The ASEAN forum is the best option for Japan
Bantarto Bandoro, Jakarta
If one were asked to identify the position of Japan in the current strategic setting of the Asia-Pacific region, the answer is that Japan is definitely a part of every aspect. Even in the ASEAN context, one clearly sees the strategic presence of Japan.
Japan is a full member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and occupies a strategic place in the ASEAN + 3 framework. At the ASEAN-Japan commemorative Summit held last year in Tokyo, Japan declared its intention to be part of the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC).
Japan's participation in TAC will be made official at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held here. The emergence of more acute international problems such as terrorism and its security and economic impacts, and the need to tackle it through collaborative means, might have been the key reasons for Japan's willingness to join the TAC.
The meeting will also see the accession of Russia and Pakistan into TAC. All this signifies the importance of the Southeast Asia region for Japan's long-term security. Security developments in the region are too important for Japan to ignore.
The Jakarta 11th ARF Meeting is particularly important for Japan, not only because it is strategically part of ASEAN TAC, but it is also because the meeting is being held at a time when countries in the region are gearing up to work out reliable and long-term strategies to combat security threats such as terrorism, human trafficking, arms trafficking etc.
Japan will certainly not sit idly by when these threats loom large in this region. Japan's primary security concern is the maintenance of stability through an extensive strategic collaboration with other powers in the region.
The meeting will also be used by Japan to demonstrate to the region its unwavering commitment to supporting the security of the region. The series of terrorist attacks in Indonesia and the Phillipines and foiled ones in other countries of the region, have forced Japan to look to such a multilateral forum in addressing that issue. It means that, despite the limitations faced by Japan in its pursuit of an active political and security role in eastern Asia, Japan remains vigorous in the promotion of a multilateral framework for coping with new and pressing regional security issues.
But the US showed its reluctance to accept any multilateralism in the region, arguing that it would undermine the existing bilateral security alliance.
Japan's contribution to the security of the region included the hosting of a series of meeting under the aegis of ARF. Japan's position has long been that of supporting the goals of ARF. The ARF serves Japan in the following ways.
First, to supplement the existing US-Japan bilateral security alliance. It is a primarily a forum for confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in eastern Asia. In the absence of an ARF- type framework in eastern Asia, Japan has to rely on the mechanism of the ARF to promote and develop an atmosphere of trust with other major players in the region.
Second, ARF serves as an important venue to discuss security issues not only in the Southeast Asia region, but also in Northeast Asia. On a number of occasions, Japan has brought up a number of high-profile security issues directly affecting it, such as nuclear threats from North Korea, in the ARF.
Third is Japan's concern over the future security role of China. Japan sees ARF as mechanism for engaging China. China's strategic presence in the region is indispensable. It is assumed that most Japanese are still concerned about the trajectory of China's military power in the future. Japan's decision to accede to TAC may have been dictated by the fact that China was already part of TAC and was an attempt by Japan to balance China's presence in the region. So, through the ARF process, it is important that Japan keeps China in check with the current dialog process on strategic matters.
Japan's continued attendance at the ARF meetings signify the strategic importance of the forum for Japan's long-term strategic objectives. Despite certain obstacles faced by the ARF, the forum's activities have become an important aspect in the conduct of Japan's regional relations. So it is in the interest of Japan that the ARF moves from first gear -- the confidence-building measures -- to stage two and three of its founding protocols of concrete preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution.
This year's meeting will continue to be shadowed by the urgent need for ARF to adopt a much firmer stand on high-profile security issues. Japan, being a part of TAC and as one of the major powers in the region, is in a position to exert influence in the ARF, so that fresh initiatives can be taken by the forum.
ARF is the best option for Japan, but it must be aware of how ARF is actually able to develop a policy on strategic matters, depending on a number of factors, including how the other members see their interests being served or jeopardized by such policy measures.
ASEAN must fully realize, however, that the ARF effectiveness in the long-run will be greatly dependent on the dynamics of the triangular strategic relationship among Japan, the United States and China. Turbulence in such a triangular relationship would definitely have an impact on ASEAN as well as on ARF.
The writer can be contacted at (bandoro@csis.or.id). He is an analyst at the Indonesian Quarterly of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and also a lecturer at the Post-Graduate International Relations Program in the Social and Political Science department at the University of Indonesia in Jakarta.