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The Badr Memorandum: A New Chapter in Indonesia’s Defence Diplomacy

| Source: CNBC Indonesia Translated from Indonesian | Politics
The Badr Memorandum: A New Chapter in Indonesia’s Defence Diplomacy
Image: CNBC Indonesia

The signing of the Badr Memorandum by Indonesia, Qatar, Türkiye and Pakistan in Doha on 21 October 2026 opens a new chapter in Indonesia’s defence diplomacy. The agreement positions industrial cooperation, technology development and increased production capacity as important tools for strengthening strategic relations between the countries.

According to Indonesia’s Ministry of Defence, the memorandum covers three main areas: research and development as well as technology transfer; industrial and manufacturing collaboration; and human-resource development. These areas are intended to combine the expertise of the participating countries, create investment opportunities and enhance defence-industry capabilities in response to advances in modern military technology.

Indonesia’s Deputy Minister of Defence for Logistics, Defence Industry and Technology, Air Marshal Yusuf Jauhari, signed the agreement on behalf of Indonesia, alongside Türkiye’s Minister of National Defence Yaşar Güler, Qatar’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Defence Affairs Sheikh Saud bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, and Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif.

Prof. Haluk Görgün, head of Türkiye’s Presidency of Defence Industries, also signed the memorandum alongside Güler, demonstrating the direct involvement of industrial authorities in the cooperation framework.

Qatar acted as host and diplomatic facilitator for the meeting of four countries with differing defence experience and interests. Qatar News Agency described the Badr Memorandum as a means of integrating manufacturing capabilities, expanding industrial capacity and meeting the needs of friendly countries through multilateral cooperation.

The agreement’s strategic significance lies in broadening Indonesia’s defence diplomacy from intergovernmental relations to the joint development of industrial capabilities. Defence diplomacy is no longer understood solely in terms of military exercises, official visits or arms purchases, but also through the creation of networks for technology, investment, production and specialist training.

This shift is relevant as defence capabilities increasingly depend on technological expertise, reliable supply chains and long-term maintenance capacity. A country with modern weaponry may still lack sufficient defence autonomy if critical components, software, systems integration and technical support remain dependent on external parties.

The Badr Memorandum provides a framework for addressing these issues through a partnership among four countries seeking to develop capabilities collectively. However, the signing of a memorandum of understanding must be distinguished from the delivery of projects: the success of industrial diplomacy will be determined by measurable results after the political agreement has been reached.

Shared interests

The four participating countries have capabilities and interests that could complement one another in developing the defence industry. Türkiye has experience in developing various military systems; Pakistan has a defence-industrial base and aerospace production experience; Qatar has financial resources and diplomatic networks; while Indonesia has an interest in strengthening national manufacturing capacity and expanding its technological expertise.

This combination could create a production network linking engineering, financing, manufacturing and market demand. Nevertheless, allocating roles according to each country’s strengths remains a strategic analysis, not a formal division of responsibilities announced under the Badr Memorandum.

Türkiye holds an important position because its defence industry has developed across several sectors, including military vehicles, unmanned technology, electronic systems and aerospace. Its experience in cooperating with Pakistan on the production of MILGEM-class warships, which includes construction in Türkiye and Karachi, shows that industrial defence ties between the two countries were established before the Badr Memorandum was signed.

For Pakistan, that experience provides an example of how international partnerships can develop towards greater involvement by domestic industry. Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif said the Badr Memorandum was expected to strengthen joint research and development, training exchanges, industrial capacity, co-production and technology transfer, while complying with national and international law.

Qatar brings different interests, including financial resources, a strategic position in the Gulf and security relations with various international partners. Its involvement could expand financing opportunities and connect procurement needs with industrial-development prospects, although the scale of investment and the division of funding for Badr projects have not been detailed.

For Indonesia, the potential benefits relate to strengthening national industry, improving technical capabilities and expanding access to international defence supply chains. The partnership could create opportunities for Indonesian defence companies to take part in research, component development, manufacturing, maintenance and higher-value engineering activities.

The comparative advantages of each country will not necessarily produce a balanced partnership automatically. Differences in capital, technological expertise, production capacity and bargaining power could affect how benefits are shared, so project agreements must take account of each participant’s national industrial interests.

From the perspective of international political economy, industrial defence cooperation can strengthen countries’ positions when they are able to pool resources and reduce barriers to technological development. The Badr Memorandum could serve as an instrument for achieving that goal, but its success will depend on the design of the cooperation, the division of responsibilities and the ability to turn diplomatic interests into sustainable industrial programmes.

Industrial sovereignty

Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Vahd Nabyl A. Mulachela said Indonesia wanted to increase national production capabilities through partnerships with countries possessing relevant qualifications and compatible capabilities. He also said combining the expertise of the four countries was expected to drive defence-technology innovation and strengthen Indonesia’s position in global supply chains.

The statement shows that the government regards the enhancement of domestic capabilities as one of the Badr Memorandum’s main objectives. This approach matters because defence self-reliance cannot be measured solely by the number of major weapons systems a country owns; it also depends on its ability to maintain, repair, develop and produce the systems it needs.

Research and development, together with technology transfer, is the first area that could determine the depth of the cooperation. Technical knowledge, engineering capabilities and the involvement of Indonesian specialists in product development will be more strategically valuable if they create expertise that can be retained after a project ends.

The second area, industrial and manufacturing collaboration, offers opportunities to link investment with increased production capacity. Co-production can generate economic benefits by developing local suppliers, improving workforce skills and strengthening links between the defence industry and the wider national manufacturing ecosystem.

