They can run, but how long can they hide?

They can run, but how long can they hide?

Endy M. Bayuni, Jakarta

The Oct. 1 bomb attacks in Bali exposed gross weaknesses in the
capability of the National Police force and the National
Intelligence Agency (BIN) in dealing with terrorism. They may be
good in handling the matter after the fact -- our police seem to
be quick off the mark in identifying the perpetrators and
arresting some of them. But they fall short when it comes to
anticipating or detecting the next attack.

Central to any success in the fight against terror will be the
capture of the two Malaysians whose names have been connected
with the first deadly bomb attacks in Bali in 2002 and with just
about every major bombing that has occurred in Indonesia since
then. It is thought that Azahari bin Husin and Noordin M. Top
orchestrated the coordinated attacks on Oct. 1.

These two men are not even fugitives in the real sense of the
word. We have learned from court testimonies and police briefings
that both men remain active in pursuing their evil deeds. They
raise funds and train new recruits to be suicide bombers, and
they plan their next attacks.

Surely their arrests should be the first priority of the
National Police and BIN. Instead, when Gen. Sutanto was appointed
National Police chief in July, he launched a massive campaign to
wipe out gambling and run in the owners of major illegal casinos.

His predecessor Gen. Da'i Bachtiar -- anxious to keep his post
after Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono won the presidential election in
October last year -- promised the new President that he would
catch Azahari and Noordin, both Malaysian nationals, within three
months. The fact that Da'i was able to keep his job for as long
as he did after failing to live up to his promise suggests the
President too had other priorities.

And here, perhaps, lies the crux of the problem: Indonesia is
not serious enough in pursuing its war on terror. That is
certainly the impression Western governments have of Indonesia.

Now, after the Oct. 1 bombings, Australia is leading the calls
once again for Indonesia to ban Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), the
regional terrorist network connected with all the major bomb
attacks in Indonesia. Australia has also demanded that the
government refrain from giving sentence reductions to Abu Bakar
Ba'asyir, the alleged spiritual leader of JI who is currently
doing time for his indirect part in the 2002 Bali bombings.

Such demands, however, will do little to stem the terrorist
attacks in Indonesia and they could even sidetrack the
authorities from going after the real terrorists. Moreover,
outlawing the group could be counterproductive if it gives the
impression that Indonesia is under the thumb of Western powers.

The real problem at hand is not the JI nor Abu Bakar Ba'asyir.
The real problem is Azahari and Noordin. And the fact that they
have been able to do their evil deeds suggests two basic flaws in
the way the war on terror is being pursued: One is downright
incompetence, and the other is lack of leadership.

After the Oct. 1 bomb attacks, the Australian public
rightfully inquired about the efficacy of the help that foreign
governments, particularly theirs, had been giving Indonesia --
from funding, equipment, to training in counterterrorism -- all
at their taxpayers' expense.

The Indonesian government must show that it is serious in
catching the terrorists, particularly the two Malaysians.

The suggestion that BIN be given more power -- including the
power to arrest terrorist suspects without trial and that the
military revive its territorial function -- shows more
opportunism on its part than a serious attempt to catch the
terrorists. We know from the past that those extra powers would
be abused for other purposes. Soeharto used them to silence his
critics.

Even within the prevailing legal framework, the authorities
are not using the powers and means available to them to catch
Azahari and Noordin.

Their mug shots, for example, are not familiar to the public .
If they moved in next door, chances are the penny would not
drop even after a face-to-face encounter. The only time their
photos are in the newspapers and on television is just after they
have struck. The pictures displayed at bus and railway stations
or district offices vanish after a few days or
weeks, never to be replaced.

Indonesia's two most-wanted men could be roaming around your
neighborhood and no one would be able to identify them because
most of us have forgotten what they look like.

And what about putting a price on their heads? Surely those
who have given them sanctuary, or just know of their whereabouts,
would be tempted to cooperate.

With the introduction of community policing, our officers
could learn a thing or two from the military's territorial
command concept in intelligence gathering. The territorial
officers, called Babinsa, were so integrated into the community
that they knew everybody by name and the movements of any
strangers on their turf.

So far, Azahari and Noordin have been able to elude the
authorities, but surely they cannot stay hidden forever.
The police and our intelligence agency have a lot to answer for
in their constant failures to catch them or anticipate their next
move.