Indonesian Political, Business & Finance News

The Mineral Exchange and a New Chapter in Indonesia’s Downstreaming

| Source: CNBC Indonesia Translated from Indonesian | Investment
The Mineral Exchange and a New Chapter in Indonesia’s Downstreaming
Image: CNBC Indonesia

Indonesia has long been learning how to process minerals. The next challenge is much greater: learning how to build a market that determines their value.

Over the past decade, downstreaming has mainly been understood as the journey of minerals from the mine to smelters and processing industries.

This strategy has transformed the national industrial landscape. More of the added value that was previously captured by other countries is now retained in Indonesia for longer. But one strategic link in the chain remains beyond our full control: where minerals are valued, traded, their risks managed and their financing arranged, and where market benchmarks are ultimately established.

This is why the Mineral and Strategic Commodities Exchange (BMKS) means far more than simply creating a new exchange. If the first generation of downstreaming took Indonesia from raw-material exporter to producer of processed goods, the next chapter is about moving from production power to market power.

Indonesia cannot merely be a place where minerals are mined and refined. We need to build the capacity for mineral prices, transactions, financing, risk management and market information to be increasingly generated at home.

The institutional momentum is now more tangible. On 9 September 2026, Sarjito was formally sworn in as Chief Executive Supervisor of the Mineral and Strategic Commodities Exchange and a member of the OJK Board of Commissioners for the 2026–2031 term. Earlier, the OJK appointed Henry Rialdi as Deputy Commissioner for BMKS Regulation and Supervision. The organisational strengthening signals that BMKS supervision now has a dedicated structure within the OJK.

Its regulatory foundations are also in place. OJK Regulation No. 15 of 2026 sets out the phased transfer of BMKS transaction regulatory and supervisory duties and powers from Bappebti to the OJK, and has been in force since 17 September 2026. OJK Regulation No. 16 of 2026, on the operation of the Mineral and Strategic Commodities Exchange, will take effect on 1 January 2027. BMKS has therefore moved from an idea towards institutionalisation.

A Production Giant, But Not Yet a Market Giant

Nickel illustrates why this transformation is necessary. Indonesia has become a major force in global nickel production. The US Geological Survey’s Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 puts Indonesia’s mine production in 2025 at around 2.6 million tonnes of contained nickel, out of global production of about 3.9 million tonnes. Indonesia’s reserves are estimated at around 62 million tonnes, out of a global total of more than 140 million tonnes.

That resource strength has been translated into industrialisation. Exports of iron and steel are among the pillars of Indonesia’s trade. In other words, the country is no longer selling only what comes out of the ground; it is increasingly selling processed products. Yet this success carries a paradox: Indonesia has growing influence over supply, but not commensurate influence over price discovery.

Reference prices for many metals are still largely established at global trading centres. The London Metal Exchange (LME), for example, built its strength not because the UK is a leading nickel producer, but because it has a globally trusted trading ecosystem: standardised contracts, clearing, physical delivery, approved brands, warehouses, liquidity and a network of global participants.

The fundamental lesson is that controlling production does not automatically mean controlling the market; and controlling the market does not automatically mean setting prices. Downstreaming must therefore enter its next chapter.

Market Downstreaming

The journey towards mineral-sector strength can be understood in five stages: resource ownership, production power, trading power, pricing power and financial power.

Indonesia already has substantial assets in the first two stages. BMKS offers an opportunity to move towards the next three.

Trading power grows when large volumes of transactions take place through a credible domestic market. Pricing power develops when the prices formed there have sufficient liquidity, transparency, integrity and depth to be considered as benchmarks. Financial power emerges when minerals and their contracts can support hedging, trade finance, inventory management, collateral and other financial instruments that underpin the real economy.

This can be called market downstreaming. Downstreaming no longer stops at physically transforming minerals from ore into processed products; it continues through the development of markets, prices, data, risk management and financing.

This perspective matters because minerals have become instruments of geoeconomics. Nickel, cobalt, copper, tin and aluminium are no longer simply mining commodities. They are at the heart of supply chains for batteries, electric vehicles, renewable energy, electronics and high-technology industries.

In this competition, a country with mineral resources is not necessarily the country that captures the greatest value from them. Value is also determined by who controls technology, processing, standards, trading, logistics, financing, data and price benchmarks.

Lessons from London and Shanghai

The LME demonstrates the strength of an ecosystem. The UK did not need to be the world’s largest nickel producer to make London one of the world’s centres for mineral price formation.

