The rules of the diplomatic game in Southeast Asia go

The rules of the diplomatic game in Southeast Asia go something like this. Whatever a government, despotic or otherwise, chooses to do within the privacy of its borders is its business. Specifically, the key neighborhood club -- the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) -- lists as a core principal the "non-interference in the internal affairs" of another member state. When ASEAN was founded in 1967 this cosy deal was enthusiastically embraced. At the time the region was in mainly authoritarian hands; Indonesia's Soeharto was especially keen to have a blind eye turned on his political armory of summary executions, torture and disappearances. The unprecedented threat from Malaysia to break the non-interference code over political repression in Myanmar has the potential to reshape regional diplomacy positively. Willing interference in Myanmar from ASEAN would be a far more powerful lever than the economic sanctions and condemnation Western nations can dish out.

When Myanmar gained ASEAN membership in 1997 the military regime in Rangoon won the benefits of regional cooperation, but accepted no constraints on repression at home. The political map of Southeast Asia, however, has been shifting since the 1980s as more affluent populations have demanded accountable and democratic governments. The recent election of the reformist Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as president in Indonesia and Abdullah Ahmad Badawi as prime minister in Malaysia has tipped the balance inside ASEAN. Malaysia, due to assume the rotating chairmanship later this year, is maneuvering to have Myanmar, next in line for 2006, passed over for the ASEAN chairmanship. Malaysia's Parliament will also demand the release of Myanmar's pro- democracy leader, Aung San Suu Kyi.

Whether ASEAN will manage to speak as one on Myanmar is not yet clear. Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines have expressed their dismay over Myanmar's intransigence. But Thailand, now a mainly stable democracy, is wary of stoking opposition inside Myanmar which may spill, as it has before, across its borders. Many powerful Thais also have lucrative business interests linked to Myanmar's junta. China, too, is an important player. Beijing is keen to reap the benefits of access to Myanmar's rich natural resources. The increasing integration of ASEAN economies with China's booming markets means Beijing may be able to pressure Malaysia to back off. ASEAN, however, also realizes its continuing tolerance of Myanmar could damage ties to the European Union and the United States, both of which promise a comprehensive boycott if Myanmar manages to assume the ASEAN chairmanship. Australia, with its recently enhanced links to ASEAN, should amplify this message. -- The Sydney Morning Herald.

Musharraf visit

Only the very naive will believe that when Gen. Musharraf visits Delhi to watch a cricket match, his scheduled confabulations with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will be confined to the captaincy skills of Inzamam ul Haq and Sourav Ganguly. It is known that the general believes in jumping over intermediate levels and talking directly to the Indian leadership. This approach may have advantages, as it can jump- start negotiations mired in a bureaucratic process. But the dangers are greater, as the failed Agra summit in 2001 showed.

The danger is clear. Since Musharraf says that the "core dispute" must be resolved before there can be progress, he will have to, at some point, divulge the prescription he has for such a resolution. This will, in all likelihood, be a version of the Owen-Dixon plan, or the "Chenab" formula, or some such scheme that would involve a significant redrawing of boundaries. Mapmaking, of course, is anathema to the Indian side, and such proposals are dead in the water. But disagreement at top levels would amount to a loss of face for the party making the proposal. This could have negative repercussions for the peace process itself -- something like this is precisely what happened at Agra.

It may have been much better to have issues thrashed out at intermediate levels, with political direction from the top, after which leaders could have met for a formal ratification. But Delhi could not very well refuse after Musharraf made his intentions known. What it can do is downplay the import of the visit by keeping up the cricket fig leaf, to suggest this is an informal meeting between leaders, instead of a formal summit. Agra was marked by complacency and lack of preparation on the Indian side. Delhi has to keep its guard up and look out for googlies bowled by the redoubtable general. A repeat of Agra must be avoided, and Delhi should be able to present a wish list to Musharraf instead of having him monopolize proceedings.

It is commendable that the general sent many members of his family ahead of him, and took a certain risk by allowing the opening up of old memories. But he is an ex-commando who takes calculated risks, and South Block must not turn mushy at his new- found cricket diplomacy, pun fully intended. At the risk of sounding contradictory, it must also be ready to lend an ear to what the general has in mind these days. A lot has happened since Agra, the chief developments being that terror is not a "normal" tool of international diplomacy any more, and Musharraf himself has been a target of terror. He may be thinking differently on certain issues and Delhi would not be wise to exclude the possibility. What it can count on is that Musharraf is under pressure at home, far more than when he came to Agra, and has to show some success from his Indian visit. -- The Statesman, Calcutta