This Week in Indonesian Politics (15-21 Feb 2026)
The week of 15 to 21 February 2026 will be remembered in Indonesian political history primarily for one seismic development: President Prabowo Subianto's appearance in Washington DC for the inaugural Board of Peace summit, where Indonesia committed 8,000 TNI personnel to a proposed International Security Force for Gaza and Prabowo himself was appointed the body's Deputy Commander. The optics were extraordinary -- a retired Indonesian general, once persona non grata in Washington over past human rights controversies, standing alongside American leadership and being entrusted with a co-command role in what may become the defining post-conflict stabilisation mission of the decade. Prabowo also used the visit to meet President Donald Trump and sign a bilateral trade framework, signalling that Jakarta's diplomatic pivot westward, which has quietly accelerated since his inauguration, is now operating at full stride. For a country that has long championed non-alignment and "a thousand friends, zero enemies," the depth of this engagement with Washington and the willingness to deploy troops under an internationally supervised mandate represents a meaningful evolution in Indonesian foreign policy posture.
The Gaza commitment drew predictable commentary at home. Supporters framed it as Indonesia finally punching at its demographic and economic weight on the world stage; critics, including some within the Islamic political ecosystem that forms part of Prabowo's coalition, questioned whether the terms of engagement were sufficiently anchored in humanitarian principles rather than geopolitical convenience. Those debates will continue into March, but the domestic political calculus is clear: Prabowo returned from Washington with a foreign policy achievement that is difficult for any opposition figure to assail without appearing indifferent to Palestinian civilian welfare -- the issue that has united Indonesian public opinion across party lines for decades.
While the president was abroad, two domestic security scandals consumed considerable public attention and forced the National Police into an uncomfortable defensive crouch. In Tual, in Maluku province, a Brimob officer identified as Bripda MS fatally assaulted a 14-year-old madrasah student, a killing that prompted immediate calls for accountability from civil society and religious organisations. The National Police moved quickly to announce disciplinary proceedings, but the incident reignited a long-running conversation about impunity within the mobile brigade -- a force whose mandate for handling high-intensity situations has at times translated into a culture of physical aggression in everyday encounters. Separately, AKBP Didik Putra Kuncoro, the former Bima City police chief, was dishonourably discharged and named a suspect after investigators concluded he had received approximately Rp 2.8 billion from drug trafficking networks operating in his jurisdiction. That a senior uniformed officer responsible for law enforcement in a district had been on the payroll of the criminal ecosystem he was sworn to dismantle provoked genuine public anger -- and renewed momentum behind parliamentary proposals to restructure Polri's accountability framework. The competing proposals on whether the National Police should remain directly under presidential authority or be subordinated to a ministry continue to divide political opinion, with Muhammadiyah, one of Indonesia's largest Islamic mass organisations, publicly opposing any ministerial placement on the grounds that it would politicise the force further rather than professionalise it.
The week also provided a vivid illustration of how Indonesian coalition politics operates in the spaces between formal parliamentary sessions. NasDem party chairman Surya Paloh hosted a cross-party iftar gathering -- anticipating Ramadan, which begins in early March -- that brought together figures including former Jakarta governor Anies Baswedan, former Vice-President Jusuf Kalla, and PDI-P's Puan Maharani. The symbolism was unmistakable. NasDem, which backed Anies in the 2024 presidential contest before ultimately accommodating itself to the Prabowo government, is clearly positioning itself as a convening force for a broad-tent political conversation about Indonesia's direction. Paloh's reported openness to supporting Prabowo for a second term in 2029 -- contingent, one infers, on appropriate reciprocal consideration -- and his floating of a raised parliamentary threshold of seven percent both reflect the kind of long-horizon strategic thinking that has made NasDem a more durable institution than its relatively recent founding might suggest. The iftar gathering also served as a rehabilitation moment of sorts for the party, after the turbulence of the August 2025 protest cycle, which had drawn NasDem into uncomfortable proximity with street mobilisation politics. Ahmad Sahroni's reinstatement as deputy chairman of Commission III, the DPR's law and security committee, closed a loop that had been open since his removal amid that earlier controversy.
