The capital market versus the banking system
The capital market versus the banking system
By I Putu Gede Ary Suta
This is the first of two articles on the capital market and
the government's privatization policy.
JAKARTA (JP): To sustain national employment, we must finance
an expanding industrial and commercial infrastructure. Capital on
the scale required is available only on the international market.
Despite the dire economic situation, there is a reserve of
goodwill in the world that we can tap by improving investors'
perception of our economic management.
To provide employment, companies must invest in buildings,
machines, factories, equipment and working capital. Because this
investment is permanent, it must be financed in ways that do not
require repayment. This is the reason for equity financing and
the basis for the capital market.
Shareholders cannot demand that a company redeem their stock
when they are dissatisfied. Instead, investors must sell their
shares to someone else. The company stays with its factories and
permanent working capital. Employment continues.
The fundamental cause of the crisis of 1997 was that many
companies were not financing long-term assets with equity.
Instead, companies were using short-term bank financing.
Companies could continue to provide employment only as long as
banks renewed their loans.
When banks do not renew capital loans, companies must sell
assets or reduce working capital, unless alternative financing is
available. Since asset liquidation or refinancing may be
difficult or impossible, unsound financing leads to defaults and
a drop in employment.
A bank is an institution that receives deposits from the
public and promises to return these deposits upon demand. In
order for the bank to repay depositors, it must hold deposits as
cash or liquid assets, preferably short-term, self-liquidating
loans.
Because bank depositors can demand a return of their deposits
at any time, even short-term "self-liquidating" loans do not
provide funds on short notice. When banks lack cash to pay
depositors, they must borrow from another source. Central banks
serve this purpose.
The system is simple: when the bank cannot meet demands of
depositors, it borrows from the central bank, using high-quality,
"self-liquidating" short-term promissory notes or trade
receivables as collateral. The central bank is protected by
assurance of repayment from the bank's debtors.
In Indonesia, banking authorities allowed unsafe banking
practices to become widespread. For years, state-owned banks
dominated the banking system and set a bad example by lending
depositors' money to friends and associates of government
officials.
When the government opened banking to others, private banks
imitated unsound practices of state-owned banks. Large groups
controlled banks and, contrary to honest banking principles,
directors used their own banks as a source of long-term capital
for affiliates. Not only were these debts not self-liquidating,
but loans were the result of collusion between directors and
borrowers.
Unsafe financing worked as long as borrowers controlled banks
and as long as the central bank was able to support the distorted
system. However, in the 1990s, demand for capital became so great
that corporations began to use short-term foreign loans to
finance long-term needs.
Foreign bank financing presented two problems. First, foreign
banks were not controlled by Indonesian borrowers. When
foreigners lost confidence, they refused to renew short-term
loans. Without renewal, loans for long-term purposes could not be
repaid.
Second, foreign loans were payable in foreign currencies that
most Indonesian businesses did not earn when they sold their
products. To repay foreign loans, borrowers were dependent upon
government support of the exchange rate.
In mid-1997, speculators attacked the rupiah. The only way to
save the economy would have been for the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the government to combine resources and defend
against devaluation.
However, this did not happen. Bank Indonesia abandoned the
exchange rate in August 1997. Domestic borrowers rushed to buy
dollars to cover unhedged liabilities. Excessive demand for
dollars weakened the rupiah, causing a massive increase in debt
coming due in 1997 and 1998.
Many companies listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange became
"technically bankrupt". As banks became insolvent, depositors
rushed to withdraw funds, forcing the authorities to guarantee
bank liabilities.
A "de facto" moratorium developed as debtors ignored
creditors. A weak bankruptcy law and reluctance to act against
cronies made this possible. Widespread defaults cut off new
finance. Companies laid off workers and scaled down activities.
If Indonesian business had used the capital market rather than
the banking system for long-term funding, there would have been
no economic crisis. Equity financing does not have to be repaid
and cannot cause companies to become insolvent, no matter what
level the rupiah-dollar rate. Countries with strong economies
give importance to capital markets, providing investors and
issuers with powerful incentives. This did not occur in
Indonesia, because the banking system was favored.
The writer is a former chairman of the Indonesian Capital
Market Supervisory Agency (Bapepam).
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/the-capital-market-versus-the-banking-system-1447893297-1422372)
Originally published by The Jakarta Post