The principle of RI's defense policy

The principle of RI's defense policy

Bob Lowry analyses the fundamentals of Indonesia's defense and security policy and the prospects of change to the structure of its armed forces.

In 1993, Indonesia commenced its second 25-year long-term development plan, the first five-year period of which will take the country to the dawn of the new millennium. What do the defense and security elements of these plans tell of Indonesia's regional security vision and its threat perceptions? Do they signify any change in defense policy or strategy and are the force structure proposals appropriate?

In mid-1995, Indonesia issued its first Defense White Paper. It purports to be the basis for planned development over the next five years but is merely a summary and update of the sixth five-year development plan. It is part of the regional security dialogue and a contribution to "transparency," rather than a fundamental review of defense policy and strategy.

The five-year plan to 1999 does not envisage radical changes in force structure. The navy and air force will be subject to qualitative improvements as funds allow. This will include improving air traffic, air surveillance and control systems; the upgrade of F-5 and A-4 fighters; the introduction of Hawk fighters already ordered; and the purchase of an additional squadron of fighters to replace the OV-10F Bronco. So, Indonesia will end the century with a relatively modern but modest fighter force of six squadrons and supporting air defense infrastructure.

The navy will end the century with its current fleet minus some decommissioned vessels and plus additional amphibious vessels to support a third marine battalion landing team currently being formed. It may also have placed orders for several new submarines to complement the two in service and begun planning a replacement frigate program.

The army will have expanded by 30,000 to 243,000, with most of the increase going to the territorial forces to fill current shortfalls. And the police will be expanded from 180,000 to a police/population ratio of 1:1000 and later 1:750 if funds and resources permit.

Details of the 25-year plan have not been released but, based on stated capability requirements and current patterns, it is possible to speculate about what is intended by 2018. The air force will have expanded to eight fighter squadrons, sufficient strategic transport aircraft to deploy three parachute battalions simultaneously, another maritime reconnaissance squadron and possibly an airborne early warning and control squadron.

The navy will have about eight submarines and a replacement surface fleet of current numbers or slightly more. And the army will have expanded the central reserve forces (Kostrad) to three divisions and added another group to the special forces (Kopassus) to bring them to a total strength of about 45,000. But the bulk of army manpower increases will go to the territorial forces, with total regular army strength estimated at about 330,000.

This force structure is indicative and is not based on any specific external threat, but rather on norms related to regional capabilities, resource constraints and domestic considerations. Nevertheless, it does illuminate Indonesia's regional and domestic threat perceptions and demonstrate the continuity in Indonesian defense policy and strategy.

Indonesia faces no significant threats from its immediate neighbors and poses no serious threat to them, if only because it needs support in the evolving regional security environment. It looks towards China with particular concern for what it may do with its new found economic might. Is China's aggressive stance in the South China Sea indicative of designs for regional hegemony or is it the last spasm of a decaying communist regime? If so, what form will China's political transformation take and what will that mean for the region? Both success and failure of Chinese economic and political transformation pose potential threats for Indonesia.

Consequently, it is not surprising that Indonesian policy is designed to keep the U.S. engaged in the region and develop a regional security buffer to deter possible Chinese assertiveness. These moves are complemented by the efforts of ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum to engage China in a comprehensive security arrangement designed to create a "balance of interests" rather than a balance of power.

Difference of strategic perception and extant disputes within ASEAN will continue to bedevil the potential for ASEAN-wide multi-lateral defense cooperation but the bilateral "spider web" of defense relations, especially with maritime Southeast Asia and Australasia, will provide Indonesia with some strategic depth, especially on the South China Sea axis. But no matter what transpires in China, it will take many years before it has the capability, let alone the intention, to exercise any expansionist ambitions.

Given the lack of any immediate external threat, why are the army and police being expanded to such a degree? In the case of the police, it is supposedly based on norms in other countries and the growing incidence of crime. Increases in army strength could be understood if there was an imminent external threat but that it is not the case. The reason, of course, is the perception that population increases and social change accompanying economic development will create a crisis of expectations which will threaten the regime and the integrity of the nation. And given increasing transparency it will be essential to identify potential crises early and take preventive action before they have a chance to snowball and gain national or international support.

If that assessment is correct it has the potential to undermine Indonesia's defense policy, which is based on an integrated conventional/guerrilla strategy. Given the absence of an identifiable and imminent external threat it would be more appropriate for Indonesia to decrease regular army manpower to the minimum, rely more on reserves and devote the resources saved to qualitative improvements in the navy and air force. But the perception is that the internal threat not only remains more immediate but will increase. That outcome will undermine the credibility of the guerrilla strategy even allowing for polarization against external threats. Increasing regular army strength is a signal of growing weakness rather than growing cohesion which is an essential characteristic of a guerrilla strategy. Such a dilemma can only be resolved by political reforms which produce the cohesion current arrangements are apparently failing to achieve.

Given the increase in conventional capabilities, there is also a need to consider how they are going to be used in achieving security objectives and in defense. Are they going to be used to allow Indonesia to become the gate-keeper of the archipelago in times of crisis between third parties, or for Indonesia's immediate defense needs only? In either case, the doctrinal basis of such a strategy needs to be formulated and relevant parts made public so that there are no misunderstandings about Indonesia's intentions should such crises develop.

Indonesia is not only at the geographic crossroads of the region but is also approaching the crossroads in terms of its economic, political, defense and security development. Indonesian development planning is holistic and long-term, but the question remains: Has it got the balance right? Does the changing balance between the conventional and guerrilla elements of the strategy have a sound doctrinal basis and do domestic political developments enhance or hinder Indonesia's self-reliant defense strategy? Answers to these questions will only come to light in the years ahead.

Bob Lowry is a Visiting Fellow at the Australian Defense Force Academy, Canberra.