The impact of Azahari's death

The impact of Azahari's death

Aleksius Jemadu, Bandung

Soon after it was announced that Azahari had been killed
during a raid on a terrorist hideout in Batu, Malang, Indonesian
government officials began making optimistic statements that
Azahari's death would hurt the morale of his followers and
damage their ability to carry out attacks. National Intelligence
Agency chief Syamsir Siregar, for example, said terrorist groups
very much depended on Azahari's bomb-making expertise.

However, Azahari's death will by no means automatically reduce
the scale of the terrorist threat in Indonesia. Terrorist
networks do not depend entirely on any individual, and these
networks are able to replace lost leaders.

The series of terrorist attacks that have taken place in the
country beginning with the first Bali bombings in 2002 have had
certain characteristics that may not exist for terror attacks in
other parts of the world. Terrorist attacks in Indonesia rarely
target government officials or properties. Former President
Megawati was once mentioned as a possible target for
assassination but there was no real evidence terrorist groups
ever contemplated such an attempt.

Terrorist groups have mainly targeted Western properties and
people. In conflict areas like Maluku and Poso, the terrorists
also target Christian churches and Christians, with the goal of
inciting new outbreaks of religious violence.

There are visible signs the Indonesian government wants to
introduce tougher policies in its fight against terrorism.
Recently, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono asked the Indonesian
Military (TNI) to play an active role in curbing terrorism in the
country.

Although this policy is strongly opposed by human rights
activists, the government is determined to go ahead with the
policy. In addition, Vice President Jusuf Kalla recently
disclosed a government plan to monitor the activities of some
pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) to prevent the spread of
radical and militant views.

The police raid that killed Azahari and several of his
followers in Malang could be seen as a sign of the government's
tough new stance on terrorism. This tough policy will be
perceived by the terrorist groups as an open declaration of war
against them.

So far the Indonesian government has expressed its full
support for the global war on terrorism, but not to the extent
that it will jeopardize its relationship with domestic Islamic
groups. When the Indonesian government protested the U.S.
military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the protests were not
only aimed at upholding the principle of respect for state
sovereignty, but also at appeasing domestic political
constituents.

Western government leaders sometimes have a difficult time
understanding the seeming ambiguities of Indonesia's policies in
dealing with domestic terrorist groups. They are naive in
assuming that these policies are formulated in a political
vacuum. The commitment of the Indonesian government against
terrorism does not necessarily mean it agrees with all Western
assumptions about the war on terrorism.

Certain political nuances exist and they do affect the
formulation and implementation of antiterrorism policies. For
example, the Indonesian government continues to shrug off
international pressure officially to declare Jamaah Islamiyah a
terrorist group and ban it from Indonesia. The government argues
that it cannot ban a shadowy organization whose real structure is
not clear.

If the killing of Azahari is perceived by the terrorists as an
indication of tougher policy measures on the part of the
Indonesian government, it is predicted that in the future
government officials and properties will become direct targets of
terrorist attack. In other countries like Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan, government buildings and state officials became
targets after their governments introduced harsh measures against
the terrorists.

This prospect will become even more likely if the three people
sentenced to death over the first Bali bombings, Imam Samudra,
Mukhlas and Amrozi, do not receive clemency from the President.

The government should anticipate this threat by mobilizing
society in its support, particularly Islamic leaders. Being tough
on terrorist groups should not isolate the government from the
majority of its domestic constituents. And we cannot deny that
the terrorists, with their militant views and murderous plans,
are born and grown up in our society.

The Indonesian government will only create more trouble for
itself if it neglects the importance of societal support in its
war on terrorism.

The writer is head of the Department of International
Relations and head of the MA study program in social sciences at
Parahyangan University in Bandung.