On institutional integrity, the week brought renewed scrutiny to the Constitutional Court. The appointment of Adies Kadir -- a Golkar politician and DPR deputy speaker -- as a Constitutional Court justice provoked sharp criticism from legal scholars and civil society monitors who argued that placing an active politician on the bench, even one formally resigning his party positions, undermines the court's independence at precisely the moment it may be called upon to adjudicate disputes arising from the current legislative agenda. The Judicial Ethics Council, MKMK, publicly declined to yield to DPR pressure on the matter, a small but meaningful act of institutional assertion in a political environment where parliamentary majoritarianism has sometimes tested the boundaries of separation of powers.
In Papua, the security situation continued its grim deterioration. Armed criminal groups -- designated KKB in Indonesian security terminology -- mounted fresh attacks in Yahukimo and Nabire, and a Smart Air aircraft was struck by gunfire in what authorities characterised as a deliberate targeting of civilian aviation infrastructure. The incidents underline the persistent gap between Jakarta's infrastructure investment narrative for Papua and the on-the-ground reality of communities living under endemic threat. The challenge for the Prabowo government, which has emphasised military-led development approaches to the region, is to demonstrate that security presence translates into durable civilian safety rather than simply a higher operational tempo.
Anti-corruption enforcement produced its own chapter. The Corruption Eradication Commission advanced investigations into a customs bribery network, continued its examination of the hajj quota case involving former Religious Affairs Minister Yaqut Cholil Qoumas, and progressed proceedings against regional executives in Ponorogo and Central Lampung. The steady rhythms of KPK casework provide a counterpoint to the periodic institutional debates about the commission's independence and mandate -- evidence that enforcement activity continues even as the legal architecture around the KPK remains contested. Meanwhile, a 2-tonne methamphetamine seizure in the Sea Dragon operation demonstrated the scale of the transnational narcotics threat flowing through Indonesian maritime corridors.
Looking ahead, the weeks immediately following will be shaped by three converging forces. Ramadan's arrival will compress the parliamentary calendar and shift public attention toward household economics -- particularly food prices, the availability of subsidised goods, and the government's ability to manage Ramadan-cycle inflation expectations. The ongoing debate over the Population Administration Bill, which proposes to phase out physical KTP-el cards in favour of digital identity, will continue to draw scrutiny over data privacy and exclusion risks for citizens with limited connectivity. And Indonesia's assumption of the presidency of the UN Human Rights Council's 61st session from 23 February will test whether the country can translate its aspirational multilateral posture -- elevated this week in Washington -- into substantive leadership on the global human rights agenda. Jakarta's detractors will watch closely for any contradiction between its international advocacy and its domestic record. Whether the government chooses to manage that tension or lean into it may prove one of the defining questions of Prabowo's term.
The Gaza commitment drew predictable commentary at home. Supporters framed it as Indonesia finally punching at its demographic and economic weight on the world stage; critics, including some within the Islamic political ecosystem that forms part of Prabowo's coalition, questioned whether the terms of engagement were sufficiently anchored in humanitarian principles rather than geopolitical convenience. Those debates will continue into March, but the domestic political calculus is clear: Prabowo returned from Washington with a foreign policy achievement that is difficult for any opposition figure to assail without appearing indifferent to Palestinian civilian welfare -- the issue that has united Indonesian public opinion across party lines for decades.
While the president was abroad, two domestic security scandals consumed considerable public attention and forced the National Police into an uncomfortable defensive crouch. In Tual, in Maluku province, a Brimob officer identified as Bripda MS fatally assaulted a 14-year-old madrasah student, a killing that prompted immediate calls for accountability from civil society and religious organisations. The National Police moved quickly to announce disciplinary proceedings, but the incident reignited a long-running conversation about impunity within the mobile brigade -- a force whose mandate for handling high-intensity situations has at times translated into a culture of physical aggression in everyday encounters. Separately, AKBP Didik Putra Kuncoro, the former Bima City police chief, was dishonourably discharged and named a suspect after investigators concluded he had received approximately Rp 2.8 billion from drug trafficking networks operating in his jurisdiction. That a senior uniformed officer responsible for law enforcement in a district had been on the payroll of the criminal ecosystem he was sworn to dismantle provoked genuine public anger -- and renewed momentum behind parliamentary proposals to restructure Polri's accountability framework. The competing proposals on whether the National Police should remain directly under presidential authority or be subordinated to a ministry continue to divide political opinion, with Muhammadiyah, one of Indonesia's largest Islamic mass organisations, publicly opposing any ministerial placement on the grounds that it would politicise the force further rather than professionalise it.
