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The future of toll road investment

| Source: The Jakarta Post

The future of toll road investment

The following is the second of two articles on the toll road
sector by Heru Dewanto, executive director of the Jakarta-based
Center for Technology and Industry Development.

JAKARTA (JP): Before the crisis, the toll road sector had made
reasonable progress, with improvements taking place in procedures
and frameworks for wider private sector participation. A large
program of investment was moving along, and the sector was
approaching some maturity, in which fine-tuning of processes,
improving efficiency and the scale of operations were becoming
the main concerns.

The remaining key issues concerned the land procurement
process and pricing, the mechanism for adjusting toll rates, the
method of increasing the scale of operations without over-
stretching the participation and creditworthiness enhancements
provided by Jasa Marga, the National Toll Road Corporation, and
the transition to a transparent, evenhanded competition.

The crisis has affected existing private-owned toll roads and
paralyzed many projects that had been approaching financial
closure or which were already under construction.

In 1996, a number of projects were awarded to a range of local
and international bidders for 19 different sections of toll
roads. However, actual development came under the severest
pressure, and virtually all of the winning bidders have ended up
in serious, if not impossible, difficulties that affected
implementation under the agreed terms and conditions, because of
the impact of the economic crisis.

Their financial basis is in serious question and in most cases
the projects were eventually considered untenable.

The slump in the overall economic growth has in a way
presented a window of opportunity in which to reassess and re-
evaluate future strategies for this important sector. A better
future for toll road investment in Indonesia needs to be
carefully planned, and this must be done now.

Of particular urgency is the need to review the extent and the
size of the various project risks to be borne by the government
and the project sponsors. It is also important to create a
situation in which the various parties involved are able to
address these risks in the changed situation.

In late 1997, in response to the crisis, the government drew
up a list of infrastructure projects, these being classified as
to continue, to be postponed, or canceled.

The classification, however, seems to have been based more on
project readiness, i.e. its stage of development, whether
physical or financial, rather than on the potential of the
project to assist in reviving regional development or the
recovery of the economy as a whole.

Since then, the whole political scene has been changing as a
result of the institution of major reforms; a new paradigm has
been emerging that will affect the manner of future development.

A key element of this is the restructuring of the banking
sector and, parallel to this, the efforts of large private sector
corporations, many with interests in infrastructure, to
restructure crippling debts. The revival of the real sector
hinges on this.

However, an apparent consequence of the focus on these
fundamental issues is a general insufficient attention paid to
the importance of primary infrastructure development as part of
the strategy for economic recovery.

It is important that this issue attracts political and
government support at an early date. The question is how to pick
up the previously stimulating progress, which has been obstructed
by the economic crisis.

Local traffic, as a result of there being no adequate toll
road alternatives, has become chaotic for much of any day. While
the public quietly questioned project investment awards in the
past, and to some degree some of these awards might be seen as
having contributed to the crisis, the lack of development in
this sector now will even slow down the economic recovery.

Private toll road companies have been seeking ways out of
their problems. Some have made individual approaches by inviting
new foreign strategic investors to assume their debt in return
for substantial shareholding in the toll road companies.

This or a rescheduling of debt seems to be the only possible
action to take, but there has been no success to date, because of
the perceived uncertainty in economic recovery.

Meanwhile, the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) has
taken over almost all private toll road companies and placed them
under their asset management unit.

IBRA's main remit, however, is to restructure those companies'
debts at Indonesian banks. This is not sufficiently
comprehensive, unfortunately, and the lack of a nationwide
strategy that includes infrastructure development as one of the
key elements in the economic recovery is still of concern.

In the medium-term, the postponement of projects in the
pipeline will have a negative impact on the infrastructure
sector; the overall availability of infrastructure services; and
the economy in general. Further delay will prove to be costly.

In the longer term, on the positive side there is an
opportunity to learn from this crisis, especially for improving
the fundamental structure of the institutional framework of toll
road development and for private sector investment in toll road
projects.

The real challenge now is how to mobilize community and
political support. There is a need to review the role of
infrastructure, including toll roads, in supporting economic
recovery, through a study on how the regional economy is enhanced
as a result of infrastructure development.

There is available precrisis evidence which can be used as a
basis for this work. A systematic parallel effort in public
relations is also required to inform the public and obtain their
support behind beneficial and socially sustainable projects.

In this window of opportunity for reformulating the current
approach, all institutional and political parties and the
communities affected will need to feel confident in the process,
and be assured of the reliability of the long-term legal process.

It is time to rethink the relative roles of government, Jasa
Marga, investors, financiers, the various structures and
instruments of development, and to reassign net risk
responsibility.

The coming devolution of autonomy to the regions will also
endorse new approaches from domestic and regional as well as
global investors in the sector.

One immediate outcome of the financial structuring of toll
road projects will be the need for a strong domestic capital
market. Inputs of foreign funds should be used only as a
supplement to domestic funding, rather than being the main source
of funding. However, the depth of the crisis is such that short-
term reliance on foreign loans cannot be avoided.

There also needs to be an improved balance in risk allocation
between the government and the private sector in order to avoid
high private financing cost or heavy leveraging due to widespread
use of government guarantees.

Institutional framework reforms should include taking away the
client role from Jasa Marga and returning it to the government.
Its role should be exclusively as an operator and investor in
toll roads.

Cooperation between the state-owned toll road company,
provincial government-owned bodies and private sector concerns
must be based purely on profitability.

The next task is to establish a competitive market. This will
need setting enabling conditions across many diverse areas such
as legal and regulatory regimes, tariff reforms and designing
incentives for technological upgrades.

In parallel, in a wider context, the holding structure of
national toll companies should be altered. Finally, a new holding
umbrella for each metropolitan area may be needed to cover all
toll road companies within those areas, with another one
established for regional toll road companies.

Toll road development in Indonesia has an unquestionably
auspicious prospect. The government has prepared a very ambitious
program, based on a reasonable forecast of demand.

In the short-term, a number of toll road projects that have
been postponed or slowed down are being reviewed with a view to
recommence as the economy recovers.

The previously planned program is still considered valid in
the long run. In fact, the demand is there and economic growth is
expected to reach the previous level as the economy gradually
recuperates.

The crisis has caused a temporary halt, and yet in view of the
long-term potential of toll road development in this country,
this could be seen positively as a moment of truth: to reflect
and acknowledge any shortcomings, muster all the energy and then
move on afresh.

More from 22 September 2000 โ†’

Cite this article
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/the-future-of-toll-road-investment-1447893297-1280593)
Originally published by The Jakarta Post
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