The War on Drugs Requires More Than Raids
The joint operation by the National Police, the National Narcotics Agency (BNN), the Indonesian Military (TNI) and the Civil Service Police Unit (Satpol PP), which targeted Kampung Ambon and Kampung Boncos in Jakarta recently, deserves recognition. Deploying around 700 personnel, the authorities searched the two areas, which are known as drug-trafficking centres, and detained 24 people for further questioning.
However, the success of such an operation cannot be measured simply by the number of personnel deployed, locations raided or people detained. The most important question is whether the operation can expose drug supply networks, identify financiers, cut off the flow of criminal proceeds and help restore social life in areas vulnerable to drug activity.
This is where the state’s resolve is put to the test. A raid is an entry point for law enforcement, not the end point. A show of force that lasts only a short time risks creating an illusion of success. The authorities arrive and street-level offenders are arrested, but the drug business network survives, relocates and resumes operations once public and police attention fades.
The approach to combating drugs must therefore shift beyond enforcement operations alone. It must encompass the dismantling of syndicate networks down to their funding sources and profiteers, as well as the sustained social and economic recovery of affected communities.
The drug trade is not run by just one or two people. It involves many actors forming a supply chain that includes street dealers, couriers, kingpins, suppliers, distribution controllers, financiers and those who conceal and enjoy the proceeds of crime. Those found at raid locations may not know the network’s full structure, and they are not necessarily the people who make the greatest profits from the illicit business.
From the perspective of organised crime, syndicates endure through a division of roles, resources, protection networks and the ability to manage risk. The most influential criminal actors are often far removed from the places where drugs are sold. The principal figures will never deal directly with the drugs themselves.
For this reason, enforcement in drug-trafficking areas must develop into investigations that trace links between offenders, supply sources, distribution patterns and the flow of proceeds. BNN and the National Police should strengthen coordination with the Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (PPATK), prosecutors and relevant agencies to uncover suspicious transactions and assets suspected of originating from drug crimes.
Asset tracing is a strategic tool for undermining syndicates’ ability to finance their operations. Bank accounts, property, vehicles, front companies and other assets should be traced and dealt with through the appropriate legal processes. The aim is not only to punish offenders, but also to prevent illegal proceeds from being used to expand drug-trafficking networks.
This approach is consistent with Gary S. Becker’s economic theory of crime, which explains that decisions to commit crimes are influenced, among other things, by a comparison between expected gains and the risk of punishment. If the profits from the illegal drug trade remain high while the risk of losing those proceeds is relatively low, arresting some offenders will not change drug syndicates’ economic calculations.
The state must reverse that calculation. Drug networks should not merely lose their merchandise; they must lose their funding sources, access to distribution and opportunity to enjoy their profits. Measures of success in combating drugs should also be broadened to include the number of networks dismantled, masterminds exposed, financial flows traced, assets seized and supply routes to trafficking areas cut off.
From Raids to Community Recovery
Combating drugs requires more than a security and law-enforcement approach. Vulnerable areas must also be understood in terms of the socio-economic conditions that allow drug networks to establish and expand their businesses. Unemployment, limited business opportunities, weak neighbourhood oversight and poor access to social services can be exploited by syndicates seeking to recruit couriers or dealers from vulnerable communities.
Economic hardship does not automatically drive someone to crime. However, when opportunities to earn a legitimate income are lacking, the promise of quick money from drug networks can tempt some members of the community. Law enforcement must therefore be accompanied by efforts to widen access to legitimate livelihoods.
Social Disorganisation Theory suggests that a community’s limited collective capacity to maintain social order can make an area more vulnerable to crime. When social ties weaken, informal oversight becomes ineffective and local institutions play a diminished role, criminal groups have greater opportunities to build influence in the community.
This theory does not mean that poor areas are inherently criminal. Rather, the issue is how the state can strengthen communities’ ability to protect their neighbourhoods. Residents need safe public spaces, constructive activities for young people, swift and trusted reporting channels, and support for people experiencing drug misuse. Enforcement operations must therefore be followed by community recovery programmes.
Recovery must go beyond counselling sessions or one-off aid distributions. The government should assess local economic potential, residents’ skills, market needs and groups requiring support. Programmes could include relevant vocational training, small and medium-sized enterprise development, stronger cooperatives, access to finance, digital marketing and partnerships with businesses.
Community organisations, religious institutions, universities and the private sector can be involved as partners. They can help provide business mentors, skills training, market access and social support. All programmes, however, must be designed around the community’s real needs and delivered consistently, rather than as ceremonial or one-off activities.
The success of community recovery should be measured through concrete outcomes: how many residents find work, how household incomes change and whether vulnerability to recruitment by criminal networks declines. Without clear indicators, economic empowerment can easily become a ceremonial exercise with no long-term impact.
Ultimately, the operations in Kampung Ambon and Kampung Boncos should serve as a catalyst for a more comprehensive anti-drug strategy. The state must act firmly against kingpins and financiers, consistently trace criminal proceeds, provide support to those who need it and expand economic opportunities for people in vulnerable areas.
The war on drugs must not become a series of high-profile operations that flare briefly and then disappear without offering solutions. If dealers are arrested while financiers continue to enjoy the profits, the war is not over. If trafficking is temporarily halted but communities remain trapped in social and economic vulnerability, recovery has not succeeded.
Victory in the war on drugs will not be achieved merely when the authorities arrest dealers and seize trafficking centres. It will come when syndicates lose the ability to operate, their profits are confiscated and communities can build a safe, independent and dignified social order.