The 35th PBNU Congress, Middle East Diplomacy and NU's Political Autonomy
The 35th Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) Congress, held at the Bahrul Ulum Tambakberas Islamic Boarding School in Jombang, East Java, from 27 to 31 August 2026, should be read as an important moment for understanding anew the relationship between religious authority, civil society organisations, the state, and geopolitical changes in the Middle East.
The forum, which NU calls the organisation’s highest deliberative assembly, will not only determine the PBNU leadership for the 2026-2031 term of service, but also potentially determine how NU positions itself amid the demands of community service, national interests, and increasingly complex international networks.
The congress theme, ‘Maintaining Dignity, Enriching Service for the Benefit of the Nation’, has broader relevance when placed within the changing strategic environment of Indonesia and a Middle East experiencing great uncertainty.
At the time the congress takes place, the conflict between the United States and Israel with Iran has entered a protracted phase, tensions in the Strait of Hormuz are disrupting global energy flows, while violence in Gaza continues despite a ceasefire framework that has not been able to halt all violence.
In such a situation, NU occupies an interesting position because it is not a state, not a political party, and not a formal diplomatic institution, yet it possesses networks of ulama, Islamic boarding schools, cadres, intellectuals, students, the diaspora, and Special Branch Managements of Nahdlatul Ulama in various regions of the world.
This character allows NU to be understood as a transnational civil society actor with the capacity to conduct religious diplomacy, build cross-group communication, and voice peace without having to be entirely within the structure of state foreign policy.
Therefore, the strategic question of the 35th congress is not merely about who receives the mandate as Rais Aam and General Chairman of PBNU, but about NU’s institutional direction in facing the relationship between domestic power and international geopolitics.
This question becomes increasingly important because changes in election mechanisms, the configuration of pesantren elites, relations with the government, and the orientation of international networks can affect NU’s capacity to maintain its moral autonomy over the next five years.
The Congress and the Contest for Nahdlatul Ulama’s Direction
The 35th congress shows that NU leadership has a structural dimension far more complex than electoral competition between figures because the organisation has close relationships between the Syuriyah, Tanfidziyah, PWNU, PCNU, pesantren, autonomous bodies, and international networks.
The final voter list being finalised ahead of the congress includes hundreds of managements from branch, regional, and overseas PCINU levels, while the number of official participants is estimated to reach more than 3,000 people with thousands of supporters present in Jombang. This configuration makes the congress an arena for the meeting between the organisation’s formal authority and the cultural authority that grows from pesantren and kiai networks.
Structural strength is not always identical to cultural strength because a candidate may have strong administrative support but still require legitimacy from the pesantren environment, while a figure with high cultural capital must be able to translate that influence into the applicable organisational mechanisms.
The contest for general chairman shows this plurality of orientations with the emergence of names such as Gus Yahya, Gus Kikin, Gus Rozin, Gus Yusuf, Gus Salam, KH Zulfa Mustofa and several other figures entering the leadership race.
Gus Yahya is running again with the argument of continuing the agenda he has initiated, Gus Kikin has received a mandate from PWNU and PCNU across East Java, Gus Yusuf has obtained support from 23 PCNU in Central Java, while Gus Rozin and Gus Salam offer different emphases regarding organisational reform, regeneration, pesantren, and internal reconciliation.
These differences should not be translated as a battle between entirely good and entirely bad groups because each candidate has a different basis of legitimacy, experience, and ideas.
From an organisational politics perspective, the contest is more accurately understood as a competition over leadership models, the distribution of authority, programme priorities, and how NU balances the relationship between pesantren, organisational structures, society, and the state.
The AHWA issue shows more clearly that the question of NU leadership concerns the distribution of authority within the organisation. The discourse on changing the mechanism for electing the general chairman from direct election to a mechanism related to AHWA is still being discussed ahead of the congress, and Rais Aam KH Miftachul Akhyar has stated that the final decision is returned to congress participants through organisational mechanisms.
If the mechanism changes, the consequences are not merely procedural because a change in the election method can shift the balance point between structural representation and ulama authority. The debate over who elects the leader is thus a debate over who has the strongest legitimacy to determine the organisation’s direction in the next period.
Amid these dynamics, Yenny Wahid’s message about the importance of returning to the Qanun Asasi and Khittah NU is relevant as a call to maintain organisational cohesion after the contest concludes. She also reminded that the congress should not produce new factions and that the elected leadership must be able to embrace all groups involved in the competition.
NU’s Networks in the Middle East
NU’s relationship with the Middle East has a long history that extends beyond the current leadership period.