The Tokdo/Takeshima dispute aggravates Tokyo-Seoul ties

The Tokdo/Takeshima dispute aggravates Tokyo-Seoul ties

By Mark J Valencia

Japan and South Korea should jointly explore and develop any
resources in their disputed maritime areas.

The Tokdo/Takeshima controversy has again raised its ugly
head, this time shaking fragile relations and leading to the
cancellation of the planned South Korea and Japan summit talks
last March. The dispute has prompted both countries to formally
declare 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zones, even though
this may lead to further difficulties in sorting out the
boundaries of such zones -- between themselves as well as with
North Korea and China.

The problem is complicated by nationalism and Japan's
historical domination of Korea, as well as by fish and possible
mineral wealth in the waters surrounding the feature. By
shelving the sovereignty dispute and jointly exploring and
developing any resources in the disputed maritime area, South
Korea and Japan could turn this irritant into an opportunity for
strengthening relations.

The dispute has a complex history. The Continental Shelf
boundary drawn by South Korea and Japan in 1974 stopped about 70
nautical miles from Liancourt Rocks, called Tokdo in Korean and
Takeshima in Japanese. Since 1952, Japan and South Korea have
disputed the ownership of these rocks. Tokdo -- which is
currently occupied by South Korea -- consists of two tiny islets
18 miles east of South Korea's Ulleung Do and 31 miles northwest
of the Japanese Dogo. These islets appear to be unable to support
human habitation and do not have an economic life of their own.
Therefore, under Article 121 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea, they are rocks and are not entitled to a
200-nautical-mile EEZ or continental shelf. However, their owners
may claim a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea.

Nevertheless, both South Korea and Japan may try to use these
features as a basis for equidistance lines between the two
nations. If used for this purpose, the features would allow
claims to considerable sea and seabed (see map). Further
complicating the issue is the possible overlap of a North Korean
EEZ with the area that might be claimed by Japan or South Korea
based on these rocks.

At stake is a polyhedron including the northeastern Tsushima
Basin -- which may have some oil and gas potential -- and the
southwestern Yamato Rise and Trough. If Japan were deemed to be
the owner of Takeshima, it would obtain a small northeastern
portion of the Tsushima Basin and almost the entire Yamato Rise
and Trough, including an area of possible seafloor spreading and
thus the prospect of metallic sulfide deposits containing copper,
zinc, lead, nickel, cobalt, gold and silver.

If Korea owns Tokdo, then it would gain the northeastern
portion of the Tsushima Basin as well as the southwestern end of
the Yamato Rise and Trough. The Japanese oil and gas
concessionaire system already includes most of the eastern
portion of the disputed area, and even overlaps an EEZ boundary
which could be claimed by North Korea.

The Tokdo/Takeshima area boundary problem is complex only in
the sense that both parties seem to insist on the symbolic
significance of these rocks. But for this, it is surprising that
this dispute has not been settled by now, given the strong
interest of both parties in securing new sources of offshore
petroleum to explore. No third party interest or strategic
security concern exists to explain the sensitivity of this issue.
Such maritime issues are usually a relatively minor part of
overall relations. Because the water is deep and the petroleum
potential small, it may be that the two capitals have in the past
agreed to give the issue a low rank on their diplomatic agenda of
topics for negotiation. The risk associated with such a policy is
that the issue, seen in emotive sovereignty terms, may become a
running sore. Indeed, given the fragile relations between the two
and the possibility of resources in disputed waters, such issues
can become the tail that wags the dog in their international
affairs.

If both sides can agree not to insist on the symbolic
importance of these rocks, the solution is relatively
straightforward. The parties could agree on a 12-nautical-mile
enclave around the rocks with joint access thereto, leaving their
ownership to be settled by future generations. The boundary then
would be an equidistance line, ignoring the islands. In fact such
a line is already in use as one boundary of their joint fisheries
resources research zone.

The parties might then agree on joint scientific research in
the northern portion of the overlap area and on joint development
in the area of greatest prospects for oil and gas in the south.
This should be feasible, since the two have one institutionally
successful joint development scheme already in the northern East
China Sea, as well as a fisheries agreement
which allows Japan to fish in what would become South Korea's
half of this area. This interim solution would replace this
irritant in the South Korea-Japan relationship with a joint
venture that could build a strong bond between the two nations.

Dr. Mark J. Valencia is a Senior Fellow in the East-West
Center, Honolulu, Hawaii.