Indonesian Political, Business & Finance News

The good, bad and ugly sides of SOEs

| Source: The Jakarta Post

The good, bad and ugly sides of SOEs

The following is the first of two articles on state-owned
enterprises by Sauri Hasibuan, assistant manager at ERNST & YOUNG
Consulting Corporate Finance Division in Jakarta

JAKARTA (JP): Reform of Indonesia's state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) can play a significant role in the economy. Unfortunately
there are so many interests wanting to control SOEs.

SOEs manage more than 40 percent of national assets. The
economic cost of this push and pull to exploit these firms are
clear: the government cannot meet the target of Rp 5 trillion in
contributions to the 2000 state budget.

In addition, as the ASEAN Free Trade Area is just around the
corner and it will expose SOEs to international competition, the
task of reforming these institutions is even more urgent, but no
less daunting.

By year's end, SOEs' total debt will reach 91 percent of gross
domestic product. The government is reportedly planning to
conduct a debt-to-equity swap of its US$134 billion debts.
Strategic companies such as state-owned electricity company
(PLN), has been plagued by debts due to the complicated web of
foreign creditors.

Many other businesses have used up most of its capital stock,
but have produced little in return. And perhaps most importantly,
some 15 percent of the country's bank loans are given to SOEs.

Besides crowding out Indonesia's private sector from the
capital market, the entire financial system is put at risk as a
large share of these loans will never be paid back.

Some 20 percent of SOEs' workforce have been laid off. This
presents the country's leaders with a painful conundrum. Through
the concept of "People's Economy", the government claims that
workers' welfare is their raison d'etre.

Does the government actually have strategies to reform these
SOEs?

The government plans to invite a number of investors to
consider purchasing SOE shares. The dilution of shares, as one
expert at the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) puts
it, can be done in a variety of ways.

An initial private offering or IPO would be one way; acquiring
a strategic partner would be another, or even direct private
placement. In all, the strategy includes various privatization
schemes.

SOEs on sale would be those from prospective industrial
sectors such as telecommunications, transportation, plantations,
hotels and tourism.

But neither the will of Indonesia's leaders nor sales of
shares to investors will be enough to reform the SOEs. The
enterprises' underlying problem is that they rarely implement
corporate governance. This is a direct legacy of the New Order
era.

Corporate governance consists of mechanisms that involve
institutional shareholders, boards of directors and
commissioners, managers (remunerated according to their
performance), the market for corporate control, investors, risk
management and product market competition.

Have Indonesia's SOEs implemented at least one of these
mechanisms? In the 1990s, the government attempted to separate
the SOEs' management from bureaucrats, and ordered bankers to
have their loans to those firms repaid.

In addition, there were also plans to dismantle assets,
especially of the more profitable SOEs. Suparno, then president
director of Garuda Indonesia Airlines, knew of these plans as
well.
That is why he talked so much about Garuda going public. What a
pity he had to resign so suddenly. And Garuda's good performance
record went down with him.

One reason for this might have been the competition with the
privately run Sempati, but the main reason for the sudden bad
performance was the dismantlement of Garuda's assets.

Garuda's maintenance units were illegally disposed of, its
revenues transferred to parties which had no connection
whatsoever with this SOE and there were many other incidence of
what can only be called "highway robbery".

This process of decay would certainly not have happened if
Garuda had implemented good corporate governance in its
organization.

To date, the government has claimed that SOEs total assets are
more than Rp 400 trillion, of which it says 60 percent to 70
percent are profitable. Do these numbers tell you anything?

Managers at SOEs have said that much of the accounting is
wrong. One manager told this writer that he actually had no idea
what his real bottom line might be.

One foreign banker in Jakarta estimates that dirty bookkeeping
accounts for almost half of SOEs' recent profit figures, another
quarter comes from windfalls to oil-producing SOEs from higher
world oil prices, and most of the remaining figures is interest
saved, thanks to government-sponsored debt-equity swaps by banks.

The official numbers serve only to obscure SOEs' underlying
problems.

Now back to the issue of corporate governance. It is by no
means the case that all SOE managers are incompetent. Rather, the
problem is that the managers have too little power in areas where
they should have power -- and too much power where they should
not.

Even when managers know what needs to be done, they often
cannot do it. Indonesians call this the dilemma of parasites
(benalu). The parasites include the droves of bureaucrats at all
levels of government -- from grassroots party cadres to
prefectural, provincial and central government officials.

This is exemplified by the growing concern of placing the
management of SOEs under the direct control of the Ministry of
Finance. Many observers say that this is just a ploy to utilize
SOE resources for personal interests, in this case the interests
of those close to President Abdurrahman Wahid.

The bureaucrats, moreover, interfere in all levels of day-to-
day business. Not only are managers themselves appointed from
within its ranks -- although merit is, occasionally, taken into
consideration -- but almost all SOEs still contain party "cells"
that can overrule managers.

The general manager of a steel company in West Java recently
wanted to raise the salaries of his engineers to stem an outflow
into better-paying jobs in foreign joint ventures. The plan was
vetoed -- and the talent is still leaving.

Most SOEs have purchased machinery from Western countries in
the past; they went on freewheeling investment sprees starting in
the late 1980s. As a result, it is not uncommon too see silent
factories filled with idle state-of-the-art western equipment.

The machines are not oiled, the staff often does not know how
to maintain them, and there is no money to pay workers, so they
have been sent home.

Such overinvestment is particularly rife among those SOEs that
are due to be sold in the near future. One senior consultant
laments that SOEs officially state they make profits. But it does
this by booking virtually all its sales as revenues, even if they
are not paid for. These debts usually prove to be uncollectable,
since most are claims on other cash-strapped SOEs.

To finance day-to-day operations, pay taxes and wages, they
usually have to borrow from state banks, which have to keep on
lending on subsidized rates. But it goes much further. A common
practice for managers defrauding the SOEs is to set up several
layers of subsidiaries under a state-controlled holding company.

These subsidiaries, which sometimes run into their hundreds,
are run either by the manager and his family members, or by
reliable business associates, who then pay themselves or their
"contractors" for dubious services and report losses to the
holding company.

This example illustrates the vicious financial circle that is
Indonesia's state-owned sector. State banks pump their
depositors' money into SOEs. From there it flows into the coffers
of various government branches through taxes and working capital,
but the actual output ultimately is of no salable worth.

Such a system can keep going for a while, but when savings
produce nothing of value, a collapse is inevitable.

Faced with such staggering array of abuse and mismanagement,
how is the current regime going about reforms? SOEs such as
fertilizer firm Pupuk Kaltim has made a profit of Rp 400 billion,
not a small amount considering the condition of this country.

But what about the electricity firm PLN? This company is huge
and carries an important public mission. PLN owes to various
local and foreign creditors. Its debts must be restructured so
that it will be on par with its equities. How about other SOEs?

More from 30 April 2001 โ†’

Cite this article
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/the-good-bad-and-ugly-sides-of-soes-1447893297-1115545)
Originally published by The Jakarta Post
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