The Birth of a New World Order: Blessing or Curse?

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, American aggression under President Donald Trump, and accusations of genocide by Israel in Palestine: The world order formed after World War II increasingly feels as though it is nearing its end. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated at the Munich Security Conference in February 2026, ‘This order, though never perfect even in its best times, no longer exists in the form we knew.’ However, Europe’s shock at the changing world is viewed differently in Asia. Former Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan, in a conversation with DW at the Shangri-La Dialogue security forum in Asia, argued that rivalry and conflict are fundamental characteristics of international relations. ‘For about two decades—from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the global financial crisis—this harsh reality was obscured. Yet that period was an extraordinary phase in world history,’ he said. According to Kausikan, Europe was too convinced that the ‘wild jungle’ of international politics had been permanently tamed. The rapid pace of global political change has shocked a Europe still clinging to the old order. Political scientist and Director of the Asia-Pacific Office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Marc Saxer, explained that the differing perspectives between Europe and Asia stem from divergent historical experiences. For decades, Europe was able to cultivate prosperity within a liberal world order under the security umbrella of the United States. For many Asian countries, that experience never truly existed. Saxer believes the liberal world order and the era of a unipolar world have ended. He assesses that the United States will not return to playing a global role as it did before the 2010s. Washington, in his view, is suffering from exhaustion due to having to face multiple conflict theatres simultaneously—Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific. Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff of the German Council on Foreign Relations, conversely, sees Washington’s foreign policy as now driven by an imperial spirit. In his view, the United States is currently trying to shape a world dominated by great powers—a sort of global directorate with Russia and China—that divides the world into respective spheres of influence. As a result, the role of international law and multilateral institutions like the United Nations is increasingly eroded by the unilateral actions of the US, China, and Russia, even though each has different motives and objectives. Marc Saxer calls the result of this development a ‘Wolfswelt’ (world of wolves): a world where the law of the stronger defeats the strength of the law itself. Most countries in the world certainly have no interest in reviving imperialism. So what forms of resistance might emerge? Kleine-Brockhoff sees at least three patterns of response. Japan, situated near a rising China and with few like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific region, has little choice but to strengthen cooperation with the United States. Europe is choosing a different path: strengthening itself economically and militarily. During this transition period, Europe is still trying to maintain relations with America for as long as possible, while building its own independence. The third model comes from an idea by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney in his speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos 2026. He proposed a counter-coalition, a sort of middle axis. ‘The old order will not return. We should not mourn it. Nostalgia is not a strategy. From this collapse, we can build something better, stronger, and fairer. That is the task of middle powers,’ Carney said. Saxer holds a view aligned with Carney. According to him, the current historical change is different because, for the first time in centuries, non-Western countries will help determine the shape of the next world order. In the future, the world order will no longer be synonymous with a process of Westernisation. The concept of global rules must consider China’s view, which emphasises collective interests over the individual, and also include the Muslim world, which is rooted in the community of believers. Nevertheless, within each model, internal differences and conflicts remain, such as the differences between Sunni and Shia Islam. To face this new world, Saxer offers three main principles. First, cooperation should not only involve large or medium-sized states, but also small countries like New Zealand, Norway, or Singapore. Every country willing to address global issues proactively and constructively must be involved. Second, cooperation should preferably not be built as an alliance that potentially creates new blocs, but rather as a ‘middle axis partnership’. Third, solving global challenges cannot rely solely on a coalition of democratic countries sharing common values. The partnership must open space for all solution-oriented countries, regardless of their domestic political systems. This pragmatic approach transcends a foreign policy based purely on shared values. If previously countries sought ‘like-minded partners’, now it is more important to find ‘partners of interest’. Countries can cooperate on issues of mutual interest, such as climate change or global health, but take different stances on other issues. Nonetheless, fundamental principles such as human rights must still be upheld. To achieve this, Saxer envisions a ‘Helsinki 2.0’ concept. He refers to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in the early 1970s, when the United States, the Soviet Union, NATO countries, and Warsaw Pact countries agreed on common principles later known as the Helsinki Declaration. That agreement was not a binding legal treaty.