The Tokdo/Takeshima dispute aggravates Tokyo-Seoul ties
The Tokdo/Takeshima dispute aggravates Tokyo-Seoul ties
By Mark J Valencia
Japan and South Korea should jointly explore and develop any resources in their disputed maritime areas.
The Tokdo/Takeshima controversy has again raised its ugly head, this time shaking fragile relations and leading to the cancellation of the planned South Korea and Japan summit talks last March. The dispute has prompted both countries to formally declare 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zones, even though this may lead to further difficulties in sorting out the boundaries of such zones -- between themselves as well as with North Korea and China.
The problem is complicated by nationalism and Japan's historical domination of Korea, as well as by fish and possible mineral wealth in the waters surrounding the feature. By shelving the sovereignty dispute and jointly exploring and developing any resources in the disputed maritime area, South Korea and Japan could turn this irritant into an opportunity for strengthening relations.
The dispute has a complex history. The Continental Shelf boundary drawn by South Korea and Japan in 1974 stopped about 70 nautical miles from Liancourt Rocks, called Tokdo in Korean and Takeshima in Japanese. Since 1952, Japan and South Korea have disputed the ownership of these rocks. Tokdo -- which is currently occupied by South Korea -- consists of two tiny islets 18 miles east of South Korea's Ulleung Do and 31 miles northwest of the Japanese Dogo. These islets appear to be unable to support human habitation and do not have an economic life of their own. Therefore, under Article 121 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, they are rocks and are not entitled to a 200-nautical-mile EEZ or continental shelf. However, their owners may claim a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea.
Nevertheless, both South Korea and Japan may try to use these features as a basis for equidistance lines between the two nations. If used for this purpose, the features would allow claims to considerable sea and seabed (see map). Further complicating the issue is the possible overlap of a North Korean EEZ with the area that might be claimed by Japan or South Korea based on these rocks.
At stake is a polyhedron including the northeastern Tsushima Basin -- which may have some oil and gas potential -- and the southwestern Yamato Rise and Trough. If Japan were deemed to be the owner of Takeshima, it would obtain a small northeastern portion of the Tsushima Basin and almost the entire Yamato Rise and Trough, including an area of possible seafloor spreading and thus the prospect of metallic sulfide deposits containing copper, zinc, lead, nickel, cobalt, gold and silver.
If Korea owns Tokdo, then it would gain the northeastern portion of the Tsushima Basin as well as the southwestern end of the Yamato Rise and Trough. The Japanese oil and gas concessionaire system already includes most of the eastern portion of the disputed area, and even overlaps an EEZ boundary which could be claimed by North Korea.
The Tokdo/Takeshima area boundary problem is complex only in the sense that both parties seem to insist on the symbolic significance of these rocks. But for this, it is surprising that this dispute has not been settled by now, given the strong interest of both parties in securing new sources of offshore petroleum to explore. No third party interest or strategic security concern exists to explain the sensitivity of this issue. Such maritime issues are usually a relatively minor part of overall relations. Because the water is deep and the petroleum potential small, it may be that the two capitals have in the past agreed to give the issue a low rank on their diplomatic agenda of topics for negotiation. The risk associated with such a policy is that the issue, seen in emotive sovereignty terms, may become a running sore. Indeed, given the fragile relations between the two and the possibility of resources in disputed waters, such issues can become the tail that wags the dog in their international affairs.
If both sides can agree not to insist on the symbolic importance of these rocks, the solution is relatively straightforward. The parties could agree on a 12-nautical-mile enclave around the rocks with joint access thereto, leaving their ownership to be settled by future generations. The boundary then would be an equidistance line, ignoring the islands. In fact such a line is already in use as one boundary of their joint fisheries resources research zone.
The parties might then agree on joint scientific research in the northern portion of the overlap area and on joint development in the area of greatest prospects for oil and gas in the south. This should be feasible, since the two have one institutionally successful joint development scheme already in the northern East China Sea, as well as a fisheries agreement which allows Japan to fish in what would become South Korea's half of this area. This interim solution would replace this irritant in the South Korea-Japan relationship with a joint venture that could build a strong bond between the two nations.
Dr. Mark J. Valencia is a Senior Fellow in the East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii.