The extension of NPT, and after

The extension of NPT, and after

By J. Soedjati Djiwandono

JAKARTA (JP): The recent decision of the four-week long
conference of the parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) to extend the treaty indefinitely was a turning point in
the denuclearization process of the world. There may be hope that
the world will at last be free from the threat of nuclear
destruction.

The NPT has been widely regarded as the cornerstone of
international efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Many
saw it not only as a crucial brake on the further spread of
nuclear weapons and on the dangers that would entail, but also as
ensuring the wider use of nuclear energy for economic and social
welfare of all nations and as a promise of early progress on the
road to nuclear arms control and disarmament.

As the main international non-proliferation body in existence
so far, the NPT has largely been successful in fulfilling its two
main purposes. But it has been least successful in achieving
early progress in global nuclear arms control and disarmament.

Despite adverse developments concerning some signatories as
well as non-signatories to the NPT, its wider acceptance in the
international community is reflected in the ever growing number
of states becoming parties to the Treaty since it was opened to
signature and ratification in 1968. Between the first and second
review conferences of the Treaty in 1975 and 1980, the membership
increased from 113 to 130; between the third and fourth review
conferences of 1985 and 1990 it increased to 135; and now it has
a membership of 178 nations.

With the declining role of nuclear weapons, the NPT is
assuming greater significance. This means that now there is a
better chance not only to prevent what the late Homi Bhabha,
founder of India's nuclear energy program, called "horizontal
proliferation", that is, the spread of nuclear weapons to
additional states, but also to prevent "vertical proliferation",
that is, the stockpiling of increasingly accurate and
sophisticated nuclear weapons by the existing nuclear-weapon
states.

Admittedly, dismantling nuclear weapons is a slow and costly
process that must be carried out with great caution. But
commitment on the part of the nuclear powers to the eventual
elimination of all kinds of nuclear weapons is an absolute
requirement if the nuclear-weapons states wish to convince the
non-nuclear-weapons states of the need and importance of
disarmament, not only of nuclear, but also of other weapons of
mass destruction, particularly biological and chemical weapons,
which have been dubbed the atomic bombs of the poor nations.

Otherwise, the nuclear powers would only create the impression
that they want only to maintain their superiority and domination
of the world. This they would love to call the "new world order".

As the cornerstone not only of the global nuclear non-
proliferation regime, but more importantly of global
denuclearization, the NPT should be not only extended
indefinitely as has been agreed upon, but also expanded. That is
all states should be bound by it and abide by its terms. But it
should also be more effectively geared towards global
denuclearization. The two documents to complement the agreement
on the indefinite extension of the treaty, one on strengthening
the review process for the treaty and the other on principles and
objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, while
somewhat pacifying those nations that, initially opposed to an
indefinite extension of the treaty without conditions, do not
seem to be a clear guarantee for it.

Therefore, some possible problems may be considered that are
likely to be faced in the years ahead. The first is how to
encourage non-signatories to accede to the treaty. A resolution
was also passed by the conference calling on all states in the
Middle East to join the agreement, an indirect reference to
Israel's nuclear program. The conference also agreed on the
creation of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East, which
is to be free also from other weapons of mass destruction. These
are, in effect, efforts to create favorable conditions for the
attainment of that goal. As far as the Middle East is concerned,
this also implies that efforts are to be intensified to advance
the peace process already underway. With the attainment of
genuine peace in the region, the countries therein, especially
Israel, may no longer feel the need for nuclear weapons. This
would pave the way for its participation in the NPT.

The same principle may be applied to South Asia, particularly
in light of relations between Pakistan and India, and between
India and China, and to Northeast Asia, particularly in light of
relations between Japan and Russia, Japan and China, China and
Russia, and between the two Koreas.

The second problem will be how to discourage withdrawal from
and/or breaches of the treaty. To deal with this problem, as well
as with the first, some form of international pressure may be
brought to bear on the countries concerned. It may take the form
of a tighter control and inspection by the International Atomic
Energy Agency. One risk of this measure is that the continued
possession of nuclear weapons by the present nuclear powers may
be necessary to sustain such pressure. But this may be
counterproductive, in that it would fail to convince non-nuclear-
weapon states that possession of nuclear weapons would not be an
assurance of their security.

In other words, the use of international pressure, especially
because such pressure needs to be sustained by the strength and
influence of the nuclear powers, would put us in a vicious
circle. It would perhaps be better for the state parties to the
NPT to stand together so as to somehow isolate non-participating
states, or those withdrawing from the treaty or failing to comply
with its terms.

The third problem is how to assure the security of the non-
nuclear-weapons states. For the moment, not even all the
acknowledged nuclear powers have committed themselves to the
principles of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, and no use of
nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear nation.

Last but not least is the commitment of the nuclear-weapons
states to the ultimate elimination of all kinds of nuclear
weapons. Indeed, it is not easy to agree on how much, how fast,
and how far is enough or sufficient to satisfy the expectations
of the non-nuclear-weapons states.

But the commitment may be indicated first by the continued
pursuit of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, which they
pledged to accomplish in 1996. And then the process of
dismantlement of nuclear weapons must be made known to the world.
The underground nuclear test conducted by China just days after
the conclusion of the NPT conference looked like a deliberate
affront to the international community.

The writer is a member of board of directors at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta.