The ASEAN forum is the best option for Japan

The ASEAN forum is the best option for Japan

Bantarto Bandoro, Jakarta

If one were asked to identify the position of Japan in the
current strategic setting of the Asia-Pacific region, the answer
is that Japan is definitely a part of every aspect. Even in the
ASEAN context, one clearly sees the strategic presence of Japan.

Japan is a full member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and
occupies a strategic place in the ASEAN + 3 framework. At the
ASEAN-Japan commemorative Summit held last year in Tokyo, Japan
declared its intention to be part of the ASEAN Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation (TAC).

Japan's participation in TAC will be made official at the
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held here. The emergence of more acute
international problems such as terrorism and its security and
economic impacts, and the need to tackle it through collaborative
means, might have been the key reasons for Japan's willingness to
join the TAC.

The meeting will also see the accession of Russia and Pakistan
into TAC. All this signifies the importance of the Southeast Asia
region for Japan's long-term security. Security developments in
the region are too important for Japan to ignore.

The Jakarta 11th ARF Meeting is particularly important for
Japan, not only because it is strategically part of ASEAN TAC,
but it is also because the meeting is being held at a time when
countries in the region are gearing up to work out reliable and
long-term strategies to combat security threats such as
terrorism, human trafficking, arms trafficking etc.

Japan will certainly not sit idly by when these threats loom
large in this region. Japan's primary security concern is the
maintenance of stability through an extensive strategic
collaboration with other powers in the region.

The meeting will also be used by Japan to demonstrate to the
region its unwavering commitment to supporting the security of
the region. The series of terrorist attacks in Indonesia and the
Phillipines and foiled ones in other countries of the region,
have forced Japan to look to such a multilateral forum in
addressing that issue. It means that, despite the limitations
faced by Japan in its pursuit of an active political and security
role in eastern Asia, Japan remains vigorous in the promotion of
a multilateral framework for coping with new and pressing
regional security issues.

But the US showed its reluctance to accept any multilateralism
in the region, arguing that it would undermine the existing
bilateral security alliance.

Japan's contribution to the security of the region included
the hosting of a series of meeting under the aegis of ARF.
Japan's position has long been that of supporting the goals of
ARF.
The ARF serves Japan in the following ways.

First, to supplement the existing US-Japan bilateral security
alliance. It is a primarily a forum for confidence-building and
preventive diplomacy in eastern Asia. In the absence of an ARF-
type framework in eastern Asia, Japan has to rely on the
mechanism of the ARF to promote and develop an atmosphere of
trust with other major players in the region.

Second, ARF serves as an important venue to discuss security
issues not only in the Southeast Asia region, but also in
Northeast Asia. On a number of occasions, Japan has brought up a
number of high-profile security issues directly affecting it,
such as nuclear threats from North Korea, in the ARF.

Third is Japan's concern over the future security role of
China. Japan sees ARF as mechanism for engaging China. China's
strategic presence in the region is indispensable. It is assumed
that most Japanese are still concerned about the trajectory of
China's military power in the future. Japan's decision to accede
to TAC may have been dictated by the fact that China was already
part of TAC and was an attempt by Japan to balance China's
presence in the region. So, through the ARF process, it is
important that Japan keeps China in check with the current dialog
process on strategic matters.

Japan's continued attendance at the ARF meetings signify the
strategic importance of the forum for Japan's long-term strategic
objectives. Despite certain obstacles faced by the ARF, the
forum's activities have become an important aspect in the conduct
of Japan's regional relations. So it is in the interest of Japan
that the ARF moves from first gear -- the confidence-building
measures -- to stage two and three of its founding protocols of
concrete preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution.

This year's meeting will continue to be shadowed by the urgent
need for ARF to adopt a much firmer stand on high-profile
security issues. Japan, being a part of TAC and as one of the
major powers in the region, is in a position to exert influence
in the ARF, so that fresh initiatives can be taken by the forum.

ARF is the best option for Japan, but it must be aware of how
ARF is actually able to develop a policy on strategic matters,
depending on a number of factors, including how the other members
see their interests being served or jeopardized by such policy
measures.

ASEAN must fully realize, however, that the ARF effectiveness
in the long-run will be greatly dependent on the dynamics of the
triangular strategic relationship among Japan, the United States
and China. Turbulence in such a triangular relationship would
definitely have an impact on ASEAN as well as on ARF.

The writer can be contacted at (bandoro@csis.or.id). He is an
analyst at the Indonesian Quarterly of the Centre for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS), and also a lecturer at the
Post-Graduate International Relations Program in the Social and
Political Science department at the University of Indonesia in
Jakarta.