The third area concerns human-resource development, which is fundamental to the industry’s sustainability. Without suitably skilled engineers, technicians, researchers and production workers, technology transfer risks stopping at assembly or the use of products that remain dependent on foreign support.

Technological self-reliance also requires attention to aspects that are not always visible in arms procurement. Control over design, software, intellectual property, critical components, communications systems and access to spare parts can determine how far a country is able to operate and maintain its weaponry independently.

The government should therefore establish clear indicators for assessing the benefits of cooperation, including local-content levels, the number of specialists trained, production capabilities established and the degree of technological expertise acquired. Assessments should also account for the full life-cycle costs of military equipment, since the initial purchase price does not reflect the entire burden of maintenance and operational dependence.

Independent and active foreign policy

The Badr Memorandum can be viewed as one instrument for translating Indonesia’s independent and active foreign policy into defence-industrial policy. The principle gives Indonesia room to cooperate with a range of countries without tying its entire strategic orientation to a single major power.

Diversifying partners matters because the international defence industry is shaped by technological competition, export restrictions, suppliers’ political interests and changing security conditions. By expanding ties with Türkiye, Pakistan and Qatar, Indonesia could gain more options for capability development and strengthen its bargaining position in defence negotiations.

However, diversifying partners does not automatically eliminate strategic dependence. If Indonesia replaces one source of supply with another without gaining technical expertise, maintenance access and greater control over technology, the pattern of dependence may simply shift without fundamentally changing.

Independent and active policy must therefore be translated into the ability to select, negotiate and manage partnerships in accordance with national interests. Indonesia needs to maintain existing defence relations while creating scope for new cooperation, taking into account systems compatibility, costs, technical standards and long-term operational requirements.

In geopolitical terms, Indonesia’s cooperation with the three countries also connects South-east Asia, South Asia and the Middle East within a single defence-industrial framework. This cross-regional link could expand Indonesia’s diplomatic network while giving participating countries room to develop their capabilities without having to build every technology independently from the outset.

Türkiye brings experience in developing the defence industry, Pakistan has military manufacturing experience, and Qatar offers strategic networks in the Gulf. Indonesia can use this combination to expand industrial cooperation, provided project arrangements deliver measurable benefits for national capabilities and do not create new forms of dependence that are difficult to manage.

The Badr Memorandum should also be understood proportionately in relation to regional security. Official announcements emphasise production cooperation, research and development, technical training and industrial development, and therefore do not provide sufficient grounds to conclude that the four countries have formed a collective defence alliance with an automatic obligation to defend one another.

This distinction matters to ensure that analysis of defence diplomacy does not conflate industrial cooperation with a mutual-defence pact. The Badr Memorandum strengthens the strategic dimension of relations, but any broader security implications will depend on the projects, coordination mechanisms and political decisions that may follow the signing.

For Indonesia, its diplomatic value lies in the ability to build flexible partnerships without losing focus on national interests. This approach is consistent with the need to preserve room for manoeuvre in foreign policy while strengthening defence capabilities through more diverse and mutually beneficial relations.

The implementation test

Indonesia’s Ministry of Defence said the participants had agreed to hold regular defence-industry meetings as a step towards implementing the Badr Memorandum. The Indonesian government also said that, after the first three months of implementation, opportunities to explore cooperation with other friendly countries could be opened under an agreed mechanism.

This information suggests that the Badr Memorandum is designed as a framework that can develop through projects and further coordination. Qatar News Agency also reported that other countries could join in future if they met criteria approved by the four participants.

Nevertheless, plans for implementation, approved projects and operational capabilities must be distinguished from one another. Based on publicly available information as of 24 October 2026, there are no complete details on total investment, the specific military equipment to be co-produced, local-content levels or agreed production targets.

The next stage should clarify project priorities in line with each country’s defence needs and available industrial capabilities. Viable projects should have a clear division of responsibilities, timelines, financing models, technology-transfer arrangements and success measures that can be assessed transparently.

For Indonesia, evaluation should begin by linking the cooperation to the Indonesian National Armed Forces’ actual requirements and the national defence-industry roadmap. Selected projects need to deliver operational benefits while advancing domestic industrial capabilities, so that defence spending supports military readiness, technological learning and the growth of manufacturing capacity.

Oversight should also ensure that technology transfer does not stop at training or the assembly of imported components. Control over design, the ability to modify systems, the availability of spare parts and independent maintenance capacity are stronger measures of whether cooperation is expanding defence autonomy.

Financing is equally important, as co-production requires investment in facilities, workforce development, certification, testing and support throughout a product’s life cycle. Without realistic economic calculations, projects could create a fiscal burden or leave facilities unsustainable because of insufficient demand.

Cooperation among the four countries will also require mechanisms for resolving conflicting interests and protecting sensitive information. Differences in technical standards, export regulations, procurement priorities and technology-security requirements need to be managed from the outset to prevent them from obstructing agreed projects.

Strategically, the Badr Memorandum could broaden Indonesia’s defence-diplomacy options while strengthening ties with countries that have different industrial capabilities. That potential will have substantive value only if it is translated into measurable capabilities that can be sustained over the long term.

The Badr Memorandum is therefore both an opportunity and a test for Indonesia’s defence diplomacy. Its success will depend on the government’s ability to turn international partnerships into technological self-reliance, national production capacity and stronger strategic leverage, without reducing the flexibility of Indonesia’s independent and active foreign policy.

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Cite this article
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/the-badr-memorandum-a-new-chapter-in-indonesias-defence-diplomacy-1792828293)
Originally published by CNBC Indonesia (https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/opini/20261024141841-14-779149/memorandum-badr-sebagai-babak-baru-diplomasi-pertahanan-indonesia), translated from Indonesian
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