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The New Order economy as seen from the present

| Source: The Jakarta Post

The New Order economy as seen from the present

By Emil Salim

The following article is based on a paper presented at a
recent conference on Indonesian modern economic history with the
theme "Crisis and Continuity: Indonesian Economy in the 20th
century" organized by the Forum on the Economic History of
Indonesia in Yogyakarta. This is the first of two articles.

YOGYAKARTA: There was serious concern among a group of
graduates of the University of Indonesia on the course set by
Indonesian leaders in economic development in 1959 after the
failure of the Constituent Assembly to agree on the nation's
Constitution.

They felt Indonesia should follow a different path of
development which did not resemble the western model. Indonesia
had been colonialized by the West. Colonialism is the child of
imperialism, which is the child of capitalism. And theories of
development that flourish in textbooks are dominated by western
economists, such as Keynes, Rostow and others.

Returning to the 1945 Constitution also meant a return to the
path of revolution against capitalism, imperialism and
colonialism rolled into one. It also meant that Indonesia had to
explore different models of development, but excluding those
related to Keynesian theories. Symbolically the economists were
required to burn Keynesian books.

The development must be seen against the background of
Indonesian political development. The enactment of the 1945
Constitution was followed by the struggle "to liberate Irian
Jaya" from the Dutch and the "Crush Malaysia" movement against
the West. And the political environment was very much anti-West.
Because of the Irian Jaya issue, Dutch enterprises were soon
nationalized and because of the "Crush Malaysia" movement,
British companies were taken over.

In such a political furor against the West, the pendulum of
the Indonesian economy swung away from a market-based private
economy to a command-based state economy.

But its consequences were clear. Without adequate government
revenue, such a "war economy" was financed by printing money and
unpaid foreign debt. Hyperinflation of 650 percent per year,
increase deficit in balance of payments and ruined infrastructure
deteriorated the economy to practical bankruptcy and created a
political environment ready to explode.

With the assassination of six Army generals, the political
environment gave way to open outbursts by the public, initiated
by students, to demand price reductions, a change of government
and the abandonment of the Indonesian Communist Party, which was
accused of being behind the Sept. 30, 1965 aborted coup. The
political landscape was in complete chaos and plunged the economy
further into turmoil.

To respond to such a chaotic condition, the government took
measures to address the issue of hyperinflation. If in the 1950s
the government literally cut Indonesian banknotes in half to
reduce the rate of inflation, this time in 1965 the zeros were
deleted from various banknotes, making a Rp 10 banknote
equivalent to Rp 1. Accompanied by setting various bus fares,
electricity rates, etc. at an unprecedented high level, the
consequences of these economic measures were disastrous. Rather
than tackling the cause of inflation, such as the huge budget
deficit, the government was handling the symptoms, such as
juggling around with eliminating zeros from rupiah banknotes.

Scarce foreign currencies, obtained from stop-gap loans from
friendly countries, were allocated not through the market but
rather by consensus among bureaucrats sitting around the table to
discuss the utilization of these scarce funds. It is not
surprising therefore if outside the meeting room the hall was
full with lobbyists and traders. And abuse of power leaning
toward corruption flourished.

These were the remnants of the gradually fading command
economy. On the one hand the bureaucracy had tasted the sweetness
of power to manage the economy. On the other hand the need
emerged to apply market mechanisms. Such a transition of mixing
command with a market economy combined the worst trait of both
systems into one.

In the provinces, foreign exchange earnings from exports were
kept in the regions and used for provincial as well as private
developments.

It is clear that this type of management brought the economy
to the brink of collapse.

The political system was also in disarray because of the
collapse of the coalition between nationalist, religious and
communist parties. The only real and effective unifying force was
perhaps the Army.

On the other hand leaders of the Army were also fed up with
the political and economic choices and the need was growing to
improve the situation.

In Bandung at the Army Staff and Command School (Seskoad)
several members of the teaching staff of the University of
Indonesia's School of Economics were invited to teach economics.
They arrived with their families and stayed at the school's
compound for 10 days. If in the mornings lectures were given to
high-ranking Army officers, the evenings were filled with serious
dialogs centering around the issue of "how to develop the
nation".

Indonesia at that time was in a peculiar situation. It had a
president, but he had been made inactive. And the country was
managed by a presidium of five top coordinating ministers.

