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The Test of Bank Indonesia's Independence

| Source: CNBC Indonesia Translated from Indonesian | Economy
The Test of Bank Indonesia's Independence
Image: CNBC Indonesia

The nomination of Destry Damayanti as the sole candidate for Bank Indonesia Governor raises a larger question than who will lead the central bank. If approved by the DPR, Destry has the opportunity to become the first woman to permanently hold the position.

Her experience in financial markets, the Deposit Insurance Corporation (LPS), and as Senior Deputy Governor of BI since 2019 signals continuity. Yet it is precisely at this transition moment that a more fundamental question deserves to be asked: where does fiscal-monetary coordination end and fiscal dominance begin?

The question matters because central bank independence is often understood too rigidly. As if BI is only independent when it always differs from the government, while purchasing government bonds or policies that also support growth are considered compromises of independence. Both are too simplistic. Independence is not isolation. Coordination is not subordination.

The essence of modern central bank independence is not absolute freedom from government, but the ability to make decisions based on its mandate without being dictated by political interests and short-term fiscal needs. The government may have preferences for growth and low financing costs, but the central bank must retain the freedom to use the instruments necessary to maintain stability.

Thus, independence does not mean that if the government wants A, BI must choose B. BI remains independent when it chooses A together with the government as long as A is consistent with its mandate. Independence is truly tested when the data requires B: does BI still have the freedom to choose it?

Independence from Whom?

The political economy of central banking perspective takes this issue further. Alessandro Roselli in The Political Economy of Central Banking (2024) shows that the position of the central bank continues to change following the relations between the state, money, markets, war, crisis, and democracy.

The broader literature even questions the assumption that central bank independence always produces stability without economic or distributional costs. This means the central bank never works in a sterile space; it sits at the intersection of government, parliament, fiscal policy, financial markets, the banking sector, the business world, and society.

Therefore, the threat to independence is not only fiscal dominance. There is political dominance when short-term political interests constrain monetary choices. There is also financial dominance when concerns about market turmoil or the health of financial institutions make the central bank reluctant to take policies that are actually necessary.

So the more substantive question of independence is not simply whether BI is free from the government, but whether BI remains free to carry out its mandate when various interests press from different directions.

This is where independence must be distinguished from rigidity. A central bank that always opposes the government is not automatically independent; it may simply be isolated. Conversely, a central bank that always accommodates the government also risks losing credibility. This is where the paradox of central bank independence emerges.

The greater the need for fiscal and monetary coordination, the more important central bank independence becomes so that coordination remains credible and does not shift into subordination. Independence is not independence from coordination, but independence from domination.

When Fiscal Becomes a Constraint

Fiscal dominance is therefore not a myth, but it also does not deserve to be a label for every fiscal-monetary coordination. The problem arises when financing needs and fiscal sustainability begin to limit the central bank’s ability to carry out the policies necessary to maintain stability. The boundary can be summarised through one question: who is the constraint for whom?

In a healthy regime, fiscal policy takes into account the consequences of monetary policy. In fiscal dominance, the relationship begins to reverse: monetary policy is increasingly constrained by its consequences for debt costs and fiscal financing.

Therefore, the main measure is not how many government bonds are on BI’s balance sheet, but whether fiscal needs are beginning to change the reaction function of monetary policy. If inflation and inflation expectations rise and the Rupiah is under pressure, but interest rates are held mainly because an increase would enlarge government bond yields and the fiscal burden, a yellow light begins to flash.

Conversely, if inflation is under control and economic conditions allow easing, a rate cut that simultaneously eases the government’s financing costs is not subordination. It can be rational monetary policy.

So what distinguishes coordination from domination is not merely the instrument, but the mandate, motive, proportionality, limits, transparency, and the ability to exit when circumstances change.

Lessons from Four Central Banks

History provides interesting comparisons. After World War II, the Federal Reserve maintained government bond yields to help the Treasury finance war debt. The tension between price stability and fiscal needs eventually produced the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord of 1951, which separated government debt management from monetary policy and became an important foundation of the modern Fed’s independence.

The ECB built a harder fence through the prohibition of monetary financing. Yet when the pandemic threatened the economy and monetary transmission, the ECB carried out large-scale bond purchases through the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme.

