endriartono has expressed his hopes of professionalizing TNI.
How realistic is this considering the ridiculously low pay and
the "ready market" for the military's "security service"?

A: Professionalism in the TNI means making it a cohesive
organization that is not the personal tool of the president or
any other external agent, such as Golkar. This has been achieved.
However, the more conservative definition of professionalism that
has come into play since 1998 does not preclude the TNI from
retaining a desire to continue as the "guardian of the state".

This more recent version of "professionalism" also does not
meaningfully address such issues as civil and political rights,
including human rights. And there is no way the TNI will
voluntarily abandon its businesses.

The TNI relies far too heavily on private sources of income to
function, while many soldiers and officers also rely not just on
the "welfare" aspects on off-budget income but also enjoy the
many benefits from unofficial financial sources.

If TNI's true function was only external defence, given the
external strategic environment Indonesia has faced for decades,
it (TNI) could be cut by more than half; savings from which could
then double existing salaries and do away with the need for
private businesses.

However, the TNI's primary function is not and has not been,
since 1949, external defence. And Indonesia would need to have
resolved a lot of major, and in some cases seemingly
irretrievable, regional claims before the TNI could be cut in
half. Given that is not very likely, neither is a significant
reduction in or reorientation of the TNI.