The Paradox of Zakat and Our Development Epistemology
There is an irony that is rarely spoken aloud. The state is eager to bring zakat into the orbit of national development. The potential zakat, estimated at Rp327 trillion, is repeatedly cited as additional fiscal ammunition to pursue poverty alleviation targets while supporting mega-programmes such as Free Nutritious Meals (MBG), People’s Schools, and the Red and White Village/Sub-district Cooperatives.
However, the reluctance is equally apparent: the state wants zakat funds, but does not want the mindset of justice that produced them.
The arithmetic itself challenges this claim. National zakat collection realisation is only around Rp44.7 trillion, less than 11 percent of its potential, and does not reach even one-sixth of the 2026 MBG budget of Rp268 trillion (which was slashed from Rp335 trillion). Zakat is never large enough to plug anyone’s deficit. Its value lies elsewhere.
Zakat is not a reserve account. Viewing zakat solely through the lens of rupiah amounts is a reductionist approach. Zakat is not a tax in a country that does not implement Islamic law. It is bound by specific wealth requirements, the eight categories of recipients (asnaf), and specific distribution protocols.
While taxes grant discretion to the authorities, zakat binds its managers to a commitment to those who are structurally oppressed. When policymakers refer to it as a fiscal instrument, the error lies not in the terminology, but in the assumption that the funds can be separated from the inherent questions: on what basis is the poverty line set, when is someone truly free from helplessness, and does state intervention empower or merely perpetuate dependency?
Conventional fiscal logic stops at budget absorption and output volume. Islamic Development Economics demands a longer chain: resources, intervention, output, results, and impact. Liquid aid does not automatically empower, and standing buildings do not necessarily birth an inclusive economy.
Testing the reality of mega-programmes. The MBG is the first case. Normatively, no one can reject the importance of child nutrition; the framework of Maqasid al-Sharia links it to the preservation of life (hifz al-nafs) and the preservation of intellect (hifz al-aql).
However, good intentions are not a valid measure of validity. By the end of the first semester of 2026, this programme absorbed Rp101.1 trillion for 63.13 million recipients through almost 30,000 food production units (SPPG). During the same period, the Ministry of Health recorded 445 suspected poisoning incidents involving 37,673 victims across 210 regencies/cities up to May 2026, with JPPI monitoring increasing this to 40,759 victims by early August. Recently, 566 people in Sidoarjo suffered poisoning from a single kitchen.
Defending the programme with ratios—arguing that victims represent only a tiny fraction of eight billion portions—actually highlights the problem. In calculating net social value, public interest (maslahah) must be weighed against emerging risks, and those risks are not distributed equally. They strike specific children in specific kitchens. A programme intended to protect life cannot claim success based solely on the number of portions served.
Secondly, the opportunity cost. Through Decision 40/PUU-XXIV/2026 on 30 July, the Constitutional Court ordered the separation of the MBG budget from the education budget by the 2028 State Budget at the latest. The facts presented in court were even more striking: of the Rp769.1 trillion education budget for 2026, Rp223.6 trillion is allocated to MBG for students. Without that allocation, the pure education budget represents only about 11.9 percent of the State Budget.
Justice demands that the state prove that the marginal benefit of every rupiah exceeds the total benefit if used for teacher quality, school sanitation, or learning facilities.
Thirdly, the People’s Schools, with a student unit cost of Rp3 million–Rp4 million per student per month. The BPS poverty line for March 2026 is Rp669,235 per capita per month, or Rp2,676,940 for a poor household averaging four people.
Enrolling one child there is equivalent to funding an entire poor family for a month. This figure is not inherently wrong, but it demands proof that the result is human development and not merely schooling, and that gathering children from the lowest deciles into separate institutions does not lead to disguised segregation.
Fourthly, the Red and White Village Cooperatives (Kopdes). With an allocation of Rp3 billion per unit and a target of 80,000 villages, the stakes approach Rp240 trillion. As of 20 August 2026, the Ministry of Cooperatives recorded that only 21,400 units have been completed and about 3,300 units are operating optimally, some in locations that are economically irrational. This is clearly a means-ends inversion. A building is not a cooperative. A cooperative lives through transactions, shared ownership, and the distribution of surplus.
Symmetry of accountability. This critique does not demand that Indonesia become an Islamic state. Approaches such as Sen’s Capability Theory and Rawls’ theory of justice can be used to dissect policy without a state needing an Islamic label; Islamic Economics must prove its analytical reach in the same way.
This is where the symmetry of accountability becomes relevant. BAZNAS published a report on 18,035 beneficiaries (mustahik) of its economic programme: 64.49 percent exited the poverty zone, with the time taken to exit compressed from 8.74 to 3.31 years, contributing 0.73 percent to national poverty alleviation.
That final figure is small, and it is acknowledged as such. That is precisely the point. Zakat institutions report the ‘graduation’ of 18,000 people, while the state spends Rp101 trillion for 63 million people and reports only portions.
If the state demands that zakat institutions be professional, transparent, and impact-based, it is obliged to apply the same standards to itself. Reporting must not stop at charity accounting or development accounting, but must reach impact accounting.
Towards a new contract. A ‘maslahah’ (public interest) that refuses to be tested risks rotting into a mere slogan. Empowerment calculated by the number of participants is a form of participatory deception, and development measured by the amount of concrete is a degradation of human dignity. Zakat must not be treated as a spare tyre for public financing. Its proper position is as a moral tester.
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/the-paradox-of-zakat-and-our-development-epistemology-1788429488)
Originally published by CNBC Indonesia (https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/opini/20260903144820-14-764689/paradoks-zakat-dan-epistemologi-pembangunan-kita), translated from Indonesian