They can run, but how long can they hide?
They can run, but how long can they hide?
Endy M. Bayuni, Jakarta
The Oct. 1 bomb attacks in Bali exposed gross weaknesses in the capability of the National Police force and the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) in dealing with terrorism. They may be good in handling the matter after the fact -- our police seem to be quick off the mark in identifying the perpetrators and arresting some of them. But they fall short when it comes to anticipating or detecting the next attack.
Central to any success in the fight against terror will be the capture of the two Malaysians whose names have been connected with the first deadly bomb attacks in Bali in 2002 and with just about every major bombing that has occurred in Indonesia since then. It is thought that Azahari bin Husin and Noordin M. Top orchestrated the coordinated attacks on Oct. 1.
These two men are not even fugitives in the real sense of the word. We have learned from court testimonies and police briefings that both men remain active in pursuing their evil deeds. They raise funds and train new recruits to be suicide bombers, and they plan their next attacks.
Surely their arrests should be the first priority of the National Police and BIN. Instead, when Gen. Sutanto was appointed National Police chief in July, he launched a massive campaign to wipe out gambling and run in the owners of major illegal casinos.
His predecessor Gen. Da'i Bachtiar -- anxious to keep his post after Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono won the presidential election in October last year -- promised the new President that he would catch Azahari and Noordin, both Malaysian nationals, within three months. The fact that Da'i was able to keep his job for as long as he did after failing to live up to his promise suggests the President too had other priorities.
And here, perhaps, lies the crux of the problem: Indonesia is not serious enough in pursuing its war on terror. That is certainly the impression Western governments have of Indonesia.
Now, after the Oct. 1 bombings, Australia is leading the calls once again for Indonesia to ban Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), the regional terrorist network connected with all the major bomb attacks in Indonesia. Australia has also demanded that the government refrain from giving sentence reductions to Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the alleged spiritual leader of JI who is currently doing time for his indirect part in the 2002 Bali bombings.
Such demands, however, will do little to stem the terrorist attacks in Indonesia and they could even sidetrack the authorities from going after the real terrorists. Moreover, outlawing the group could be counterproductive if it gives the impression that Indonesia is under the thumb of Western powers.
The real problem at hand is not the JI nor Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. The real problem is Azahari and Noordin. And the fact that they have been able to do their evil deeds suggests two basic flaws in the way the war on terror is being pursued: One is downright incompetence, and the other is lack of leadership.
After the Oct. 1 bomb attacks, the Australian public rightfully inquired about the efficacy of the help that foreign governments, particularly theirs, had been giving Indonesia -- from funding, equipment, to training in counterterrorism -- all at their taxpayers' expense.
The Indonesian government must show that it is serious in catching the terrorists, particularly the two Malaysians.
The suggestion that BIN be given more power -- including the power to arrest terrorist suspects without trial and that the military revive its territorial function -- shows more opportunism on its part than a serious attempt to catch the terrorists. We know from the past that those extra powers would be abused for other purposes. Soeharto used them to silence his critics.
Even within the prevailing legal framework, the authorities are not using the powers and means available to them to catch Azahari and Noordin.
Their mug shots, for example, are not familiar to the public . If they moved in next door, chances are the penny would not drop even after a face-to-face encounter. The only time their photos are in the newspapers and on television is just after they have struck. The pictures displayed at bus and railway stations or district offices vanish after a few days or weeks, never to be replaced.
Indonesia's two most-wanted men could be roaming around your neighborhood and no one would be able to identify them because most of us have forgotten what they look like.
And what about putting a price on their heads? Surely those who have given them sanctuary, or just know of their whereabouts, would be tempted to cooperate.
With the introduction of community policing, our officers could learn a thing or two from the military's territorial command concept in intelligence gathering. The territorial officers, called Babinsa, were so integrated into the community that they knew everybody by name and the movements of any strangers on their turf.
So far, Azahari and Noordin have been able to elude the authorities, but surely they cannot stay hidden forever. The police and our intelligence agency have a lot to answer for in their constant failures to catch them or anticipate their next move.