The week also provided a vivid illustration of how Indonesian coalition politics operates in the spaces between formal parliamentary sessions. NasDem party chairman Surya Paloh hosted a cross-party iftar gathering -- anticipating Ramadan, which begins in early March -- that brought together figures including former Jakarta governor Anies Baswedan, former Vice-President Jusuf Kalla, and PDI-P's Puan Maharani. The symbolism was unmistakable. NasDem, which backed Anies in the 2024 presidential contest before ultimately accommodating itself to the Prabowo government, is clearly positioning itself as a convening force for a broad-tent political conversation about Indonesia's direction. Paloh's reported openness to supporting Prabowo for a second term in 2029 -- contingent, one infers, on appropriate reciprocal consideration -- and his floating of a raised parliamentary threshold of seven percent both reflect the kind of long-horizon strategic thinking that has made NasDem a more durable institution than its relatively recent founding might suggest. The iftar gathering also served as a rehabilitation moment of sorts for the party, after the turbulence of the August 2025 protest cycle, which had drawn NasDem into uncomfortable proximity with street mobilisation politics. Ahmad Sahroni's reinstatement as deputy chairman of Commission III, the DPR's law and security committee, closed a loop that had been open since his removal amid that earlier controversy.
On institutional integrity, the week brought renewed scrutiny to the Constitutional Court. The appointment of Adies Kadir -- a Golkar politician and DPR deputy speaker -- as a Constitutional Court justice provoked sharp criticism from legal scholars and civil society monitors who argued that placing an active politician on the bench, even one formally resigning his party positions, undermines the court's independence at precisely the moment it may be called upon to adjudicate disputes arising from the current legislative agenda. The Judicial Ethics Council, MKMK, publicly declined to yield to DPR pressure on the matter, a small but meaningful act of institutional assertion in a political environment where parliamentary majoritarianism has sometimes tested the boundaries of separation of powers.
In Papua, the security situation continued its grim deterioration. Armed criminal groups -- designated KKB in Indonesian security terminology -- mounted fresh attacks in Yahukimo and Nabire, and a Smart Air aircraft was struck by gunfire in what authorities characterised as a deliberate targeting of civilian aviation infrastructure. The incidents underline the persistent gap between Jakarta's infrastructure investment narrative for Papua and the on-the-ground reality of communities living under endemic threat. The challenge for the Prabowo government, which has emphasised military-led development approaches to the region, is to demonstrate that security presence translates into durable civilian safety rather than simply a higher operational tempo.
Anti-corruption enforcement produced its own chapter. The Corruption Eradication Commission advanced investigations into a customs bribery network, continued its examination of the hajj quota case involving former Religious Affairs Minister Yaqut Cholil Qoumas, and progressed proceedings against regional executives in Ponorogo and Central Lampung. The steady rhythms of KPK casework provide a counterpoint to the periodic institutional debates about the commission's independence and mandate -- evidence that enforcement activity continues even as the legal architecture around the KPK remains contested. Meanwhile, a 2-tonne methamphetamine seizure in the Sea Dragon operation demonstrated the scale of the transnational narcotics threat flowing through Indonesian maritime corridors.
Looking ahead, the weeks immediately following will be shaped by three converging forces. Ramadan's arrival will compress the parliamentary calendar and shift public attention toward household economics -- particularly food prices, the availability of subsidised goods, and the government's ability to manage Ramadan-cycle inflation expectations. The ongoing debate over the Population Administration Bill, which proposes to phase out physical KTP-el cards in favour of digital identity, will continue to draw scrutiny over data privacy and exclusion risks for citizens with limited connectivity. And Indonesia's assumption of the presidency of the UN Human Rights Council's 61st session from 23 February will test whether the country can translate its aspirational multilateral posture -- elevated this week in Washington -- into substantive leadership on the global human rights agenda. Jakarta's detractors will watch closely for any contradiction between its international advocacy and its domestic record. Whether the government chooses to manage that tension or lean into it may prove one of the defining questions of Prabowo's term.