The Urgency of Legislation to Counter Espionage and Foreign Interference
The formation of legislation to counter espionage and foreign interference is becoming increasingly important amidst the growing complexity and difficulty in identifying threats to national sovereignty. Espionage and foreign interference are no longer limited to conventional practices but can occur through cyberspace, the theft of strategic information, influence operations, and the infiltration of institutions vital to national interests.
This situation demands that Indonesia possesses a more specific, comprehensive, and adaptive legal framework to provide legal certainty while strengthening the protection of national sovereignty. During the National Seminar ‘Sovereignty at the Forefront: National Policy for Countering Espermionage and Foreign Interference’, organised by the ASEAN Study Center FISIP UI on 27 August 2026, it was concluded that espionage and foreign interference activities can operate within grey zones that are difficult for conventional legal instruments to reach.
Indonesia’s problem is not merely a lack of security regulations. Indonesia already possesses Law No. 17 of 2011 concerning State Intelligence, which serves as the primary framework for intelligence operations and remains in effect. Indonesia also has the National Criminal Code via Law No. 1 of 2023, the Electronic Information and Transactions Law (as recently amended by Law No. 1 of 2024), Law No. 27 of 2022 on Personal Data Protection, and Law No. 14 of 2008 on Public Information Disclosure.
However, the existence of these various regulations actually reveals a different problem: Indonesia’s legal framework remains fragmented across sectors. The State Intelligence Law regulates intelligence operations, the PDP Law is oriented towards personal data protection, the ITE Law focuses on electronic activities and systems, while the Criminal Code provides a general criminal law regime.
These instruments do not automatically form a single, comprehensive legal regime that defines foreign espionage, foreign interference, foreign agents, influence operations, the theft of strategic information, cyber-esp namely, and the relationship between such activities and the interests of foreign states.
Reports from the seminar even quoted Member of Commission I of the DPR, Nurul Qomaril Arifin, stating that Indonesia indeed requires specific regulations regarding espionage because no law specifically governs it yet. The seminar highlighted the necessity of considering new legislation that is expected to tackle issues related to espionage and foreign interference.
The principle of legality in criminal law requires that the state not only has the ability to act but also possesses a clear legal basis regarding prohibited acts, the subjects held accountable, the authority of officials, and enforcement procedures. The state must not find itself in a position where it is aware of a threat but lacks the adequate legal instruments to classify and prosecute such acts.
Conversely, authorities must not be granted overly broad powers based on vague concepts of threats. Therefore, the Anti-Espionage Law should not merely be a ‘law to catch spies’, but rather a legal architecture that precisely regulates the chain of threat mitigation, such as the definition of espionage and foreign interference, prohibited acts, the status and relationship with foreign principals, illegal collection of strategic information, the recruitment or use of agents, influence operations conducted under the direction of foreign powers, and forms of espionage based on digital technology.
The urgency is even more apparent as the character of modern threats is no longer identical to foreign agents physically taking documents, but rather exists in ‘grey-zone warfare’ involving data theft, cyber-attacks, disinformation, influence operations on social media, and the infiltration of strategic institutions.
Indonesia holds a strategic position in the Indo-Pacific, due to international shipping lanes and strategic resources such as nickel, copper, gas, and critical minerals. Consequently, information regarding downstreaming policies, defence projects, and resource negotiations holds strategic value.
This issue is not hypothetical. Indonesia’s experience with the disclosure of state official wiretapping by Australian intelligence demonstrates that friendly relations between nations do not erase the respective intelligence interests of each country.
That event also showed that espionage can relate to diplomatic and economic interests, not just military defence. From an international law perspective, this need is increasingly logical.
The UN Charter places sovereign equality as a fundamental principle of relations between states and prohibits UN intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, without prejudice to enforcement mechanisms based on the UN Charter.
In the cyber field, the international regime does not yet have a universal convention that comprehensively criminalises all forms of cyber-espionage. Based on various international legal studies regarding cyber-espionage, such as Michael N. Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0, and others, cyber espionage is not automatically illegal per se; its legality depends on how the operation is conducted and whether it violates other principles or obligations of international law.
The absence of a simple universal prohibition does not mean that a state does not need national laws. On the contrary, the grey areas of international law increase the need for Indonesia to clarify its position.