The Changing Role of Indonesia in the OIC

The Changing Role of Indonesia in the OIC

Anak Agung Banyu Perwita
Department of International Relations
Parahyangan Catholic University
Bandung
banyu@home.unpar.ac.id

As reported by The Jakarta Post (Feb. 27, 2003), President
Megawati Soekarnoputri has called on the United States not to
unilaterally attack Iraq. This statement, made during the
informal consultation of the Organization of Islamic Conference
(OIC) in Kuala Lumpur, reflects a stronger stance of Indonesia on
the U.S.'s intention to use force against Iraq.

Of course, this statement also marked a more significant
Indonesian policy toward the OIC.

But how far can Indonesia change its position toward the OIC?
In the first two decades of Indonesia's involvement with the OIC
into the late 1980s, Indonesia had no strong political commitment
in enhancing its relations with the Muslim world.

In the eyes of Indonesia's foreign policy makers, a deep
involvement with the Muslim world would only create new problems
in Indonesia's relations with Western countries. This minimum
political contact with the OIC also enabled Indonesia to have
more flexibility in its relationship with both Islamic and
Western countries.

Indonesia also perceived that the OIC did not have enough
power to settle all issues related to Islam. This was mainly due
to the ideological barriers and internal weaknesses of the OIC.

The lack of strong internal cohesion among its members pushed
Indonesia to limit its political commitment to the OIC. Moreover,
OIC was divided into two main groups: The revolutionary
(progressive) and the conservative. It was good for Indonesia to
stay away from these two groups in order to lessen internal
conflict among members.

OIC would only be effective in settling international problems
pertinent to Islamic issues, as long as these problems did not
involve the interests of the Western world -- in particular, the
U.S.

A more cynical comment about the OIC argued that the
organization was a mere toothless tiger in world politics. Again,
it was because of the internal political problems among members
that the OIC could not face the international challenges of
global politics.

As a result, Indonesia did not prioritize its involvement in
OIC at the top of its foreign policy. Even though Indonesia has
long historical ties with the Muslim world, particularly the Arab
states, the government tends to be cautious in facing the West.
In comparison to Indonesia's participation in the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM), Indonesia's involvement in OIC was quite low-key.

This minimum political interaction with the organization was
due to the perception that Indonesia did not want to be perceived
by Western countries of giving room to Islamic radicalism in the
Muslim world.

However, the end of the Cold War and changes in the domestic
political map and world politics, also heralded changes to
Indonesia's role within the OIC. Since the late 1980s, there have
been some subtle shifts in Indonesia's foreign policy toward the
Muslim world. These shifts, to a large extent, were motivated by
the changing domestic, as well as international, environment.

The rising political role of Indonesia within OIC became
apparent when it proposed ways of improving the world's image of
Islam. In the post-Cold War era, Islam has often associated with
terrorism and violence throughout the world, ensuing in the
negative image of Islam in the West.

In today's development of global politics, it is also a
"necessity of foreign policy" for Indonesia to play a more
significant role in the OIC, so that Indonesia can apply its
bebas aktif (free and active) foreign policy to pursue its
national interests.