China has taken a different path. The Shanghai Futures Exchange (SHFE) has developed a commodities market underpinned by a vast domestic industrial base, renminbi-denominated contracts and physical-delivery infrastructure. Since April 2026, international participants have also gained greater access to SHFE nickel futures and options.

The lesson is not that Indonesia should copy London or Shanghai. On the contrary, Indonesia needs to find its own market advantage.

BMKS can build its strength by integrating physical commodities, financial infrastructure, technology and the industrial ecosystem.

Traded minerals must have verifiable origins and quality, supported by credible warehouses, standardised contracts, and trusted clearing and settlement. This ecosystem can then be connected to financing, hedging, collateral and industrial needs.

That would also create another asset of comparable strategic value: data. Information on prices, volumes, stocks, quality, locations, trade flows and concentration of positions can improve the ability of the government and industry to read the market. The exchange could thus become not merely a venue for transactions, but also market-intelligence infrastructure.

From Institutional to Ecosystem Supervision

This is where the creation of a dedicated BMKS supervisory structure within the OJK becomes relevant. BMKS will be more complex than conventional commodity trading. Exchanges, clearing houses, electronic custodians, warehouses, conformity-assessment bodies, mining companies, smelters, traders, financial institutions and investors may all form part of a single transaction network.

Risks will no longer be confined to one institution. Price manipulation, fictitious transactions, conflicts of interest, concentrated positions, failed commodity deliveries, quality disputes and misuse of information can spread across the market network. When appointing the BMKS Deputy Commissioner, the OJK also referred to high expectations that the exchange would help address issues such as transfer pricing and under-invoicing.

BMKS supervision must therefore extend beyond institution-based supervision. Market oversight, participant conduct, transactions, risks and links between parties need to be assessed as a single ecosystem.

Technology can play an important role. Integrating data on transactions, positions, ownership, warehouses, settlement and financing would allow supervision to move beyond detecting violations after they occur and towards identifying anomalies and risks earlier. BMKS could thus serve a dual function: market infrastructure and market-intelligence infrastructure.

An Exchange Does Not Automatically Become a Market

However, once regulations have been issued and institutions established, the real test begins. An exchange does not automatically become a market. Markets need liquidity; liquidity needs participants; participants need trust. And trust depends on integrity, legal certainty, standardisation and reliable settlement.

BMKS’s success will therefore rest on at least five foundations: credible price formation; standardised quality and contracts; integrity in warehousing and settlement; sufficient liquidity; and links to the financing needs of industry and the real economy. Indonesia must also be realistic about its ambition to establish a price benchmark.

Global benchmarks do not emerge because they are designated by regulation. They gain legitimacy through use. The more transactions that take place, the broader market participation becomes, the more transparent price formation is, and the greater the confidence in settlement, the more likely those prices are to be considered by global participants. In other words, a benchmark cannot simply be declared; it must earn market trust.

BMKS need not begin with the ambition of replacing London or Shanghai. The more fundamental goal is to establish credible, liquid and transparent domestic prices that can gradually merit consideration in international markets.

From Mines to Market Power

This is the strategic significance of BMKS for Indonesia’s downstreaming. The first generation of downstreaming took minerals from mines to smelters. The next must take them from smelters to markets, from markets to price formation, from prices to risk management and financing, and from transactions to control of data and market information.

Indonesia has demonstrated its ability to turn resource ownership into production power. The next challenge is more ambitious: turning production power into market power, and then gradually building pricing power and financial power.

The future success of the Mineral Exchange should therefore not be measured only by whether trading begins on 1 January 2027, how many contracts are available, or the trillions of rupiah in transactions recorded.

More strategic measures are whether, in five or ten years, prices formed in Indonesia are taken into account in trade contracts; whether domestic industry can hedge and obtain financing more efficiently; whether transaction data gives Indonesia a stronger grasp of its own supply chains; and whether a greater share of the economic value of its minerals can be retained at home.

The world has long known Indonesia as a source of strategic minerals. The next chapter should be more ambitious. As the world determines the prices and value of strategic minerals, Indonesia should be present not only as a source, but also as one of the markets helping to shape that value.

More from 18 October 2026 →

Cite this article
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/the-mineral-exchange-and-a-new-chapter-in-indonesias-downstreaming-1792342226)
Originally published by CNBC Indonesia (https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/opini/20261018225005-14-777279/bursa-mineral-dan-babak-baru-hilirisasi-indonesia), translated from Indonesian
Print