The restructuring of Indonesia's intelligence service network

Aleksius Jemadu, Bandung

The preservation of democracy and the upkeep of national security are two equally important challenges that Indonesia is facing today. While many agree that this country needs special legislation to regulate its intelligence services, there is little discussion about concrete proposals on how to restructure the current organization of intelligence services.

From the perspective of international cooperation on fighting terrorism, Indonesia has been pressured by its neighbors not to become the weakest link in the intelligence networks of southeastern Asia.

The operation of Indonesian intelligence today is based on at least two regulations made by the president.

First, Presidential Instruction No. 5/2002 on the assignment of the Head of National Intelligence Agency (BIN) to coordinate all intelligence activities and Presidential Decree No. 9/2004 on the position, function, authority, organizational structure and working procedures of all non-departmental agencies. Not only are the two stipulations too simple and vague, there are no explicit regulations regarding special powers of the intelligence service whose implementation may lead to the violation of civil liberties.

It is understandable that some civil society organizations remain suspicious about the existence of an intelligence service with a new mandate. However, we have to develop a new mindset that the existence of an open democratic society and a professional intelligence service can be made equally subject to the same principle of the rule of law.

As a starting point, we need to learn from the best practices in other democratic countries. In order to convince the skeptical public we need to make a clear distinction between intelligence services and law enforcement bodies. Such distinction implies that intelligence officials should never be allowed to detain people.

By law, only the police have the authority to arrest people if there is enough evidence of criminal action. The task of the intelligence services should be limited to the gathering of information in order to make an accurate and timely assessment of threats to national security. Based on such threat assessments, the policymakers will take necessary action to prevent the materialization of the threat.

On top of that, the citizens need a legal guarantee that the exceptional powers that are often given to the intelligence service will not be misused by the ruling power.

Another best practice that we need to apply in the restructuring of the intelligence service is concerned with the issue of coordination. Under the current regulation, the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) finds it structurally difficult to coordinate the gathering of information from various elements of intelligence community in order to establish the imminence of a threat. The restructuring of the U.S. intelligence services after The Sept. 11 terrorist attacks can be used as an example from which we may take lessons about the importance of a clearly authorized coordinating agency.

Thus, based on the recommendation of the Sept. 11 Commission Report, the U.S. government has created the office of the National Intelligence Director whose function is to unify the whole structure of the U.S. intelligence community for the sake of an effective coordination and integrated policy recommendation. The Director of National Intelligence who has now greater political leverage than the Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), is directly responsible to the U.S. President.

If indeed coordination among different elements of the intelligence community is of supreme importance for Indonesia today, some political analysts propose the establishment of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (Lembaga Koordinasi Intelijen Nasional or LKIN), which is parallel to the position of the office of the director of national intelligence in the U.S.

The Head of LKIN is directly responsible to the president with the main task of providing timely and accurate information on the imminent threat to national security. He or she is expected to be the analyst-in-chief for the government.

The establishment of LKIN reminds people of the State Intelligence Coordination Agency (BAKIN) that was notorious for its past abuses of civil liberties. This is a legitimate complaint that the new intelligence bill should address.

The Indonesian Working Group on Intelligence Reform tries to deal with this issue by proposing that LKIN is only responsible for the coordination function. The operational function of intelligence activities is divided into two separate institutions.

First, we need to establish the (new) National Intelligence Agency (BIN), which is responsible for domestic intelligence with the main task of gathering and analyzing information related to the imminent domestic threat to national security. For the sake of ministerial oversight this agency can be put under the Ministry of Home Affairs or the State Ministry of National Security.

Second, the current Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS), which is currently under the Indonesian Military (TNI) to be put under the Ministry of Defense. The combat intelligence will remain attached to the TNI structures.

Taking into account the important role of the intelligence units that are so far attached to various agencies like the police, attorney general, immigration and customs, it is proposed that as members of the intelligence community, they too are subject to the coordination conducted by LKIN.

Hopefully, with the restructuring of our intelligence service, not only can we facilitate an effective coordination, but we can also ensure that future intelligence operations will not go beyond the mandate given by the national legislature on behalf of the Indonesian people.

Aleksius Jemadu is the dean of the Department of International Relations at Parahyangan Catholic University in Bandung, as well as a member of the Indonesian Working Group for Intelligence Reform. He can be reached at aleks@home.unpar.ac.id.