The rules of the diplomatic game in Southeast Asia go

The rules of the diplomatic game in Southeast Asia go
something like this. Whatever a government, despotic or
otherwise, chooses to do within the privacy of its borders is its
business. Specifically, the key neighborhood club -- the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) -- lists as a core
principal the "non-interference in the internal affairs" of
another member state. When ASEAN was founded in 1967 this cosy
deal was enthusiastically embraced. At the time the region was in
mainly authoritarian hands; Indonesia's Soeharto was especially
keen to have a blind eye turned on his political armory of
summary executions, torture and disappearances. The unprecedented
threat from Malaysia to break the non-interference code over
political repression in Myanmar has the potential to reshape
regional diplomacy positively. Willing interference in Myanmar
from ASEAN would be a far more powerful lever than the economic
sanctions and condemnation Western nations can dish out.

When Myanmar gained ASEAN membership in 1997 the military
regime in Rangoon won the benefits of regional cooperation, but
accepted no constraints on repression at home. The political map
of Southeast Asia, however, has been shifting since the 1980s as
more affluent populations have demanded accountable and
democratic governments. The recent election of the reformist
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as president in Indonesia and Abdullah
Ahmad Badawi as prime minister in Malaysia has tipped the balance
inside ASEAN. Malaysia, due to assume the rotating chairmanship
later this year, is maneuvering to have Myanmar, next in line for
2006, passed over for the ASEAN chairmanship. Malaysia's
Parliament will also demand the release of Myanmar's pro-
democracy leader, Aung San Suu Kyi.

Whether ASEAN will manage to speak as one on Myanmar is not
yet clear. Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines have
expressed their dismay over Myanmar's intransigence. But
Thailand, now a mainly stable democracy, is wary of stoking
opposition inside Myanmar which may spill, as it has before,
across its borders. Many powerful Thais also have lucrative
business interests linked to Myanmar's junta. China, too, is an
important player. Beijing is keen to reap the benefits of access
to Myanmar's rich natural resources. The increasing integration
of ASEAN economies with China's booming markets means Beijing may
be able to pressure Malaysia to back off. ASEAN, however, also
realizes its continuing tolerance of Myanmar could damage ties to
the European Union and the United States, both of which promise a
comprehensive boycott if Myanmar manages to assume the ASEAN
chairmanship. Australia, with its recently enhanced links to
ASEAN, should amplify this message.
-- The Sydney Morning Herald.

Musharraf visit

Only the very naive will believe that when Gen. Musharraf
visits Delhi to watch a cricket match, his scheduled
confabulations with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will be
confined to the captaincy skills of Inzamam ul Haq and Sourav
Ganguly. It is known that the general believes in jumping over
intermediate levels and talking directly to the Indian
leadership. This approach may have advantages, as it can jump-
start negotiations mired in a bureaucratic process. But the
dangers are greater, as the failed Agra summit in 2001 showed.

The danger is clear. Since Musharraf says that the "core
dispute" must be resolved before there can be progress, he will
have to, at some point, divulge the prescription he has for such
a resolution. This will, in all likelihood, be a version of the
Owen-Dixon plan, or the "Chenab" formula, or some such scheme
that would involve a significant redrawing of boundaries.
Mapmaking, of course, is anathema to the Indian side, and such
proposals are dead in the water. But disagreement at top levels
would amount to a loss of face for the party making the proposal.
This could have negative repercussions for the peace process
itself -- something like this is precisely what happened at Agra.

It may have been much better to have issues thrashed out at
intermediate levels, with political direction from the top, after
which leaders could have met for a formal ratification. But Delhi
could not very well refuse after Musharraf made his intentions
known. What it can do is downplay the import of the visit by
keeping up the cricket fig leaf, to suggest this is an informal
meeting between leaders, instead of a formal summit. Agra was
marked by complacency and lack of preparation on the Indian side.
Delhi has to keep its guard up and look out for googlies bowled
by the redoubtable general. A repeat of Agra must be avoided, and
Delhi should be able to present a wish list to Musharraf instead
of having him monopolize proceedings.

It is commendable that the general sent many members of his
family ahead of him, and took a certain risk by allowing the
opening up of old memories. But he is an ex-commando who takes
calculated risks, and South Block must not turn mushy at his new-
found cricket diplomacy, pun fully intended. At the risk of
sounding contradictory, it must also be ready to lend an ear to
what the general has in mind these days. A lot has happened since
Agra, the chief developments being that terror is not a "normal"
tool of international diplomacy any more, and Musharraf himself
has been a target of terror. He may be thinking differently on
certain issues and Delhi would not be wise to exclude the
possibility. What it can count on is that Musharraf is under
pressure at home, far more than when he came to Agra, and has to
show some success from his Indian visit.
-- The Statesman, Calcutta