In the discussions arose the concepts of the required
macroeconomic policy, the urge to develop the rural sector to
enhance food production, to restructure the economy through a
system of "planning through the market".

To accomplish these policies in the midst of political and
economic chaos, the need was felt to make the Army the "agent of
change" through its "dual function".

These ideas were elaborated on in various seminars and
discussions with students and political parties. When the
Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS) convened in
1966 it issued decree no. XXIII/MPRS/1966 on the Renewal of the
Basic Economic, Finance and Development Policy, which observed
that economic deterioration had occurred because of:

(1) no effective control by legislative institutions on the
government's economic policy;

(2) the subordination of economic to political interests;

(3) rational economic principles were set aside in tackling
problems.

It was therefore deemed necessary to strengthen control on the
government's economic policy by, among other ways, through the
budget right of the legislature and implementing strict financial
control by the State's Audit Body.

People's economic improvements obtained the highest priority
in national development. And economic issues had to be tackled by
rational and realistic economic principles. Economic democracy
were to be the guiding principle in developing the economy.
Liberalism, etatism and monopoly which were harmful to people had
no place in an economic democracy.

It was on these bases that the New Order economy was to launch
stabilization and rehabilitated programs covering:

* a physical plan with emphasis on restoring and raising
production capacity of food, exports and clothing, accompanied by
rehabilitation and improving economic infrastructure to support
the above productions;

* a financial plan to assure rupiah and foreign exchange
financing to implement the physical plan and control inflation to
obtain a proper price structure.

To implement this important MPRS decision it was felt
necessary to have an active force in society capable of bringing
in all political parties. But political parties were more engaged
in politics to restructure and consolidate themselves in this New
Order era. Army generals strongly felt that it was necessary to
put more emphasis on economic rather than political development.

An Army seminar was organized in Bandung in August 1966 to
discuss the necessary follow-up of the MPRS decisions, which was
to serve as the highest event of the "Special Short Course" for
the top echelon of the Armed Forces. This seminar was intended to
build consensus among the leaders of the Armed Forces on the
method and program to meet the challenges of the New Order era
starting since 1966.

In this seminar consensus was reached on action plans:

-- to control inflation through, among other things, balancing
the budget, which in practical terms meant that expenditure could
only be raised if revenue also increased. Through this simple
notion budget, discipline was imposed on a government that was
used to working without a budget. It also meant introducing an
austerity program, which for the Armed Forces meant a significant
budget cut. Because of the "war-type economy", approximately 45
percent of the budget was allocated to military expenditure.
Another 43 percent of the budget was used for the salaries of
government employees. Most of the remainder went to subsidies for
various services rendered by state enterprises. Hence development
projects could only be financed by printing more money. This had
to be drastically stopped;

-- to reach self-sufficiency in food by moving agricultural
production firmly ahead. There were other ideas floating around
to stress industrial development and bypassing agriculture, in
order to obtain a short-cut to economic takeoff. The fact,
however, that the highest portion of the people were living in
rural areas was a major consideration to reject industrial
development for the benefit of agricultural and rural
development. In a period of rice shortages, the green revolution
was widely accepted as a major tool to achieve self-sufficiency
in food. It was many decades later that shortcomings of the green
revolution became known;

-- to rehabilitate economic infrastructure. The often quoted
Dutch phrase at that time was "de weg is we" (meaning: the road
is gone). Priority was given to roads, harbors, irrigation and
others to support agricultural production. There was a clear
focus on agricultural development to be adhered to by all other
sectors;

-- to promote export mainly through eliminating physical and
administrative bottlenecks in exports. Also foreign exchange
earned by exporters was gradually transferred fully to the
exporters by raising the share of the exporters on their Bukti
Ekspor (BE, or export documentation) claims;

-- to increase the production of textiles and clothing which
absorbed a large portion of the workforce;

-- to restructure state enterprises to raise efficiency and to
eliminate corruption;

-- to eliminate price, tariff and wage distortions by relying
more on market mechanisms;

-- to improve effectiveness and efficiency of the bureaucracy
and government personnel;

-- to finalize the necessary institutional and legislative
arrangements, especially in foreign investment, Central Bank and
the banking system and in financial relations between central and
provincial governments.

The writer was a minister several times in New Order Cabinets.

More from 1 September 1999 โ†’

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Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/the-new-order-economy-as-seen-from-the-present-1447893297-1414688)
Originally published by The Jakarta Post
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