The Gold Standard That Was Pawned
For nearly two decades, the United States anchored its nuclear diplomacy in the Middle East on one principle: any country seeking to cooperate on civilian nuclear technology with America had to accept the ‘gold standard’ commitment to forgo domestic uranium enrichment or reprocessing of spent fuel. The United Arab Emirates accepted this in 2009 and became the model Washington proudly touted as a safe, proliferation-proof civil nuclear partnership. Last week, that standard cracked. The United States signed a 123 Agreement with Saudi Arabia that, according to congressional and media reports, potentially allows Riyadh to enrich uranium on its own soil. This is not a mere technical detail in an energy deal. It is the moment the principal architect of the global non-proliferation regime dismantles the very foundation it built.
The reasoning put forward by the Trump administration sounds familiar: economic cooperation, high-value American jobs in the nuclear sector, and the need to prevent Saudi Arabia from turning to Russia or China for reactor technology. The argument makes commercial sense but is strategically brittle. Non-proliferation is not a bilateral game. Once one country obtains enrichment rights without the ‘gold standard’ conditions, other states in the same region will demand equal treatment, and the precedent, once set, is almost impossible to revoke.
This concern is not mere speculation. The Middle East is the only region in the world today where two major powers are openly competing on nuclear capacity while deeply suspicious of each other’s intentions. Iran is already under scrutiny after Washington raised suspicions about a new underground facility at a complex referred to as Pickaxe Mountain. If Saudi Arabia acquires domestic enrichment capacity with America’s blessing, Tehran’s argument that its nuclear programme is equivalent to the rights of other regional states becomes morally harder to refute. This is the classic logic of an arms race: once one party gains a new capability, the other feels entitled to demand the same.
What makes this deal even more complicated is the political condition later revealed by President Trump himself: the continuation of the agreement hinges on Saudi Arabia normalising diplomatic relations with Israel. Riyadh has insisted it will only do so if there is tangible progress towards a Palestinian state, something virtually impossible under the current Israeli government. Civilian nuclear power is thus being used as a bargaining chip in a much broader geopolitical negotiation, holding non-proliferation decisions hostage to short-term diplomatic calculations.
This dynamic must also be read in the context of the regional rivalry for influence between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, two Gulf monarchies competing to be America’s primary strategic partner. The UAE accepted the gold standard in 2009, a decision that left it entirely dependent on external fuel supplies. If Saudi Arabia now secures domestic enrichment capacity without the same restrictions, Abu Dhabi will have a powerful argument to demand renegotiation of its own agreement. Washington would then face not only the risk of vertical proliferation between Riyadh and Tehran, but also horizontal proliferation among its own Gulf allies.
The US Congress has yet to fully approve the deal, and several members have voiced proliferation concerns. But commercial pressure—billions of dollars in potential investment for American nuclear companies—is a force that historically has rarely lost out to long-term non-proliferation anxieties, especially when competitors like Russia and China stand ready to fill any void left by an American withdrawal.
The history of American nuclear diplomacy reveals a recurring pattern: principles that appear firm on paper always have room for negotiation when strategic and commercial interests are sufficiently large. India, which is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, received a special exemption for civil nuclear cooperation from the US in 2008 because Washington viewed New Delhi as a counterweight to China. A similar pattern is now repeating with Saudi Arabia. Each exception makes the next one easier to justify, slowly eroding the meaning of the ‘standard’ itself.
For Indonesia, which is considering developing its own civilian nuclear energy, this precedent is worth watching closely. Not because Indonesia holds the same bargaining position as Saudi Arabia, but because this deal demonstrates that the global non-proliferation regime, long considered a relatively stable norm, is remarkably elastic when confronted with the commercial and strategic interests of major powers. Principles that appear fixed in multilateral forums can be loosened in bilateral negotiations, depending on who sits at the table and what is at stake.
Saudi Arabia may get its reactors and enrichment capacity. But what America is putting at risk is far greater: its own credibility as the guardian of the non-proliferation standard that has long distinguished peaceful nuclear cooperation from the path to an arms race. The gold standard did not crack under external pressure. It was pawned by the very hands that created it.
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/the-gold-standard-that-was-pawned-1785365427)
Originally published by Media Indonesia (https://mediaindonesia.com/opini/916262/standar-emas-yang-digadaikan), translated from Indonesian