The Anticlimactic Fallout of the Febrie Adriansyah Case
The discovery of evidence implicating former Junior Attorney General for Special Crimes (Jampidsus) Febrie Adriansyah by the Police’s Corruption Eradication Corps (Kortas Tipidkor) was initially hailed by the public as an extraordinary achievement. Apprehending a high-ranking figure within the Indonesian Attorney General’s Office, a key player in handling mega-corruption cases, was no easy feat.
Kortas Tipidkor was thorough, scouring 12 locations to gather evidence. On Wednesday evening (8/7), assets worth Rp60 billion were seized at the de’ Clan Signature café and Rp7.2 billion from a KOIN money changer. The following day, Kortas Tipidkor discovered Rp476 billion in a safe at Febrie’s private residence in Sentul City, Bogor.
Beyond the money, police found other physical evidence. Febrie is suspected of involvement in multiple cases, including alleged abuse of authority in handling the PT Asabri case, a suspected bribery case linked to Ronald Tannur involving Zarof Ricar, alleged criminal activity in East Kalimantan coal trading, and money laundering.
Regrettably, the police handed the case over to the Attorney General’s Office, a move many experts have deemed legally flawed. Several reasons underpin this transfer. Firstly, the corruption case allegedly involves many parties. The Attorney General’s Office had issued an order to investigate the police-managed SPPG to find evidence of corruption, an action perceived as a threat or retaliation, despite being legally valid. Secondly, the presence of Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) members guarding Febrie’s house was considered suspicious, especially after several TNI members were observed visiting the National Police Headquarters on Thursday morning.
Thirdly, the House of Representatives (DPR) has pledged to seriously monitor Febrie’s corruption case. Fourthly, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) also stated it would oversee the case transfer process, though no follow-up has been seen. Despite being repeatedly outmanoeuvred by the Attorney General’s Office in the fight against corruption, the KPK, even with public support, has not felt compelled to investigate Febrie’s corruption. The KPK’s silence increasingly suggests that the Febrie case is a white-collar crime.
The transfer of Febrie’s case to the Attorney General’s Office inevitably creates a conflict of interest. Unsurprisingly, this transfer has become an anticlimax. The police sacrificed their only strategic leverage to boost their public approval rating.
However, the Febrie case is not just a matter between the police and the Attorney General’s Office. The repercussions are widespread. Firstly, this legally flawed transfer further highlights the legal uncertainty in Indonesia, which will certainly erode public trust, as well as the confidence of other nations and investors. The logical consequence is that Indonesia will find it increasingly difficult to recover from its economic slump. No investor wants to place their money in a disputed territory.
Secondly, the anticlimax of the Febrie case further exposes the festering wounds and decay of Indonesia’s democratic quality. Horizontal accountability is shrinking. It is not only a crisis of horizontal accountability; vertical accountability is also lukewarm. The Febrie case only generates heat on social media. There are no street protests demanding transparency in the investigation, even though social media uproar is ineffective without real-world demonstrations.
This lack of public control shows how citizens do not feel that massive corruption is connected to their lives. Yet, the Febrie case directly impacts energy, a fundamental need for all Indonesians. Coal supply issues not only cause power outages but also halt factory operations, small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and all activities requiring electricity.
A more structural and institutional consequence is our failure and error in understanding democracy. The root of democracy is the Trias Politica. Democracy limits and balances power by distributing it among three high state institutions: the executive, judiciary, and legislature. The goal is not only mutual control but also competition to advance the interests of the state and society.
Studies by Vincent Ostrom and Elinor Ostrom across various countries, including Bali, have proven that polycentric governance, which necessitates competition between and within government agencies, private institutions, and citizens, actually improves work quality, resolves conflicts, and yields maximum results. The logic of competition not only makes markets healthy and progressive but also the state order. Only competition can bring innovation and greater benefits to citizens. In the Febrie case, the police, Attorney General’s Office, and KPK, under the DPR’s oversight, should have been competing to thoroughly investigate and punish the perpetrators.
The poor handling of the Febrie case not only results in the loss of state funds and adds to the list of poor performances by high state institutions but also tests the government’s commitment to eradicating corruption. The quality of Indonesia’s democracy will certainly decline further. A weak democracy index is a barrier to attracting foreign investment. The losses behind the Febrie case are far greater than the severe punishment for all those complicit in this elite crime.