The History of G30S 1965: Chronology, Controversy, and Its Impact on Indonesia
On 30 September to 1 October 1965, Indonesia experienced one of the most decisive political events in its history. A number of Army officers were kidnapped and killed by a group calling itself the 30 September Movement (G30S). Six generals and one first lieutenant became victims. Their bodies were later found in the Lubang Buaya area, East Jakarta.
The event did not stop at the kidnapping and murder of the officers. In the following months, arrests, killings, torture, forced disappearances, and various forms of violence occurred against people accused of links to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Komnas HAM declared the 1965–1966 events as one of the humanitarian tragedies and documented various forms of gross human rights violations that occurred during that period.
G30S also became a turning point in the power relations between President Sukarno, the Army, the PKI, and various other political groups. After the movement was suppressed, General Suharto’s political position grew stronger. A few years later, Sukarno lost power and Indonesia entered the New Order era.
However, the history of G30S is not as simple as the narrative that a group staged a rebellion and was then suppressed. To this day, historians still debate the extent of PKI involvement, the relationship between several PKI figures and the movement, as well as the role of various military and political actors.
Therefore, understanding G30S requires separating the facts of the event, historical interpretation, and political propaganda that developed afterwards.
Background: Political Tensions Leading Up to 1965
To understand G30S, we need to look at the conditions in Indonesia before September 1965.
During the Guided Democracy period, President Sukarno’s political power was immense. On the other hand, the PKI grew into one of the largest political forces in Indonesia. The PKI had extensive mass organisations and obtained political support from Sukarno in the Nasakom political configuration, namely nationalism, religion, and communism.
The problem was that the PKI’s relationship with the Army was deteriorating.
The conflict did not only occur at the elite level. Social tensions also developed in various regions due to agrarian conflicts, competition between mass organisations, and struggles for political influence. At the same time, Indonesia’s economic condition worsened and inflation became a serious problem.
The situation became increasingly complex because Indonesia was in the context of the Cold War. The United States and Western countries viewed the PKI’s development with concern, while Indonesia under Sukarno was growing closer to socialist countries such as the Soviet Union and China.
Declassified American diplomatic archives show that the US Embassy in Jakarta intensively monitored the conflict between the Army and the PKI both before and after G30S.
Against this backdrop, the issue of Sukarno’s health, the existence of a ‘Council of Generals’, and the possibility of a change in power became matters of suspicion among political and military elites.
Indonesia entered September 1965 in a state of extreme tension.
The Night of 30 September and 1 October 1965
In the early hours of 1 October 1965, the G30S group moved to kidnap a number of Army generals.
The six generals who became victims were Ahmad Yani, R. Soeprapto, M.T. Haryono, S. Parman, D.I. Panjaitan, and Sutoyo Siswomiharjo. In addition, First Lieutenant Pierre Tendean, aide to General A.H. Nasution, also became a victim.
General A.H. Nasution himself was a target of the kidnapping but managed to escape. His daughter, Ade Irma Suryani Nasution, was shot during the incident and later died.
The victims were taken to the Lubang Buaya area. Their bodies were later found in a well.
At the same time, the G30S group seized control of several strategic facilities and broadcast an announcement through Radio Republik Indonesia. They stated that the movement was aimed at saving President Sukarno from what they called the threat of the Council of Generals.
However, the movement did not last long.
Major General Suharto, who at the time served as Commander of Kostrad, took over coordination of Army forces. In a relatively short time, troops loyal to the Army managed to regain control of strategic points in Jakarta.
The movement ultimately failed to maintain control.
It was at this point that the G30S event turned into a national political crisis.
From G30S to a Change of Power
The failure of G30S provided a major momentum for the Army under Suharto.
The PKI was then accused of being the main mastermind behind the movement. This accusation became the basis for extensive political and security actions against the PKI and organisations considered affiliated with it.
However, the PKI’s involvement in G30S needs to be understood more carefully. Historian John Roosa in Pretext for Mass Murder shows the involvement of several PKI figures in the movement, but the analysis of the structure and level of involvement of the PKI organisation as a whole is not as simple as the picture that the entire PKI planned the operation.
The historiographical debate regarding G30S is indeed quite broad. The Komnas HAM library collection itself shows the existence of various works discussing different theories, ranging from PKI involvement, internal Army conflicts, to the possible involvement of other political actors.
Therefore, saying ‘the PKI was involved’ and saying ‘the entire PKI was the sole mastermind’ are two statements with different levels of claim.
What is indisputable is that after G30S, the systematic destruction of the PKI’s political power occurred.
Komnas HAM documented various forms of violence in 1965–1966, including murder, extermination, enslavement, forced displacement, torture, sexual violence, persecution, and forced disappearance.