The extension of NPT, and after

The extension of NPT, and after

By J. Soedjati Djiwandono

JAKARTA (JP): The recent decision of the four-week long conference of the parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to extend the treaty indefinitely was a turning point in the denuclearization process of the world. There may be hope that the world will at last be free from the threat of nuclear destruction.

The NPT has been widely regarded as the cornerstone of international efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Many saw it not only as a crucial brake on the further spread of nuclear weapons and on the dangers that would entail, but also as ensuring the wider use of nuclear energy for economic and social welfare of all nations and as a promise of early progress on the road to nuclear arms control and disarmament.

As the main international non-proliferation body in existence so far, the NPT has largely been successful in fulfilling its two main purposes. But it has been least successful in achieving early progress in global nuclear arms control and disarmament.

Despite adverse developments concerning some signatories as well as non-signatories to the NPT, its wider acceptance in the international community is reflected in the ever growing number of states becoming parties to the Treaty since it was opened to signature and ratification in 1968. Between the first and second review conferences of the Treaty in 1975 and 1980, the membership increased from 113 to 130; between the third and fourth review conferences of 1985 and 1990 it increased to 135; and now it has a membership of 178 nations.

With the declining role of nuclear weapons, the NPT is assuming greater significance. This means that now there is a better chance not only to prevent what the late Homi Bhabha, founder of India's nuclear energy program, called "horizontal proliferation", that is, the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states, but also to prevent "vertical proliferation", that is, the stockpiling of increasingly accurate and sophisticated nuclear weapons by the existing nuclear-weapon states.

Admittedly, dismantling nuclear weapons is a slow and costly process that must be carried out with great caution. But commitment on the part of the nuclear powers to the eventual elimination of all kinds of nuclear weapons is an absolute requirement if the nuclear-weapons states wish to convince the non-nuclear-weapons states of the need and importance of disarmament, not only of nuclear, but also of other weapons of mass destruction, particularly biological and chemical weapons, which have been dubbed the atomic bombs of the poor nations.

Otherwise, the nuclear powers would only create the impression that they want only to maintain their superiority and domination of the world. This they would love to call the "new world order".

As the cornerstone not only of the global nuclear non- proliferation regime, but more importantly of global denuclearization, the NPT should be not only extended indefinitely as has been agreed upon, but also expanded. That is all states should be bound by it and abide by its terms. But it should also be more effectively geared towards global denuclearization. The two documents to complement the agreement on the indefinite extension of the treaty, one on strengthening the review process for the treaty and the other on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, while somewhat pacifying those nations that, initially opposed to an indefinite extension of the treaty without conditions, do not seem to be a clear guarantee for it.

Therefore, some possible problems may be considered that are likely to be faced in the years ahead. The first is how to encourage non-signatories to accede to the treaty. A resolution was also passed by the conference calling on all states in the Middle East to join the agreement, an indirect reference to Israel's nuclear program. The conference also agreed on the creation of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East, which is to be free also from other weapons of mass destruction. These are, in effect, efforts to create favorable conditions for the attainment of that goal. As far as the Middle East is concerned, this also implies that efforts are to be intensified to advance the peace process already underway. With the attainment of genuine peace in the region, the countries therein, especially Israel, may no longer feel the need for nuclear weapons. This would pave the way for its participation in the NPT.

The same principle may be applied to South Asia, particularly in light of relations between Pakistan and India, and between India and China, and to Northeast Asia, particularly in light of relations between Japan and Russia, Japan and China, China and Russia, and between the two Koreas.

The second problem will be how to discourage withdrawal from and/or breaches of the treaty. To deal with this problem, as well as with the first, some form of international pressure may be brought to bear on the countries concerned. It may take the form of a tighter control and inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. One risk of this measure is that the continued possession of nuclear weapons by the present nuclear powers may be necessary to sustain such pressure. But this may be counterproductive, in that it would fail to convince non-nuclear- weapon states that possession of nuclear weapons would not be an assurance of their security.

In other words, the use of international pressure, especially because such pressure needs to be sustained by the strength and influence of the nuclear powers, would put us in a vicious circle. It would perhaps be better for the state parties to the NPT to stand together so as to somehow isolate non-participating states, or those withdrawing from the treaty or failing to comply with its terms.

The third problem is how to assure the security of the non- nuclear-weapons states. For the moment, not even all the acknowledged nuclear powers have committed themselves to the principles of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, and no use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear nation.

Last but not least is the commitment of the nuclear-weapons states to the ultimate elimination of all kinds of nuclear weapons. Indeed, it is not easy to agree on how much, how fast, and how far is enough or sufficient to satisfy the expectations of the non-nuclear-weapons states.

But the commitment may be indicated first by the continued pursuit of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, which they pledged to accomplish in 1996. And then the process of dismantlement of nuclear weapons must be made known to the world. The underground nuclear test conducted by China just days after the conclusion of the NPT conference looked like a deliberate affront to the international community.

The writer is a member of board of directors at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta.