The Poso tragedy and its significance for security

The Poso tragedy and its significance for security

Aleksius Jemadu, Bandung

Since the first Bali bombing in 2002, terrorist groups have
used two different strategies in attempting to accomplish their
political goals in Indonesia. The first strategy is to target
Western people and property with massive bomb attacks. The second
strategy is to make inroads into the communal conflicts in Maluku
and Poso (Central Sulawesi) where they try to prolong the
conflict in order to make their presence relevant. The ultimate
goal of the second strategy is to destabilize Indonesia by
destroying the very foundation of its national unity.

It is within this context that we should understand why the
terrorist groups were determined to go to the extent of
mercilessly beheading three innocent young girls in Poso on Oct.
29, 2005. As Indonesian security authorities increase their
vigilance to protect public places, terrorist groups are changing
their tactics to killing the most vulnerable and unprotected
members of society: school girls. Thanks to the maturity of the
local religious communities such blatant provocation has not led
to an new outbreak of communal violence.

Let us examine first the local context of this terrorist
attack. To some extent the killings of the three girls in Poso
reflects a desperate situation on the part of the provocateurs. A
series of bomb attacks had already taken place beforehand to try
and re-ignite the conflict. The Tentena bombing in May 2005 was
the biggest attempt, and dozens of people were killed.

The encouraging news is that both Muslims and Christians in
Poso have strengthened their solidarity to create peace and
harmony in their community. The relatively smooth conduct of
local elections recently is proof that local people are capable
of carrying out democratic mechanisms to create legitimate
government.

On top of that, to the chagrin of the terrorist and radical
groups, the candidates who won the elections were from joint
Christian and Islamic political groups. Thus, the role of the
regent of Poso, who is a Christian, and his deputy, who is a
Muslim, will be crucial in sustaining the peace between the
religious communities.

There is, however, no cause for complacency. There are real
indications that the terrorist groups have a long-term scenario
to increase their activities in the eastern regions of Indonesia.
The interception of a huge quantity of explosives by police in
Nunukan, East Kalimantan and Maumere, East Nusa Tenggara,
recently, is a clear evidence of the imminence of the security
threat.

In addition to the above explanation, some political analysts
offer an alternative approach that emphasizes the struggle among
different political groups, including some military elements,
over the exploitation of mining and plantation resources in
certain eastern provinces. According to this explanation, the
outbreak of communal violence will open the way for these
political and economic groups whose objective is to control the
exploitation of natural resources.

Whichever explanation is valid, the heart of the matter is
that there are indeed certain political groups who are keen to
take advantage of the outbreak of religious violence in the
eastern parts of Indonesia. If this is the case, then Indonesian
security authorities have to confront different sources of threat
simultaneously.

Therefore, there must be the strongest commitment from the top
level of government to remain vigilant against the increasing
activities of terrorist groups so that there will be no chance
for them to materialize their dangerous agenda.

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono should try to convince the
terrorist groups that Indonesia is too great to be dictated to by
persons whose ultimate goal is the breakup of this multiethnic
nation.

The writer is head of the department of international
relations and head of the MA study program in social sciences at
Parahyangan University, Bandung. He can be reached at
aljemadu@yahoo.co.uk.