The principle of RI's defense policy

The principle of RI's defense policy

Bob Lowry analyses the fundamentals of Indonesia's defense and
security policy and the prospects of change to the structure of
its armed forces.

In 1993, Indonesia commenced its second 25-year long-term
development plan, the first five-year period of which will take
the country to the dawn of the new millennium. What do the
defense and security elements of these plans tell of Indonesia's
regional security vision and its threat perceptions? Do they
signify any change in defense policy or strategy and are the
force structure proposals appropriate?

In mid-1995, Indonesia issued its first Defense White Paper.
It purports to be the basis for planned development over
the next five years but is merely a summary and update of the
sixth five-year development plan. It is part of the regional
security dialogue and a contribution to "transparency," rather
than a fundamental review of defense policy and strategy.

The five-year plan to 1999 does not envisage radical changes
in force structure. The navy and air force will be subject to
qualitative improvements as funds allow. This will include
improving air traffic, air surveillance and control systems; the
upgrade of F-5 and A-4 fighters; the introduction of Hawk
fighters already ordered; and the purchase of an additional
squadron of fighters to replace the OV-10F Bronco. So, Indonesia
will end the century with a relatively modern but modest
fighter force of six squadrons and supporting air defense
infrastructure.

The navy will end the century with its current fleet minus
some decommissioned vessels and plus additional amphibious
vessels to support a third marine battalion landing team
currently being formed. It may also have placed orders for
several new submarines to complement the two in service and begun
planning a replacement frigate program.

The army will have expanded by 30,000 to 243,000, with most of
the increase going to the territorial forces to fill current
shortfalls. And the police will be expanded from 180,000 to a
police/population ratio of 1:1000 and later 1:750 if funds and
resources permit.

Details of the 25-year plan have not been released but, based
on stated capability requirements and current patterns, it is
possible to speculate about what is intended by 2018. The air
force will have expanded to eight fighter squadrons, sufficient
strategic transport aircraft to deploy three parachute battalions
simultaneously, another maritime reconnaissance squadron and
possibly an airborne early warning and control squadron.

The navy will have about eight submarines and a replacement
surface fleet of current numbers or slightly more. And the army
will have expanded the central reserve forces (Kostrad) to three
divisions and added another group to the special forces
(Kopassus) to bring them to a total strength of about 45,000. But
the bulk of army manpower increases will go to the territorial
forces, with total regular army strength estimated at about
330,000.

This force structure is indicative and is not based on any
specific external threat, but rather on norms related to regional
capabilities, resource constraints and domestic considerations.
Nevertheless, it does illuminate Indonesia's regional and
domestic threat perceptions and demonstrate the continuity in
Indonesian defense policy and strategy.

Indonesia faces no significant threats from its immediate
neighbors and poses no serious threat to them, if only because it
needs support in the evolving regional security environment. It
looks towards China with particular concern for what it may do
with its new found economic might. Is China's aggressive stance
in the South China Sea indicative of designs for regional
hegemony or is it the last spasm of a decaying communist regime?
If so, what form will China's political transformation take
and what will that mean for the region? Both success and failure
of Chinese economic and political transformation pose potential
threats for Indonesia.

Consequently, it is not surprising that Indonesian policy is
designed to keep the U.S. engaged in the region and develop a
regional security buffer to deter possible Chinese assertiveness.
These moves are complemented by the efforts of ASEAN and the
ASEAN Regional Forum to engage China in a comprehensive security
arrangement designed to create a "balance of interests" rather
than a balance of power.

Difference of strategic perception and extant disputes within
ASEAN will continue to bedevil the potential for ASEAN-wide
multi-lateral defense cooperation but the bilateral "spider web"
of defense relations, especially with maritime Southeast Asia and
Australasia, will provide Indonesia with some strategic
depth, especially on the South China Sea axis. But no matter what
transpires in China, it will take many years before it has the
capability, let alone the intention, to exercise any expansionist
ambitions.

Given the lack of any immediate external threat, why are the
army and police being expanded to such a degree? In the case of
the police, it is supposedly based on norms in other countries
and the growing incidence of crime. Increases in army strength
could be understood if there was an imminent external threat
but that it is not the case. The reason, of course, is the
perception that population increases and social change
accompanying economic development will create a crisis of
expectations which will threaten the regime and the integrity of
the nation. And given increasing transparency it will be
essential to identify potential crises early and take preventive
action before they have a chance to snowball and gain national or
international support.

If that assessment is correct it has the potential to
undermine Indonesia's defense policy, which is based on an
integrated conventional/guerrilla strategy. Given the absence of
an identifiable and imminent external threat it would be more
appropriate for Indonesia to decrease regular army manpower to
the minimum, rely more on reserves and devote the resources saved
to qualitative improvements in the navy and air force. But the
perception is that the internal threat not only remains more
immediate but will increase. That outcome will undermine the
credibility of the guerrilla strategy even allowing for
polarization against external threats. Increasing regular army
strength is a signal of growing weakness rather than growing
cohesion which is an essential characteristic of a guerrilla
strategy. Such a dilemma can only be resolved by political
reforms which produce the cohesion current arrangements are
apparently failing to achieve.

Given the increase in conventional capabilities, there is also
a need to consider how they are going to be used in achieving
security objectives and in defense. Are they going to be used to
allow Indonesia to become the gate-keeper of the archipelago in
times of crisis between third parties, or for Indonesia's
immediate defense needs only? In either case, the doctrinal basis
of such a strategy needs to be formulated and relevant parts made
public so that there are no misunderstandings about Indonesia's
intentions should such crises develop.

Indonesia is not only at the geographic crossroads of the
region but is also approaching the crossroads in terms of its
economic, political, defense and security development. Indonesian
development planning is holistic and long-term, but the question
remains: Has it got the balance right? Does the changing
balance between the conventional and guerrilla elements of the
strategy have a sound doctrinal basis and do domestic political
developments enhance or hinder Indonesia's self-reliant defense
strategy? Answers to these questions will only come to light in
the years ahead.

Bob Lowry is a Visiting Fellow at the Australian Defense Force
Academy, Canberra.