The Bank of England also carried out major interventions during the pandemic while maintaining its operational independence. The BOJ for years was a very large buyer of Japanese government bonds before later moving towards normalisation.

The lesson is not that all government bond purchases are safe, nor that all are dangerous. The size of a central bank’s balance sheet does not by itself determine independence. What determines it is who controls the policy objective and whether the central bank can still change direction when its stability mandate requires it.

From Burden Sharing to Policy Mix

Indonesia has its own policy laboratory. The 2020 pandemic brought BI and the government into territory previously considered unconventional. Through burden sharing, BI purchased government bonds to support state budget financing and economic recovery. That extraordinary policy was born from a once-in-a-generation shock when the risk of inaction could be far greater than the risk of intervention.

Was that fiscal dominance? Answering ‘yes’ simply because BI bought government bonds is too simplistic. In a systemic crisis, fiscal-monetary coordination can be the optimal choice. But the legitimacy of extraordinary policy always has a partner: an exit strategy. Emergency policy loses its emergency character when it slowly turns into normality.

The question is relevant again after the pandemic. In 2025, the government and BI agreed to share the interest burden for the People’s Housing and Village/Sub-district Cooperatives Merah Putih programmes. Government bond purchases are also part of liquidity management and the policy mix.

In 2026, that complexity is increasingly visible. After standing at 4.75 percent until April, BI raised the BI-Rate to 5.25 percent in May, 5.50 percent on 9 June, then 5.75 percent on 18 June and held it in July. As of 21 July 2026, BI’s government bond purchases reached Rp188.68 trillion, including Rp76.62 trillion in the secondary market.

Those two policy directions do not have to be contradictory. This is precisely the logic of the policy mix: interest rates and exchange rate stabilisation maintain the nominal anchor, while macroprudential policy, liquidity, and the payment system can support economic financing.

However, the closer central bank policy intersects with the financing of government programmes, the stronger the need for guardrails: explicit objectives, measurable ceilings, market-based pricing, clear duration, transparency, accountability, and a credible exit strategy. What must be prevented is not coordination, but temporary coordination that unwittingly turns into permanent dependence.

Credibility Also Has a Price

This is the dimension often missed in debates about independence. The government may have an interest in keeping interest rates and yields low so that its debt costs are cheap. But if the market sees monetary policy beginning to be controlled by fiscal needs, inflation expectations and risk premiums can rise. Yields may ultimately rise instead.

The paradox of fiscal dominance is even sharper: the desire to make government financing cheaper through monetary accommodation can end up making it more expensive when credibility falls and risk premiums rise.

Independence is therefore not an institutional luxury. It is capital of trust. But independence also must not become a reason for the central bank to ignore growth, employment, financial stability, and the social consequences of its policies.

This is where political economy reminds us that monetary decisions are never entirely free of distributional consequences. What is needed is not absolute independence, but independence that is credible, adaptive, and accountable.

The Next Governor’s Test

Therefore, Destry should not be judged by how often she differs from the President or the Finance Minister. A more meaningful measure is what can be called counterfactual independence: what does BI do when fiscal interests and the monetary mandate truly conflict?

If inflation surges, expectations begin to detach from the target, and the Rupiah experiences persistent pressure, is BI still willing to tighten policy even though the consequence is that government bond yields and the government’s interest burden rise? Conversely, when stability allows, is BI adaptive enough to support growth without feeling that independence must be proven by keeping its distance from the government? That is where the boundary lies.

Coordination ends when fiscal needs begin to change the reaction function of monetary policy. Fiscal dominance begins when the central bank is no longer free to take the necessary policy because of its consequences for government financing.

Indonesia does not need a BI that is independent in a rigid and isolated sense. Indonesia needs a central bank that can coordinate without being subordinated, support growth without losing its stability anchor, and help the state in extraordinary circumstances without making extraordinary policy the new normal.

So the test of a BI Governor is not how often she says ‘no’. The test is whether she always has the freedom and courage to say ‘no’ when the mandate requires it, and the clarity to say ‘yes’ when coordination is indeed the best choice for the Indonesian economy.

That is where independence ceases to be merely a provision of law and becomes the credibility of an institution.

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Cite this article
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/the-test-of-bank-indonesias-independence-1786753221)
Originally published by CNBC Indonesia (https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/opini/20260813085614-14-758804/ujian-independensi-bank-indonesia), translated from Indonesian
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